United States District Court, D. New Jersey
June 18, 2005.
INTERFAITH COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION, et al., Plaintiff,
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., (formerly known as Allied Signal, Inc.), et al., Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: DENNIS CAVANAUGH, District Judge
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Interfaith Community
Organization's ("ICO") application for an award of litigation
costs, including attorneys' fees and expert witnesses' fees
incurred in the litigation of the fee application from June 1,
2003 through September 24, 2004 and Defendant Honeywell
International, Inc.'s ("Honeywell") motion for leave to file a
surreply. No oral argument was heard pursuant to Rule 78 of the
F.R.Civ. P. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, Plaintiff's
First Supplemental Application for an Award of Litigation costs,
Including Attorneys' fees and Expert Witnesses' Fees is
granted. Defendant's motion for leave to file a surreply is
On May 21, 2003, this Court entered an Amended Opinion granting
judgment in favor of ICO and ECARG with regard to ICO and ECARG's
42 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1)(B) claims against Honeywell. See Interfaith
Community Organization v. Honeywell Int'l Inc.,
263 F.Supp. 2d 796 (D.N.J. 2003). The Amended Opinion Awarded ICO and ECARG fees
and costs that were "incurred in furtherance of its RCRA claim
against Honeywell in this action." Id. at 850.
On July 21, 2003, ICO filed Plaintiff's Application for an
Award of Litigation Costs, Including Attorneys' Fees and Expert
Witness' Fees ("ICO Fee Application"). On August 26, 2004, the
Court entered an Opinion and Order awarding ICO fees and costs in
the amount of $4,530,327.00. On August 30, 2004, the Court
entered an Order permitting ICO to submit a petition to recover
fees and costs including attorneys' fees incurred in the
preparation of ICO's July 21, 2004, fee application. On September
29, 2004, ICO filed Plaintiff's First Supplemental Application
for an Award of Litigation costs, Including Attorneys' Fees and
Expert Witnesses' Fees ("Supplemental Application") pursuant to
the Court's Order of August 30, 2004. Honeywell filed its brief
in opposition on November 9, 2004, and ICO filed its reply brief
on December 6, 2004. Honeywell subsequently filed a motion for
leave to file a surreply on December 23, 2004.
Section 7002(e) of the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") 42 U.S.C. 6972(e) provides that the Court "may award
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorneys' and expert
witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing
party, whenever the court determines such an award is
appropriate." This Court having determined that ICO and
ECARG*fn1 are prevailing parties in this litigation, stating
in an Order dated May 16, 2003: Having prevailed on their RCRA claims, [ICO] and
ECARG are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees,
costs and expenses they have incurred in furtherance
of their RCRA claims in this action.
Honeywell does not dispute ICO is entitled to an award of fees.
(Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 1.) Honeywell's arguments involve the number
of attorney hours ICO spent litigating its initial fee
application, the methodology used in computing hourly rates,
ICO's use of senior partners in litigating the fee application,
the excessiveness of costs and ICO's application for
Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American
Radiator & Standard Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1971)
establishes the principle that the "lodestar" is calculated by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a
reasonable hourly rate. The lodestar method is presumed to yield
a reasonable fee. Washington v. Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal citations
There are several issues that must be addressed in determining
the award of attorneys' fees and costs in this matter. The Court
must determine how much of ICO's work is recoverable, what rate
to apply to the work, and multiply that rate by the reasonable
number of hours expended to arrive at the "lodestar" amount.
"[W]here a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited
success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an
excessive amount." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. Thus, adjustments
to the lodestar are within the discretion of the district court.
Id. at 436-37. Public Interest Research Group v. Windall,
51 F.3d 1179, 1189 (3d Cir., 1995). "Where a plaintiff has obtained
excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass
all hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and indeed in
some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award may be
justified." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 901 (U.S., 1984).
In this case, ICO's initial fee application sought
$4,587,990.22.*fn2 This Court's Order of August 26, 2004,
awarded Plaintiff a total of $4,529,785.92, a reduction of
$58,204.30 or a 1.3% reduction of the amount sought.
A. Standard for Evaluating Reasonableness of Hours Charged
The Third Circuit has explained that, as part of the assessment
of the reasonableness of fee petitions, district courts "should
review the time charged, decide whether the hours set out were
reasonably expended for each of the particular purposes described
and then exclude those that are `excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary.'" Windall, 51 F.3d at 1188. When a
defendant challenges the number of hours as being excessive,
courts frequently look at two factors to guide the assessment of
reasonableness whether such charges would be billed to a
fee-paying client, and what the opposing party did in the same
case. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 587 (3d
Cir. 1984); Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242, 1245 (7th
Cir. 1987); Jordan v. CCH, Inc., 230 F.Supp.2d 603, 611
(E.D.Pa. 2002); Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of
Educ., 143 F.R.D. 61, 63-65 (D.Del. 1992).
In Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 884 F.2d 713,
720 (1989), the Third Circuit held that the opposing party bears
the burden of challenging the reasonableness of a fee application with sufficient specificity as to give the applicant
notice and an opportunity to respond. Specifically, the Third
Circuit stated that:
[A] court may not sua sponte reduce the amount of the
award when the defendant has not specifically taken
issue with the amount of time spent or the billing
rate, either by filing affidavits, or in most cases,
by raising arguments with specificity and clarity in
briefs (or answering motion papers). . . . It bears
noting that the district court retains a great deal
of discretion in deciding what a reasonable fee award
is, so long as any reduction is based on objections
raised by the adverse party.
Id. (Internal citations omitted). The court went on to state
[T]he adverse party's submissions cannot merely
allege in general terms that the time spent was
excessive. In order to be sufficient, the briefs or
answers challenging the fee request must be clear in
two respects. First, they must generally identify the
type of work being challenged, and second, they must
specifically state the adverse party's grounds for
contending that the hours claimed in that area are
unreasonable. The briefs must be specific and clear
enough that the fee applicants have a fair chance to
respond and defend their request. [footnote omitted].
Id. at 720.
In Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1187 (1990), the
Third Circuit explained that based on the challenges raised by
the adverse party, the district court must "explain why it
concludes hours expended on a task are excessive" and must
"specify the number of hours that would be reasonable and why
those hours would be reasonable." It also reiterated that "[t]he
district court cannot `decrease a fee award based on factors not
raised by the adverse party.'" 892 F.2d at 1183 (quoting Bell
v. Union Princeton Properties, supra). "The first inquiry of the court should be into the hours spent
by the attorneys how many hours were spent in what manner by
which attorneys. It is not necessary to know the exact number of
minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was
devoted nor the specific attainments of each attorney. But
without some fairly definite information as to the hours devoted
to various general activities, e.g., pretrial discovery,
settlement negotiations, and the hours spent by various classes
of attorneys, e.g., senior partners, junior partners, associates,
the court cannot know the nature of the services for which
compensation is sought." Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc.,
487 F.2d at 167.
B. Hours Charged
1. Initial Brief
Honeywell argues that the 263 hours of attorney time spent
preparing ICO's initial fee application is excessive.
Specifically, Honeywell objects to the more than 73 hours
reviewing time records, 38 hours preparing exhibits, 2.46 hours
organizing materials from the fee application and .83 hours to
review the fee application after the application was filed.
(Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 5-6.) Honeywell further argues that the 150
hours expended in the preparation of Plaintiff's Reply Brief is
excessive and should not have taken more than 40 hours to
prepare. (Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 10.) Honeywell further argues that
the more than 33 hours spent preparing for oral argument is
excessive and contends that a total of 16 hours for preparation
would have been sufficient. (Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 5.) Honeywell
further argues that the attendance of Mr. Terris, Ms. Millian and Mr. Thomas at oral argument was
ICO argues that most of the time spent preparing the initial
brief was done by Carolyn Smith Pravlik, a senior attorney in the
firm. ICO argues that Ms. Pravlik is the most experienced
attorney in preparing fee applications. ICO further argues that
Ms. Pravlik was the principal lawyer in the early stages of the
litigation and therefore most familiar with the work of
Plaintiff's counsel. ICO further argues that there were roughly
6,704 time records, spanning the course of nine years which
needed to be reviewed.
Honeywell makes numerous assertions that Plaintiff's hours are
unreasonable. Honeywell contends that the number of hours spent
by ICO in preparation of the initial fee application and oral
argument is excessive, but provides only examples of instances
where a task could have and should have been performed in less
time. (Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 3.) Honeywell fails to justify its
assertions that Plaintiff's time is excessive or that the time it
proposes for the task is reasonable. Without more, the Court
cannot reach any conclusion other than the hours expended by
Plaintiff is reasonable.
Plaintiff has submitted contemporaneous time records of
counsel, as well as the total amount of time expended on each
individual litigation activity in support of its application. The
activities engaged in by Plaintiff's counsel throughout the
litigation are described in detail in two affidavits of
Plaintiff's lead counsel, Bruce J. Terris.
There can be no doubt that this has been an extensive and very
involved lawsuit spanning over the course of nine years. Furthermore, there is no question
that the Terris Firm spent a great number of hours preparing for,
as well as, conducting this suit as reflected by the roughly
6,704 time records attributable to this litigation. The Court
finds that the 263 hours of attorney time spent by ICO in
preparation of its initial brief for attorney fees is reasonable.
Honeywell fails to provide adequate justification to reduce the
number of hours sought and the Court sees no reason to depart
from the number of hours requested by ICO.
2. Reply Brief
Honeywell argues that the 150 hours expended in the preparation
of Plaintiff's Reply Brief is excessive and should not have taken
more than 40 hours to prepare. (Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 10.)
Honeywell specifically objects to the 35-40 hours spent drafting
and reviewing three expert affidavits submitted with ICO's Reply
Brief. Honeywell argues the affidavits were needed to detail how
the experts spent their time and should not be charged to
Honeywell. (Def's. Br. Opp'n at 9.) Honeywell argues, however,
that even if, as a matter of law, the time to prepare the
affidavits is compensable, 35-40 hours is excessive for the
preparation of three affidavits. (Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 9.)
ICO argues that the affidavits were necessary in order to
counter Honeywell's arguments that the experts' time reports
lacked sufficient detail. (Pl.'s Reply at 4.) ICO further argues
that substantial work was necessary to respond to Honeywell's
arguments in its Opposition Brief.
There is no doubt Honeywell has meticulously scrutinized every
expenditure and hour of attorney time for which ICO seeks to be
reimbursed. As such, 150 hours to appropriately and adequately
respond to Honeywell's objections does not strike the Court as
unreasonable. Further, as expressed above, Honeywell fails to provide adequate
justification to reduce the number of hours sought and the Court
sees no reason to depart from the 150 hours requested by ICO.
3. Motion to Strike
Honeywell argues that the 25.98 hours to oppose its motion to
strike new evidence submitted on reply is excessive particularly
in light of the fact that four attorneys billed for reviewing the
ICO is no longer seeking to be reimbursed for the time billed
by Mr. Thomas for reviewing Honeywell's motion to strike. This is
a reduction of 2.58 hours. As a result of this reduction, ICO
seeks to be reimbursed for 23.37 hours.
Honeywell further argues that Ms. Adams billed 3.72 hours to
review Defendant's motion to strike. Honeywell objects to the
3.72 hours and contends that it should not have taken more than 3
hours to review the brief. (Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 7.) Honeywell
further argues that if a single attorney had handled the briefing
in an efficient manner with a second attorney reviewing and
offering comments, opposition to the motion to strike would not
have taken more than 10 hours.
Again, Honeywell has arbitrarily assigned a number of hours to
a task with no justification. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the 23.37 hours ICO is seeking to be reimbursed for the motion to
strike is reasonable.
4. Review of Grace Briefs
Honeywell argues that the time spent reviewing Grace's briefs
in not reimbursable. Honeywell argues that reviewing Grace's briefs was not necessary
to the presentation of ICO's fee application. ICO argues that the
fee applications were being litigated together and the Grace
materials needed to be reviewed to decide whether Plaintiff could
defer to Grace's arguments.
The Court finds that ICO is entitled to be reimbursed for the
4.36 hours spent reviewing Grace's fee application. Honeywell
simply argues that the time spent reviewing Grace's briefs is
nonreimbursable but provides no support for its contention.
(Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 8.) On the other hand, ICO's explanation for
why it was necessary to review Grace's briefs is reasonable. 4.36
hours to review Grace's briefs does not strike this court as an
unreasonable amount of time.
Accordingly, ICO is permitted to recover fees for the 4.36
hours it spent reviewing briefs concerning Grace's fee
5. Oral Argument
With regard to oral argument, Honeywell argues: 1) seeking
reimbursement for the attendance of three attorneys at oral
argument is excessive; 2) the number of hours billed by Mr.
Terris and Ms. Millian is excessive; and 3) the hourly rate of
Plaintiff's travel time should be reduced by %50.
In response to Honeywell's first argument, Plaintiff has agreed
to exclude Mr. Thomas's time of 6 hours for his attendance at
Under the subcategory entitled "oral argument", ICO seeks to be
reimbursed for 33.50 hours for Mr. Terris's time and 15.67 hours
for Ms. Millian's time. Of the 33.50 hours and 15.67 hours of
time spent by Mr. Terris and Ms. Millian respectively, 11.25
hours is designated as preparation for oral argument by Mr.
Terris and 11.75 hours is designated as preparation by Ms. Millian. Honeywell argues that 11.25 hours of preparation for the
oral argument by Mr. Terris and the 11.75 hours of preparation by
Ms. Millian is excessive. Honeywell bases its argument upon the
amount of time (6 hours) it took Mr. Thomas to prepare for the
argument and implies that Mr. Terris and Ms. Millian could have
prepared for oral argument in an amount of time comparable to the
6 hours spent by Mr. Thomas. Honeywell alleges that the
difference in preparation time between Mr. Thomas and Mr. Terris
and Ms. Millian is due to Mr. Terris's and Ms. Millian's
attendance at a meeting with New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection in Trenton scheduled the same day as the
Honeywell has produced no evidence that Mr. Terris and Ms.
Millian included the time spent at a meeting in Trenton in their
fee application. Honeywell produced no affidavits supporting its
allegation and makes this allegation by stating "[i]t appears
that Mr. Terris and Ms. Millian may be (emphasis added)
including, in the time they are charging to the oral argument, a
meeting with the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection . . ." (Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 6.) Honeywell's allegation
is unsupported and grounded entirely in speculation.
ICO argues that Mr. Terris's time of 33.50 hours under the
subcategory of oral argument is reasonable since the time is
comprised of: 11.25 hours for travel to and from Washington,
D.C., and the argument before the Court; .5 hours for a
scheduling conference with Grace; and 21.75 hours for preparation
of oral argument. ICO further argues that Mr. Terris prepared for
oral argument on two occasions because the original hearing date
of January 12, 2004, was adjourned by the Court and rescheduled
for May 4, 2004.
Honeywell further argues that the hourly rate of Plaintiff's
travel time should be reduced by %50 and relies on the case of Maldonado v. Lucca,
636 F.Supp 621, 628-629 (D.N.J. 1986) to support its argument. In that case,
Plaintiff sought a reduced rate of $65.00 per hour (from his
normal billing rate of $125.00 per hour) for travel time. The
Court in its discretion awarded Plaintiff $50.00 per hour for
travel time. The Court simply reduced Plaintiff's hourly rate by
$15.00. The Court did not make a determination that Plaintiff's
hourly rate for travel time should be reduced by 50% as a matter
Accordingly, under the subcategory entitled "oral argument",
the Terris Firm is granted a fee award based upon 33.50 hours for
Mr. Terris's time, 15.67 for Ms. Millian's time and 17.25 for Mr.
6. Review of Proposed Findings
ICO seeks fees for the time spent reviewing Honeywell's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Honeywell
argues the fees Plaintiff is seeking are excessive and should be
reduced by one third because ICO used three attorneys to review
the Honeywell's proposed findings.
ICO argues that Mr. Terris and Ms. Pravlik predominantly
reviewed Honeywell's proposed findings while Ms. Millian reviewed
a narrow portion of the documents pertaining to Honeywell's new
findings regarding Grace/Roned issues. ICO argues Ms. Millian was
involved in this segment because she prepared the response to the
Grace/Roned issues in ICO's proposed findings. ICO further argues
the balance of Ms. Millian's time was limited to participation in
communications with the Court, Grace's counsel and Mr. Terris and
Ms. Pravlik regarding Honeywell's new or augmented arguments to
its proposed findings. The Court has carefully reviewed each of ICO's entries
regarding the review of Honeywell's proposed findings and is
convinced that no more than two attorneys worked on any
particular segment of the proposed findings at any given time.
(See Pl. Ex. 55, Nos. 331-342.)
Other than Honeywell's argument that no more than two attorneys
should be compensated for reviewing the proposed findings,
Honeywell has offered no other support for a one third reduction
of fees. Accordingly, fees are awarded in the following amounts:
10.25 hours for Mr. Terris; 25.73 hours for Ms. Pravlik; and 4.62
hours for Ms. Millian.
7. Administrative Scheduling Tasks
Honeywell argues that excessive time was spent on
administrative scheduling tasks. Specifically, Honeywell argues
that the 2.22 hours to draft a letter to the Court requesting
oral argument and the 1.4 hours to notice all counsel of a
postponement of the argument date billed by Mr. Thomas is
excessive and should have taken no more than a few minutes for
each task (Def.'s Br. Opp'n at 7.) Honeywell further argues that
Ms. Millian's and Mr. Thomas's combined time of 1.8 hours for a
letter to all parties regarding scheduling is excessive.
Honeywell has again alleged that excessive time has been spent
on certain tasks without providing a foundation for its claim.
Instead, Honeywell simply asserts that a lesser amount of time is
more appropriate than the time billed by ICO. Further,
Honeywell's challenge of Ms. Millian's and Mr. Thomas's combined
time of 1.8 hours fails to note that the 1.8 hours included
conferencing with Mr. Marraro and Ms. Pravlik and drafting memos
to Mr. Thomas and Mr. Terris. (See ICO Supp. App., Ex. 55, Nos.
272, 296.) Accordingly, the Court finds the above mentioned time
reasonable and will not reduce ICO's award by those hours. B. Appropriate Billing Rate
1. Washington, D.C. Rates
Honeywell argues that the relevant community for purposes of
calculating the prevailing market rate is New Jersey, not the
District of Columbia. Honeywell further argues that even if the
District of Columbia is the relevant community, the fee matrix
prepared by the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia is the
proper measure of hourly rates. Honeywell further argues that
regardless of which community is held to be the relevant
community, the baseline rates must be reduced to reflect the
non-complexity of litigating a fee petition. (Def's. Br. Opp'n at
Honeywell raises many of the same arguments pertaining to which
rates should be used in its opposition to ICO's initial fee
application. The Court has previously addressed those arguments
in the Court's Opinion of August 26, 2004, and herein
incorporates by reference its findings of fact and conclusions of
law. (See ICO v. Honeywell, Civ. 95-2097 (DMC), Slip Op.
5-14, (D.N.J. August 26, 2004, holding Washington, D.C. rates
apply based upon Plaintiff's methodology of updating the Laffey
2. Supplemental Fee Litigation
Honeywell argues there should be a reduction of hourly rates to
reflect the noncomplexity of the fee litigation. Honeywell
further argues that the review of time records should have been
performed by an associate or paralegal. ICO argues that the Court in its Opinion of August 26, 2004,
held that Plaintiff was entitled to full fees for travel time and
should similarly be awarded full fees for the preparation of the
supplemental fee application. (Slip Op. at 26.) ICO further
argues that counsel involved in the merits litigation is best
suited to address the work performed in the merits litigation.
ICO asserts that Ms. Pravlik is the most experienced and
knowledgeable of fees litigation in the Third Circuit and
District of Columbia Circuit. As a result of Ms. Pravlik's
experience in litigating fee applications, her research was
limited to updates rather than comprehensive searches. ICO
further asserts that Ms. Pravlik was the direct supervisor of
this case in the early stages which made her best suited to
review the time records. ICO further argues it would have been
less efficient and therefore more costly to have associates less
familiar with the merits litigation to review the time records
and to perform research associated with the fees litigation.
In determining the reasonableness of the rates claimed for
services in litigating the fee dispute, the court should consider
whether these services require the same quality of expertise and
skill as the underlying dispute. Public Interest Research Group
v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1190 (3d Cir., 1995). It would make
little sense for this Court to award Plaintiff fees at a reduced
rate for the preparation of its supplemental fee application when
it is settled that the law of this case provides Plaintiff its
full rate for travel. Additionally, the Court finds it reasonable
that the attorneys involved in the merits litigation also be
primarily involved in the fee applications. As mentioned earlier,
this case has spanned the course of nine years, gone through a
lengthy trial, consists of roughly 6,704 time records and has
more than 615 entries on the Court's docket. The Court finds it
reasonable that counsel most familiar with the underlying
litigation and most experienced in fees litigation be the attorney most involved in
preparing the supplemental fee application. Accordingly, ICO is
awarded its full rate for the preparation of the supplemental fee
Honeywell argues that Plaintiff's requested rate of 20 cents
per page for photocopying is excessive. This Court has previously
held that the rate of 20 cents per page is reasonable. (Slip Op.
at 39-40.) Accordingly, consistent with the holding in this
Court's Opinion of August 26, 2004, ICO is permitted to be
reimbursed at a rate of 20 cents per page for photocopying.
2. Facsimile Charges
Honeywell argues that certain facsimile charges are not
reimbursable, particularly a charge of $23.00 for a "fax to BJT,
KLM and SJG re: fee application materials to review." (Pl. Ex.57,
No 10.) Honeywell argues that there is no basis for reimbursement
of faxes sent among lawyers who all work at the same location.
ICO asserts that the materials complained of by Honeywell were
faxes to Mr. Terris for his review while he was attending a
meeting in New Jersey with Special Master Torricelli. ICO further
asserts that Ms. Millian and Mr. German, who were also in
attendance at the meeting in New Jersey, were included on the fax
to ensure that it was received by one of them for Mr. Terris's
It is perfectly reasonable that a fax be addressed to more than
one party from the same firm to ensure receipt of same.
Accordingly, ICO is permitted to be reimbursed for the $23.00
cost of said fax. Honeywell further argues that a charge of $6.00 for a fax to
"Cheryl Montgomery re: Software problems with her affidavit and
Honeywell exhibits" is not reimbursable. Honeywell asserts that
it is not responsible for transmission correspondence concerning
problems with the software of one of Plaintiff's experts. ICO
offers no explanation why a charge for a fax dealing with
software problems of one of its experts is reimbursable.
Accordingly, ICO's fee application is to be reduced by $6.00.
3. Miscellaneous Expenses
Honeywell also contests recovery for $108.27 for "support staff
overtime" for "preparing and velobinding Plaintiff's Findings and
Conclusion." Honeywell asserts there was no emergency or other
short notice deadline such that overtime costs can be shifted to
Honeywell. Honeywell further argues that ICO is not entitled to
reimbursement for an overtime meal in the amount of $19.70. ICO
has withdrawn its claim for reimbursement of $127.97.
Accordingly, ICO's award will be reduced by $127.97.
D. Honeywell's Motion to File a Surreply
Honeywell moves the Court for leave to file a surreply to
Plaintiff's Reply in support of Plaintiff's motion for litigation
costs and attorney's fees. Honeywell's motion for leave to file a
surreply is denied.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners are to be reimbursed for
litigation costs including attorneys' fees and expert witnesses' fees with deductions from
the respective applications as detailed in this Opinion. An
appropriate Order follows.