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June 3, 2005.

WARDEN MINER, Respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT KUGLER, Magistrate Judge


Petitioner Corey Lorenzo Woodfolk filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his federal sentence as unconstitutional under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and Petitioner filed a response in opposition to the motion. Having thoroughly reviewed the papers, this Court dismisses the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. I. BACKGROUND

  Petitioner challenges a 50-year sentence entered in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on November 10, 1994, based on his plea of guilty to conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin. See United States v. Woodfolk, Docket No. 93-CR-419 (JFM), j. conv. (D. Md. Nov. 10, 1994). Petitioner appealed and on June 17, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. See United States v. Williams, 87 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1996) (table).

  The sentencing court denied Petitioner's first motion to vacate the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by Order filed January 21, 1999. See Woodfolk v. USA, Civil No. 97-3737, order (JFM) (D. Md. filed Jan. 22, 1999). The Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. On July 26, 2000, the sentencing court dismissed Petitioner's second § 2255 motion as a successive petition. See Woodfolk v. USA, Civil No. 00-2086 (JFM), order (D. Md. entered July 26, 2000). Petitioner filed two motions for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, which the Fourth Circuit denied on April 26, 2001, and August 6, 2004.

  Between August 29, 2000, and July 29, 2002, Petitioner filed at least seven § 2241 petitions challenging his sentence, each of which was denied. See Woodfolk v. Dodrill, Civil No. 02-1310 (YK), order (M.D. Pa. filed Oct. 8, 2003); Woodfolk v. Dodrill, Civil No. 02-93 (YK), order (M.D. Pa. filed May 31, 2002); Woodfolk v. Romine, Civil No. 01-1651 (YK), order (M.D. Pa. filed Dec. 4, 2001); Woodfolk v. Romine, Civil No. 01-867 (YK), order (M.D. Pa. filed June 8, 2001); Woodfolk v. US, Civil No. 00-3744 (JFM), order & memorandum (D. Md. filed Jan. 9, 2001); Woodfolk v. USA, Civil No. 00-2264 (WBH), order (N.D. Ga. filed Sept. 20, 2000). Petitioner, who is now incarcerated at F.C.I. Fairton in New Jersey, filed this Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his sentence as unconstitutional under Booker. Citing Lloyd v. United States, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1155220 (3d Cir. May 17, 2005), and In re Olopade, 403 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005), Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the Petition on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction under § 2241 to entertain the Booker claim. Petitioner counters that, even if Booker does not apply retroactively, this Court should consider the merits of his Booker claim because he is actually innocent of the crime for which the District of Maryland sentenced him to 50 years in prison.


  A. Standard of Review

  "Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements." McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). A petition must "specify all the grounds for relief" and set forth "facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c) (amended Dec. 1, 2004), applicable to § 2241 petitions through Habeas Rule 1(b).

  Habeas Rule 4 requires the Court to examine a petition prior to ordering an answer and to summarily dismiss the petition if "it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4. "Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face." McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856; see also United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir. 2000); Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.3d 37, 45 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1025 (1989). B. Jurisdiction

  Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in relevant part:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless — . . . He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
  As a result of the practical difficulties encountered in hearing a challenge to a federal sentence in the district of confinement rather than the district of sentence, in its 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, Congress established a procedure whereby a federal prisoner might collaterally attack his sentence in the sentencing court.*fn1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1974); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). Section 2255 provides in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶ 1.
  "Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution." Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). This is because § 2255 expressly prohibits a district court from entertaining a challenge to a prisoner's federal sentence under § 2241 unless the remedy under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of the petitioner's detention.*fn2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Specifically, paragraph five of § 2255 provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241] in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶ 5; see Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997); Millan-Diaz v. Parker, 444 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1971); Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954).

  A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective, authorizing resort to § 2241, "only where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his wrongful detention claim." Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538. "It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to use it, that is determinative." Id. "Section 2255 is not `inadequate or ineffective' merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255. The provision exists to ensure that petitioners have a fair opportunity to seek collateral relief, not to enable them to evade procedural requirements." Id. at 539.

  In In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251, the Third Circuit applied the "inadequate or ineffective" test to a § 2241 claim based on a change of substantive law that occurred after Dorsainvil's first § 2255 motion was decided.*fn3 The Third Circuit first determined that Dorsainvil could not raise the Bailey claim in a successive § 2255 motion because the AEDPA restricted successive § 2255 motions to constitutional claims.*fn4 However, the court held that, in this narrow situation where Dorsainvil had no other opportunity to raise the claim, § 2255 was inadequate and ineffective. The Court reasoned:
Dorsainvil does not have and, because of the circumstances that he was convicted for a violation of § 924(c)(1) before the Bailey decision, never had an opportunity to challenge his conviction as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 924(c)(1). If, as the Supreme Court stated in [Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974)], it is a "complete miscarriage of justice" to punish a defendant for an act that the law does not make criminal, thereby warranting resort to the collateral remedy afforded by § 2255, it must follow that it is the same "complete miscarriage of justice" when ...

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