The opinion of the court was delivered by: STANLEY CHESLER, Magistrate Judge
[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Paul
Kamienski's motion for reconsideration [docket #36] of the Order
and Order and Opinion in this matter signed by the Court on May
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are
well-known to the parties and will not be repeated here except as
pertinent to the instant motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on June
26, 2002. On October 15, 2003, Petitioner filed an amended and
In an Opinion and Order dated May 10, 2005 this Court ordered
that (1) Petitioner's amendments of Grounds One Two, Three, and
Four will be treated as if they were filed at the time of the
original petition; (2) Petitioner's Ground Five for
Brady-Giglio Violation Re FBI Lab Documents and his Ground Six for Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel are both dismissed as they are time-barred pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); (3) the filing date of Petitioner's
Amendment and Supplement to his petition remains October 15,
2003; and (4) the Court will not entertain any requests for
discovery until after Respondent has answered the petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court, in reaching these
conclusions, made certain erroneous findings and overlooked
several factual matters and legal arguments. Specifically,
Petitioner appears to be challenging the Court's dismissal of
Ground Five for Brady-Giglio Violation Re FBI Lab Documents.
I. Standard of Review:
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Rule
That Rule provides, in part, that "[a] motion
for reconsideration shall be served and filed within 10 business
days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original
motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge." D.N.J.L. Civ. R.
7.1(i). The "purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906
909 (3d Cir. 1985).
Reargument is not a means by which to obtain a proverbial
second bite of the apple. See Chiniewicz v. Henderson,
202 F. Supp. 2d 332, 334 (D.N.J. 2002) (noting that a motion for reconsideration "is not an opportunity . . . to introduce legal
theories that a party failed to include in its initial motion").
Indeed, Rule 7.1(i) permits a reconsideration only when
"dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law"
were presented to the Court but were overlooked. See Resorts
Int'l v. Great Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831
(D.N.J. 1992); Khair v. Campbell Soup Co., 893 F. Supp. 316,
337 (D.N.J. 1995). Accordingly, the Court has reconsidered its
previous rulings only where convinced that germane information
was initially overlooked.
Relief pursuant to Rule 7.1(i) is "an extraordinary remedy"
that is to be granted "very sparingly." NL Indus. Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996);
Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp. 621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986).
Indeed, "mere disagreement with a court's decision normally
should be raised through the appellate process and is
inappropriate on a motion for reargument." Yurecko v. Port Auth.
Trans. Hudson Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609 (D.N.J. 2003)
(quotation and citation omitted).
Accordingly, a motion under Rule 7.1(i) may be granted only if:
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred;
(2) evidence not previously available has become available; or
(3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice. North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance
Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir 1995).
Petitioner points out several factual statements made in the
Court's opinion that he claims were mistaken. Specifically,
Petitioner contends that the Court: (1) incorrectly stated that
the FBI performed tests on hairs taken from Kamienski along with
fibers and hairs from Kamienski's boat (Pet. Br. for Recons. at 7); (2) mistakenly stated that the
Podolak notes concluded that no transfer of textile fibers
between the rug on Kamienski's boat and the blankets wrapped
around the victims was detected, when the rug was actually from
Alongi's boat (Id.); (3) understated the significance of the
Podolak notes as set forth in Presley's declaration by failing to
mention Presley's conclusion that the two blankets had been in
contact with the victims prior to the homicides and that the two
blankets had been stored in the victims' own car rather than
Kamienski's boat (Id. at 8); and (4) did not discuss or give
appropriate weight to the many other aspects of the Podolak notes
that Presley deemed significant (Id. at 8-9).
The Court now recognizes that some of Petitioner's factual
clarifications are indeed correct. The Court's opinion did indeed
incorrectly state that Petitioner's Brady claim relied on the
FBI tests performed on "hairs taken from the two victims, hairs
taken from Kamienski, and tests on blankets wrapped around the
victims, as well as two blankets from Kamienski's boat, along
with various fibers and hairs from Kamienski's boat and the
victims' car." (Opinion at 12 (emphasis added)). The Opinion also
incorrectly stated that the Podolak notes concluded that "no
transfer of textile fibers between the rug on Kamienski's boat
and the blanket wrapped around one of the victims was detected."
(Id. at 13 (emphasis added)). Upon further ...