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December 22, 2004.

JOSEPH O'DONNELL, Individually and t/a TOP GLOVE PROMOTIONS Plaintiff,

The opinion of the court was delivered by: JEROME SIMANDLE, District Judge


This is Defendant Nicolai Valuev's motion to vacate default judgment, entered by the Court on March 28, 2002 for failure to respond to the Court's orders requiring Defendants to provide full and complete accountings to Plaintiff. The principal issue is whether a mailing of the Complaint by Plaintiff's counsel to Defendant Valuev's address in the Russian Federation was sufficient to accomplish service of process under any method permitted for foreign service in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If it is not, default judgment must be vacated. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is granted and Defendant Valuev is required to serve an answer within 20 days of entry of the accompanying Order.*fn1


  A. Underlying Facts

  On October 10, 2001, Plaintiff, Joseph O'Donnell, individually and t/a Top Glove Promotions, filed a complaint for damages and injunctive relief against Defendants Oleg Shalayev, individually and t/a Oleg Shalayev Promotions,*fn2 and Nicolai Valuev,*fn3 grounded in several contract-based claims*fn4 relating to an "Exclusive Representation Agreement" ("Agreement") with Defendants and Arseny Berezin.*fn5

  Pursuant to the Agreement, the U.S. Parties were given the "exclusive right" to "represent" Valuev in the United States and around the world, except Russia, and to "promote and manage fights" on Valuev's behalf in all countries worldwide, except Russia, "providing [Valuev] with financial, management, training and legal support as necessary." (Agreement at ¶ 3.)

  B. Facts Relating to Service of Process

  In the section of the Agreement entitled "addresses for legal notices," the U.S. and Russian Parties agreed to use the following address for legal notices to the Russian Parties: "Oleg Shalayev, Koroleva str. 9, apt. 28, St. Petersburg, 197431 Russia." (Agreement at ¶ 13.) Additionally, on March 12, 2001, Berezin sent an e-mail to Synkov including the following address: "Valuev Nikolay Sergeevich St. Petersburg, Krasnoloselsky Rayon, Krasnoye Selo, Ul. Gvardeyskaya 8/2 apt 39."*fn6 (7/20/04 O'Donnell Cert. at ¶ 5.)

  In August 2001, Plaintiff sent, via fax, copies of the proposed summons and complaint, translated in Russian, to Shalayev and Valuev. In response, Shalayev faxed to Plaintiff a letter written in Russian. (7/20/04 O'Donnell Cert. at ¶ 12, Ex. G.) The letter is dated "08.23.001" and Plaintiff alleges that it bears the signatures of Shalayev and Valuev. (Id.) Valuev denies having signed that letter, accusing Shalayev of forging his signature. (9/04 Valuev Decl. at ¶ 3.) The English translation of the letter reads, in pertinent part: "We have received from you the papers concerning your complaint against me and Nicolay. Since this is a serious matter and requires a competent translation and consultation with experts, we are unable to give you an immediate answer, but we will respond [sic] you within a week."*fn7 (7/20/04 O'Donnell Cert. at ¶ 12, Ex. G.)

  Moreover, on or about August 23, 2001, (which was about seven weeks before the Complaint was filed on October 10, 2001) Shalayev and Valuev allegedly telephoned O'Donnell to discuss the proposed complaint. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Synkov also participated in the discussion and served as a translator. (Id.) Defendant Valuev admits participating in that telephone discussion (Valuev Decl. at ¶ 5), but asserts that he has "no recollection of speaking with Mr. O'Donnell or with Mr. Synkov after August of 2001, and certainly did not discuss any final judgment with either." (Id. at ¶ 7.) According to Defendant, he has "been contacted by many individuals regarding fighting in the United States and it is possible such a conversation occurred though I have no recollection of one with plaintiff in 2002." (Id.)

  On September 11, 2001, Plaintiff received a letter from Evgeny Vasilievich Popov, an attorney from St. Petersburg, Russia. Mr. Popov was not at that time a member of the New Jersey Bar. (7/20/04 O'Donnell Cert. at Ex. I.) The letter stated that "I have been retained by Oleg Shalayev and Nikolay Valuev to represent and protect the interests of The Russian Parties in Top Glove Promotions." (Id.) Defendant Valuev, however, maintains that "I never retained anyone, including Evgeny Vasilievich Popov to represent me in this matter. My sole retention has been the recent retention of the firm of Dines and English, L.L.C. to represent me." (4/17/04 Valuev Cert. at ¶ 5.)

  On October 10, 2001, the day the complaint was filed, Plaintiff mailed copies of the summons and complaint to Defendant Valuev at "Sergeevich St. Petersburg, Krasnoloselsky Rayon, Krasnoye Selo, Ul. Gvardeyskaya 8/2 apt 39," via DHL Worldwide Express. (7/21/04 Saputelli Cert. at ¶ 3, Ex. B.) The delivery confirmation receipt is dated October 10, 2001, and the accompanying "tracking" report indicates that the delivery was signed for by "OSIPOVA" on October 16, 2001. (Id.)

  Additionally, on October 10, 2001, Plaintiff sent, via DHL Worldwide Express, copies of the summons and complaint to Shalayev at "Koroleva St. 9, Apt. 28, St. Petersburg, Russia," the address designated by the Agreement for legal notices to the Russian Parties. (7/21/04 Saputelli Cert. at ¶ 3, Ex. A; see Agreement at ¶ 13.) According to the DHL tracking report, Shalayev signed for the delivery on October 17, 2001. (7/21/04 Saputelli Cert. at ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Finally, Plaintiff mailed copies of the summons and complaint to Mr. Popov, in Russia, via DHL Worldwide Express. (Id. at ¶ 5, Ex. C.). That delivery was signed for on October 12, 2001, by "KUZNETSOVA," Mr. Popov's secretary. (Id.)

  By handwritten letter, allegedly bearing the signatures of both Shalayev and Valuev, dated "26.10.001," the two defendants acknowledged receipt of the "Complaint." (7/20/04 O'Donnell Cert. at ¶ 18, Ex. L.) On November 8, 2001, the Clerk of the Court received a document written in Russian from Mr. Popov. The Office of the Court Clerk promptly contacted Mr. Popov via e-mail, requesting that he clarify the significance of the submission. Mr. Popov replied that he was the "attorney for defendants" and that the document was the Defendants' "answer." (7/21/04 Saputelli Cert. at ¶¶ 6-8, Ex. D.) The Court Clerk granted the Defendants an additional 30 days in which to translate the answer into English, but Defendants failed to comply within that 30 day period.

  On February 13, 2002, after oral argument by Plaintiff's counsel, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendants' November 8, 2001 submission, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ. P. 12(f), and to enter default judgment against Defendants under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a) and 55(b). In so ordering, the Court held that "personal jurisdiction over these defendants exists because they were duly served with process, they attempted to respond to these allegations, they've had substantial contacts with the forum state, New Jersey, sufficing for both general jurisdiction and transactional jurisdiction." (2/14/2002 Tr. at 15; 7-11.)

  On February 14, 2002, the Court entered an Order granting preliminary injunctive relief in favor of Plaintiff and ordering that Defendants provide an accounting to Plaintiff. On March 26, 2002, a final hearing was held on the default judgment damages. Final judgment was entered on March 28, 2002, in favor of Plaintiff, in the amount of $176,783.04.*fn8 Plaintiff served copies of the Orders of February 13 and 14, 2002, along with certified translations thereof, upon Defendants Valuev and Shalayev and Mr. Popov, via Courier Express Services, Ltd., as per the Court's Order. (7/21/04 Saputelli Cert. at ¶ 12, Ex. J.; 2/14/2002 Order at 4.) On March 30, 2002, a copy of the Final Judgment, as well as a certified Russian translation, was delivered to "St. Petersburg, Krasnoloselsky Rayon, Krasnoye Selo, Ul. Gvardeyskaya 8/2 apt 39." (8/3/04 Saputelli Cert. at ¶ 6, Ex. C.)

  Before the Court is Defendant Valuev's Motion To Vacate Default Judgment and Set Aside Orders, filed July 9, 2004.*fn9


  A. Standard of Review

  Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[f]or good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4), "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment" if "the judgment is void." A default judgment rendered by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725-727 (1877). A defendant may challenge the personal jurisdiction of the rendering court by attacking the validity of the service of process. Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus. Inc., 800 F.2d 53, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1986). "Service of process refers to a formal delivery of documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendants with notice of a pending action." Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 699, 701 (1988).

  Though the decision to set aside a default judgment is left "primarily to the discretion of the district court," United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit mandates that a district court generally must weigh three factors in ruling on a motion to vacate default judgment under Rule 60(b):
(1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced if the default is lifted;
(2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and
(3) whether the default was the result of the defendant's culpable conduct.
Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1987); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985); Mettle v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 279 F. Supp. 2d 598, 601 (D.N.J. 2003).

  However, since "[a] default judgment entered when there has been no proper service of the complaint is, a fortiori, void, and should be set aside," Gold Kist, 756 F.2d at 19 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4)), in such instances, the district court need not resort to an analysis of the three factors listed above. Gold Kist, 756 F.2d at 19; Mettle, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 603 n. 3 ("As this Court finds that entry of default against [defendant] is void based on the improper service of the summons and complaint, the Court need not consider the factors set forth in Gold Kist." (citing Gold Kist, 756 F.2d at 19)).

  B. Defendant's Motion to Vacate

  Defendant Valuev seeks to have the Court set aside default judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4).*fn10 (Def.'s Br. at 3.) Valuev contends that service of process was never properly effectuated pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(f), thereby preventing the Court from obtaining personal jurisdiction ...

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