The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLIAM J. MARTINI, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and to
impose sanctions on plaintiff. There was no oral argument.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 78. After full consideration, defendants' motion is
GRANTED, plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety,
and defendants' request for sanctions is DENIED. BACKGROUND
This is a civil rights action arising out of the arrest of
Bryant Young, pro se plaintiff, by members of the Hackensack
and New York State police departments. On May 3, 2002, Detective
Sergeant Stephen Moger of the Hackensack Police Department
learned from his Captain that officers from New York had
requested the department's assistance in making an arrest later
that evening. At approximately 9:30 p.m., New York State police
officers Sergeant Michael Enright, Detective Terry Leto, and
Detective Joseph Calabrese appeared in the Hackensack Police
Department to effectuate the arrest. Sergeant Enright informed
officer Moger that plaintiff was charged with Aggravated
Harassment in the Second Degree and that this was a felony
offense because the alleged victim was a police officer. Sergeant
Enright presented officer Moger with a New York warrant issued by
Magistrate Judge James D. Gibbons that ordered plaintiff's
arrest. He also provided officer Moger with a mugshot pedigree of
plaintiff along with his Hacksensack address.
Hackensack police officers then accompanied the New York
officers to plaintiff's residence and arrested plaintiff.
Subsequently, plaintiff was detained in the Bergen County Justice
Center, Hackensack, New Jersey, on the charge of being a fugitive
from justice until he posted bail on May 9, 2002. On April 29,
2004 plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants
predicated on alleged violations of his civil rights pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims allege violations of his First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In
essence, plaintiff alleges that Hackensack police officers
arrested him without a valid New York arrest warrant, and that he
could not be lawfully arrested without the issuance of a New
Jersey arrest warrant. All of plaintiff's claims arise out of the arrest on May 3, 2002. Because plaintiff introduces no evidence
to support his claims that his arrest and detainment violated his
constitutional rights, the Court grants defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment eliminates unfounded claims without resorting
to a costly and lengthy trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). However, a court should grant summary
judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden of showing
that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests initially on
the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A litigant may
discharge this burden by exposing "the absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. In evaluating
a summary judgment motion, a court must view all evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.
Once the moving party has made a properly supported motion for
summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
"set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The substantive law
determines which facts are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. No issue
for trial exists unless the nonmoving party can demonstrate
sufficient evidence favoring it such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in that party's favor. Id. at 249.
II. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims Alleging Violations Of His
Constitutional Rights Are Unsubstantiated
For a § 1983 claim to survive summary judgment, there must be
some evidence that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed
by a person acting under color of law; and (2) this conduct
deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the U.S. Constitution or laws of the United States. See Shaw by
Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1142 (3d Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are predicated on alleged violations
of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See Compl. ¶¶ 29, 33). There is, however, no
evidence to support plaintiff's § 1983 claims that his federal
constitutional rights were violated.
A. The First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments Are Not Implicated
by Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that his § 1983 claims are based in part on
violations of his First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights.
(See Compl. ¶¶ 29, 33). The First Amendment serves to protect
the free exercise of religion and the freedom of speech and
assembly. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. However, plaintiff produces
no evidence that his First Amendment rights were infringed upon,
and his deposition acknowledges the groundlessness of this claim.
(See Pl.'s Dep. at 131:11-13). The Sixth Amendment involves the right to a speedy trial and to
counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "[T]he Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest or
indictment, whichever comes first, and continues until the trial
commences." United States v. Sprouts, 282 F.3d 1037, 1042 (8th
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Generally speaking, a defendant's
trial must occur within seventy days of his indictment or first
appearance, whichever occurs later. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
Because plaintiff's ...