The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOSE LINARES, District Judge
This matter comes before this Court on a motion by Defendants
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("FRB"), Ron Henry, Cynthia
Ramos, Leroy Hope, Dottie Boyd, Kim Russo, Lisa Young, and Mertha
Jakubiszen (hereinafter collectively "Defendants"), for
reconsideration of this Court's March 31, 2004 Opinion and Order
pursuant to L. Civ. R. 7.1(g), or certification of an
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This Court
considered submissions in support and opposition of the motion.
This matter is resolved without oral argument. Fed.R.Civ.P.
78. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for
reconsideration is DENIED. Alternatively, Defendants' motion for
certification of interlocutory appeal is GRANTED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A detailed factual background of this case is set forth in an
earlier Opinion and Order of this Court entered March 31, 2004
("Op. & Order"), and will not be repeated here, except where
necessary to provide context for the pending motion for
reconsideration and request for certification of an interlocutory
appeal. On December 18, 2001, Plaintiff Maureen Fasano
(hereinafter "Fasano" or "Plaintiff") initiated suit against
Defendants in New Jersey Superior Court, for retaliation and
failure to accommodate in violation of the New Jersey
Conscientious Employment Act ("CEPA"), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et.
seq., and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"),
N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et. seq.. After removal to this Court,
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In the March 31 Opinion and Order, this Court denied Defendants'
motions, holding that the FRB is a private corporation subject to
state employment claims. (Op. & Order at 6-12). Furthermore,
applying the preemption test for private employers, this Court
determined that Defendants had not met their burden of
demonstrating field preemption. (Id. at 12-14). In addition,
analyzing the relevant state and federal laws,*fn1 this
Court determined that they did not conflict sufficiently to
warrant preemption. (Id. at 14-23).
I. Motion for Reconsideration
Prior to reaching the merits of a motion for reconsideration,
the Court "must decide whether the arguments are properly raised
under Local [Civil] Rule 7.1(g)". Holten v. Chevron U.S.A.,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17600, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2001). This
rule provides in relevant part:
A motion for reargument shall be served and filed
within 10 days after the entry of the order or
judgment on the original motion by the Judge or
Magistrate Judge. There shall be served with the
notice a brief setting forth concisely the matters or
controlling decisions which counsel believed the
Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked.
L.Civ.R. 7.1(g). The motion may not be used to re-litigate old
matters, or argue new matters that could have been raised before
the original decision was reached. P. Schoenfeld Assets Mgmt.,
L.L.C. v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349
, 352 (D.N.J. 2001);
NL Indust., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996). Rather, "the motion may address only those matters of fact or issues of law which were
presented to, but not considered by, the court in the course of
making the decision at issue." Holten, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17600, *6 (citing Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J.
v. Monsanto Co., 727 F. Supp. 876, 878 (D.N.J.), aff'd,
891 F.2d 283
(3d Cir. 1989).
Relief by way of motion for reargument is "an extraordinary
remedy" that is to be granted "very sparingly." Yurecko v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 606, 608 (D.N.J.
2003); Sagaral v. Mountainside Hosp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6872, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar 28, 2001); NL Indus., Inc.,
935 F. Supp. at 516. The purpose of a motion for reargument is "to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence." Harasco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906,
909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986);
Tischio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 532 (D.N.J. 1998).
Only in circumstances "where matters were overlooked and which,
if considered by the Court, might reasonably have resulted in a
different conclusion, will the Court entertain such a motion."
Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610,
613 (D.N.J. 2001). On the other hand, mere disagreement with the
Court's decision is inappropriate on a motion for reargument, and
should instead be raised through the normal appellate process.
Holten, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17600, at *6. Accordingly,
reconsideration motions "will be granted only where (1) an
intervening change in the law has occurred, (2) new evidence not
previously available has [e]merged, or (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or prevent a manifest injustice arises." Id.
at * 7 (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co.,
52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). With this legal framework in
mind, the Court will now consider Defendant's motion for
reconsideration. B. Entitlement to Reconsideration
Before evaluating the merits of the motion for reconsideration,
the Court must first determine whether Defendants' arguments are
properly raised under Local Rule 7.1 (g). In order for an
argument to be considered properly raised, Defendants must
concisely set forth dispositive facts or controlling decisions of
law which they claim this Court has overlooked. This Court finds
that all arguments now raised by Defendants were previously
raised and already considered by this Court in deciding
Defendants' original motion to dismiss. Furthermore, Defendants
have failed to demonstrate that there has either been an
intervening change in law or a controlling decision that this
Court overlooked. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to
reconsideration of the decision.
Initially, Defendants move for reconsideration on the grounds
that this Court committed error in overlooking the significance
of cases that distinguish the concepts of federal agency and
federal instrumentality. In fact, this Court has already
considered, and rejected, Defendants' argument that the FRB is an
instrumentality. (Op. & Order at 6-12). In the original analysis
of Defendant's motion to dismiss, this Court cited an abundance
of authority to support the holding that the FRB is a private
corporation rather than an instrumentality. (Id.). Furthermore,
this Court discussed and distinguished cases that found the FRB
to be an instrumentality. (Id. at 10-12) (distinguishing
Goodyear v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988); Fed. Reserve Bank of
St. Louis v. Metrocentre Improvement Dist., 657 F.2d 183 (8th
Cir. 1981); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976)); and Fed.
Reserve Bank of Boston v. Comm'r of Corps. & Taxation,
499 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1974)).
In their brief in support of the motion for reconsideration,
Defendants rely heavily on McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), arguing that this
Court overlooked the Supremacy Clause in the March 31, Opinion.
Specifically, Defendants contend that the holding of McCulloch
is not limited solely to taxation. Rather, Defendants argue that
the McCulloch holding was designed to keep federal government
activity free from any type of state interference, absent clear
Congressional authorization. However, this argument was never
raised in Defendants' original memorandum in support of their
motion to dismiss. In their initial memorandum, Defendants assert
that "[t]he McColloch holding is unambiguous: `the law passed
by the legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of
the United States, is unconstitutional and void.'" (Defs.' Mem.
in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 9) (citing McCulloch,
17 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added)). This Court has already distinguished the
instant case from cases involving the issue of state taxation of
Federal Reserve Banks. (Op. & Order at 10). Moreover, at no point
in their original memorandum did Defendants' argue that the
preemption analysis of McCulloch extended beyond taxation
claims to cover "any attempt by states to `retard, impede, burden
or in any matter control' the operations of the United States and
its instrumentalities, including the nation's central banks."
(Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Recons. & Req. for
Interlocutory Appeal at 8) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 436).
Since this argument was not raised before the original decision
was reached, it cannot be entertained by this Court in the
context of this motion for reconsideration. See P. Schoenfeld
Assets Mgmt., 161 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
Defendants also contend that classifying the FRB as a private,
non-governmental employer, led to the application of the
incorrect preemption standard. This argument is entirely based on
the contention that the FRB is an instrumentality rather than a
private employer. As previously mentioned, this Court thoroughly analyzed an abundance
of case law before holding the FRB to be a private,
non-governmental employer. Defendant's mere disagreement with
this Court's characterization of the FRB as a private employer is
not appropriate on a motion for reconsideration. See Holten,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17600, at *6. Defendants do not assert that
the preemption analysis applied by this Court was inappropriate
for private ...