On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 363 N.J. Super. 266 (2003).
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
The Court determines whether a public entity is immune from liability under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:4-8, in a situation in which the decedent fell off a cliff in a public parkway, and the plaintiffs assert that the subsequent acts or omissions of the public entity contributed substantially to reducing the decedent's chances of survival.
Aversano, a nineteen-year-old man, was sunbathing in the Palisades Interstate Park when he fell backwards off a 300-foot cliff. Palisades Interstate Parkway Police officers did not call the local rescue squad because they assumed that Aversano could not have survived the fall. Instead, they determined to carry out a"recovery" operation. Using a four-wheel drive vehicle and then hiking to the base of the cliffs, they reached Aversano about three hours after his fall. They found that Aversano was still breathing, but he was not conscious. The officers called for the Closter Rescue Squad. After the rescue squad reached the top of the cliff, it took them an hour and a half to rappel down to Aversano. However, by that time Aversano was no longer breathing. He was pronounced dead at the scene.
Aversano's father and brother filed a complaint against the Palisades Interstate Parkway Commission and the Palisades Interstate Parkway Police (collectively, Palisades) alleging that they were negligent in their maintenance and supervision of the park, in their failure to provide sufficient warnings, and in their failure to initiate efforts to rescue and bring medical aid to Aversano. Palisades filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were immune from liability under the TCA and under the Landowners' Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-3 (LLA). The trial court granted the summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint, finding that immunity was appropriate under the TCA because Aversano's injuries stemmed from the recreational use of unimproved public property. Plaintiffs conceded on appeal that Palisades is immune under the TCA to the extent that an alleged dangerous condition on the unimproved public land, or to the extent that defendants' alleged failure to warn or prevent access to the cliff, bore a substantial causal relationship to Aversano's death. The trial court did not address the facts or law concerning the claim that Palisades negligently failed to take reasonable steps to rescue Aversano. Instead, the judge concluded that the majority decision in Fluehr v. City of Cape May, 159 N.J. 532 (1999), required summary judgment on that claim.
With one member dissenting, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision regarding both the TCA and the LLA. 363 N.J. Super. 266 (2003). Concerning the TCA, the majority held that unimproved-property immunity did not eliminate exposure to liability for the reduction in Aversano's chances of survival that might have been caused by defendant's alleged negligence in undertaking a proper rescue. In part, the panel determined that the duty of the officers to call a rescue squad was a"ministerial" function, rather than an exercise of judgment or discretion, for the purposes of the TCA's provisions that deny immunity for negligence in carrying out ministerial functions. The panel also distinguished this Court's opinion in Fluehr, in which the Court determined that the alleged negligence of a public employee was remotely or insignificantly related to the plaintiff's accident and therefore it did not constitute a cause of the accident. Here, the panel determined that the record supports a question of fact respecting causation, i.e., whether the delay in calling the rescue squad caused a significant lost chance of survival. Finally, the majority concluded that any immunity created by the LLA was similarly limited. The dissenting judge would have granted immunity under the TCA. She found it unnecessary, therefore, to address whether Palisades was immune under the LLA.
HELD: The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division, 363 N.J. Super. 266 (2003), denying immunity from liability to public entities under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:4-8, when the public property's natural condition was not the sole cause of the decedent's death and the entities' acts or omissions contributed substantially to reducing the decedent's chances of survival.
1. The Court affirms the Appellate Division's judgment on the reach and effect of unimproved-property immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-8. In respect of the question whether immunity applies if the cliff's dangerous natural condition was not the sole cause of Aversano's death, and the same public entity's acts or omissions contributed substantially to reducing Aversano's chance of survival, the Court agrees that the answer to that narrow question is no. (Pp. 3 -- 4).
2. The Court's disposition does not foreclose an analysis of an officer's purported duty in these circumstances as measured against other forms of immunity that might be relevant, which the Court views as a separate inquiry. That analysis implicates whether the TCA's provisions pertaining to discretionary acts might apply to limit or eliminate the Palisades' potential liability. Although the majority opinion of the Appellate Division addressed such discretionary-act immunity, that aspect of the opinion was not necessary to decide the discrete legal question whether unimproved-property immunity trumped all theories of liability asserted against Palisades. (P. 4).
3. The trial court's written opinion did not explicitly address or discuss discretionary-act immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3a or 59:3-2a. To the extent that an evaluation of that subject requires further development of undisputed facts or resolution of any material factual disputes, it should be reviewed initially at the trial court level. In remanding to the trial court for that purpose, the Court suggests no ultimate outcome. The Court's decision not to affirm that part of the Appellate Division's opinion regarding N.J.S.A. 59:2-3a and 59:3-2a reflects a modification of the Appellate Division's judgment. (Pp. 4 -- 5).
4. Although the dissenting judge in the Appellate Division briefly referred to the LLA, it was not the subject of the dissent, therefore the immunity established by the LLA is not before the Court. As a result, the conclusion of the Appellate Division majority in respect of the LLA is the law of the case but not a determination of this Court. Nor does the Court's disposition here preclude either the trial court as a matter of law or a jury, if appropriate, from determining the applicability of immunities found in statutes other than the TCA and LLA. (P. 5).
As MODIFIED, the judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Court does not retain jurisdiction.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and ...