The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOSEPH GREENAWAY, District Judge
[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] OPINION
Defendant Elizabeth Board of Education ("Defendant") seeks a
grant of a motion for summary judgment.*fn1 For the reasons
explained below, this Court grants Defendant's motion.
Plaintiff, Lyman S. Hopkins ("Plaintiff"), a black man, is a
former employee of Defendant Elizabeth Board of Education.
(Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 8.) While employed
by Defendant, Plaintiff resided in Lodi, New Jersey. (Def.'s Mot.
for Summ. J., Deposition of Lyman S. Hopkins, Ex. B., at 31,
l.10.) Plaintiff was a middle school Spanish teacher at Hamilton
Middle School. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A.) Plaintiff's one
year contract with Defendant began in September 2000 and expired
in June 2001. (Id.) Plaintiff's employment officially ended in
June 2001 when Defendant failed to renew his contract. (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 9.) In October
2001, Plaintiff relocated to Claymont, Delaware. (Def.'s Mot. for
Summ. J., Deposition of Lyman S. Hopkins, Ex. B., at 31, l.12.)
Plaintiff was unemployed during the 2001-2002 academic year.
(Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Deposition of Lyman S. Hopkins, Ex.
B., at 30, l.6.) He began collecting unemployment in December of
2001. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Deposition of Lyman S. Hopkins,
Ex. B., at 31, ll. 2-5.) In June of 2002, while he resided in
Delaware, Plaintiff began the process required to obtain his
teacher's certification in the State of Connecticut (Def.'s Mot.
for Summ. J., Ex. A.) The application process required Plaintiff
to obtain a completed "Statement of Successful Professional
Experience" from his former employers. Plaintiff mailed the
appropriate form to his former employers, including Defendant, in
early July 2002. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A.)
On August 16, 2002, the Connecticut Department of Education
reminded Plaintiff of the impending deadline and the fact that
they still had not received the necessary forms from the
following former employers: Defendant, Newark School District,
and Willingboro School District in New Jersey and Wilmington
School District and Newark School District in Delaware.
(Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 17.) On August 20,
2002, Plaintiff mailed an additional set of forms to his former
employers including Defendant. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A.)
On September 13, 2002, Plaintiff began to contact Defendant by
phone in order to verify the status of the requested forms. (Id.)
As of October 18, 2002, all of Plaintiff's former employers, save
Defendant, had submitted the required forms. (Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff continued to
contact Defendant and request that Defendant send the forms to
the appropriate recipient for approximately two weeks. (Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 22.) On November 4, 2002, the
Connecticut Department of Education forwarded a letter to
Plaintiff advising him that only a submission fee was outstanding
on his application. (Id.) Plaintiff received his certification in
May of 2003. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was the sole black male Spanish
teacher at Elizabeth School. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was intentionally dilatory in
processing his papers because he is a black male. (Id.) The
alleged discriminatory conduct took place following Plaintiff's
employment term and lasted from August 15, 2002 to March 27,
2003. (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff
further alleges that Defendant's conduct was responsible for his
inability to secure employment in Connecticut. (Def.'s Mot. for
Summ. J., Ex. A.)
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party
establishes that "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). See Abramson v. William Patterson Coll.
of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides in relevant
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion
for summary judgment unless it is both genuine and material.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48
(1986); Kreschollek v. Southern Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202,
204 (3d Cir. 2000). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-movant, and it is
material if, under the substantive law, it would affect the
outcome of the suit. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The
moving party "cannot simply reallege factually unsupported
allegations contained in his pleadings." Clark v. Clabaugh,
20 F.3d 1290, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994). The moving party must show that
if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible
evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the
non-moving party to carry its burden of proof. See Celotex v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 318 (1986); Blackburn v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1999). Once the moving party
has carried its burden under Rule 56, "its opponent must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts in question." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The opposing party must set forth specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of its pleadings. See Sound Ship Bldg.
Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 533 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976). At summary judgment, the
court*s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In
doing so, the court must construe the facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Wahl v.
Rexnord Inc., 624 F.2d 1169, 1181 (3d Cir. 1980); Boyle v.
Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The court must
award summary judgment on all claims unless the ...