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May 6, 2005.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLIAM H. WALLS, District Judge


Plaintiff moves to dismiss Counts I, IV, V and VI of defendant's Counterclaim. This motion is decided without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78.


  This matter involves a dispute between two competitors, Syncsort Inc. and Innovative Routines International, Inc. Both parties develop and sell sorting software for computers that operate the UNIX operating system. Plaintiff produces and licenses a sorting software product called "SyncSort UNIX." Defendant markets a directly competing sorting product called "CoSORT."

  On July 29, 2004, plaintiff filed a Complaint against defendant alleging claims for misappropriation of plaintiff's trade secrets, copyright infringement, breach of licensing agreement, false advertising, trademark infringement and dilution, and unfair competition. On August 27, 2004, defendant filed its Answer and Counterclaim of six counts. Count I alleges a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. More specifically, defendant alleges that plaintiff is attempting to monopolize the sort software market for UNIX operating systems by engaging in predatory pricing, leveraging its monopoly position in the mainframe sort software market, and by instituting this lawsuit. Count II alleges that plaintiff has engaged in false advertising through its publication of statements that represent that plaintiff's product is the fastest and the only sort product designed for high performance. Count III alleges that plaintiff has infringed on defendant's copyright in its CoSORT software and related documentary materials. Count IV states a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Count V states a claim for tortious interference with contract. Count VI alleges unfair competition.

  On September 20, 2004, plaintiff moved to dismiss Counts I, IV, V and VI of the Counterclaim.


  Standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

  On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court is required to accept as true all allegations in the pleading and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and to view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.*fn1 Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2002). The question is whether the claimant can prove any set of facts consistent with his or her allegations that will entitle him or her to relief, not whether that person will ultimately prevail. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

  While a court will accept well-pled allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, it will not accept unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegation. Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 27 n. 2 (1977). Moreover, the claimant must set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claims or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The Court may consider the allegations of the pleading, as well as documents attached to or specifically referenced in the pleading, and matters of public record. Sentinel Trust Co. v. Universal Bonding Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2003); see also 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERALPRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357 at 299 (3d ed. 1998).

  "A `document integral to or explicitly relied on in the complaint' may be considered `without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment.'" Mele v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 255 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)). "Plaintiffs cannot prevent a court from looking at the texts of the documents on which its claim is based by failing to attach or explicitly cite them." Id.

  The Supreme Court has expressly stated that motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted "very sparingly" in antitrust cases. In Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 746-47 (1976) the Court held: "[I]n antitrust cases, where the `proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,' dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly." (citing Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)).


  I. Count I

  Count I of defendant's Counterclaim states a cause of action for a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. More specifically, defendant alleges an attempted monopolization claim. The Third Circuit has said that "to prevail on attempted monopolization claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act, `a plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) specific intent to monopolize and with (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.'" Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 442 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 890, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 (1993)). "In determining whether there exists a viable claim of monopolization or attempted monopolization, an inquiry `into the relevant product and geographic market' is required." Syncsort Inc. v. Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 318, 327 (D.N.J. 1999) (quoting Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459, 113 S.Ct. 884)). Thus, in addition to pleading facts that would support the elements enumerated above, a claimant also "must plead facts sufficient to demonstrate a viable relevant market." Sequential Software, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 327 (citing Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 436; Schuylkill Energy Resources, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 415 (3d Cir. 1997); Brader v. Allegheny General Hospital, 64 F.3d 869, 877 (3d Cir. 1995)).

  Plaintiff contends that defendant has insufficiently pled some of the necessary elements of an attempted monopolization claim. Plaintiff first charges that defendant's allegations concerning the relevant market are deficient. Next, plaintiff argues that defendant's allegations regarding anti-competitive conduct are insufficient. Third, plaintiff contends ...

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