IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
September 29, 2003
JOHN R. ANDREWS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,
GREGORY HOLLOWAY A/K/A GREG HOLLOWAY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Simandle, District Judge
This motion concerns the appropriate scope of post-judgment discovery from the current spouse and business partner of the judgment debtor upon a six-million dollar consent judgment entered in June of 1997. Presently before the Court is the request of the spouse, non-party witness Laura Andre, for the Court to reconsider the scope of permissible discovery in this matter. Andre, who was a co-defendant in this case, settled all claims against her in June 1997, and then married defendant Gregory Holloway. Holloway, who consented in June 1997 to a $6,097,015.00 judgment to satisfy all claims against him, has not paid the judgment and plaintiffs allege that he, with Andre's assistance, has fraudulently transferred or concealed assets to avoid payment.
The Court has granted plaintiffs' request for post-judgment discovery about these allegations and had ordered that Holloway and Andre appear for deposition. Defendant Holloway was deposed over the course of three days in March, 2003. Andre appeared for deposition on August 6, 2003, but refused to answer any question about her own assets, citing her status as a party who has settled all claims in this suit.
After 1 1/2 hours of deposition filled with such objections, the parties contacted the Court which immediately heard their arguments by telephone and ruled orally. Ms. Andre was unhappy with the Court's ruling made during the August 6, 2003 telephone hearing, which required her deposition to proceed, and unilaterally refused to appear on August 7, 2003. She now asks for the Court to again consider the scope of discovery permissible from her. Plaintiffs counter with a request for sanctions, asserting that her objection is just another means of avoiding, or delaying, the Court's ordered deposition.
This Court has considered the positions of the parties, including their oral arguments on September 8, 2003, and has found, for the following reasons, that the scope of permissible discovery from Andre should be articulated explicitly to encompass all matters relevant to the plaintiffs' right of execution upon the Judgment entered by this Court on June 27, 1997 against defendant Gregory Holloway in the amount of $6,097,015, and all matters relevant to the sources and extent of Ms. Andre's apparent wealth (including her income, expenses, assets and liabilities), for the entirety of the period that she has been associated with Mr. Holloway, personally or professionally. The Court further finds that Ms. Andre's unilateral refusal to continue her deposition was in direct violation of this Court's order and should be sanctioned by shifting to her the plaintiffs' fees and costs associated with their appearance at deposition on August 7, 2003 and with the present motion.
Laura Andre is presently a non-party in this fraud case, though she was a co-defendant in the case from its filing in March 1995 through her settlement of the claims against her in June 1997. Plaintiffs have been granted leave to take post-judgment discovery from her about the financial situation of her husband, defendant Gregory Holloway because defendant Holloway (and his entities Continental Rare Coin Funds, Inc., Continental Rare Coin Fund I, Ltd., and Continental Investment Group, Inc.) consented to entry of a $6,097,015.00 judgment in June 1997 to satisfy all plaintiffs' claims, except for those of Louis Larsen, but has paid nothing.
Since at least January 16, 2002, plaintiffs have sought the deposition of Laura Andre because they suspect that when Holloway agreed to the 1997 consent judgment, or soon thereafter, he transferred his assets to Ms. Andre, his then-fiancé, and now-wife. (See [Docket Item 423-1.]) On February 6, 2002, the Court found that plaintiffs' allegations could form the basis for "new post-Judgment claims arising after June, 1997" which warranted "post-judgment discovery from defendant Gregory Holloway and from Laura Andre and from others having knowledge of issues relevant to the plaintiffs' rights to enforce the Judgment in this case." (2/6/02 Order.) *fn1 The Court ordered that Laura Andre, both personally and as an officer or director of various corporations named by the plaintiffs, appear, testify, and respond to reasonable document production requests upon "all matters relevant to the plaintiffs' right of execution upon the Judgment entered by this Court on June 27, 1997 against defendant Gregory Holloway in the amount of $6,097,015." (Id.) The Court provided two examples of relevant matters included "within the scope of permitted discovery," namely:
testimony, records, documents and other things related to Holloway's income, assets, and transfers of property owned by him or in which he may have had an interest, or may presently have an interest, from June, 1997 through the present time, and:
[t]ransactions between Holloway and entities in which Holloway has an interest as an owner or officer, on the one hand, and Laura Andre, and entities in which Laura Andre has an ownership interest or serves an officer, on the other hand, from June 27, 1997 until the present.
(Id.) The deposition of Laura Andre was ordered to occur within thirty days of the February 6, 2002 Order. (Id.) It did not begin until August 6, 2003. *fn2
In the meantime, the Court had considered two discovery disputes pertinent to the scope of discovery from Ms. Andre. First, in March, 2002, the Court considered Andre's objections to plaintiffs' document requests in light of the Court's February 6, 2002 Order. Generally, the Court sustained the objections for requests which sought information concerning Ms. Andre's personal assets, and overruled objections which sought information about joint assets of Andre and Holloway. (3/26/02 Order.) Second, in June, 2003, the Court considered a motion by Andre to quash certain subpoenaed witnesses and, in so doing, reaffirmed that "the scope of such discovery regarding Laura Andre and her related corporations" whether the information was sought from Andre or from a third-party witness, "shall be the same scope as set forth in . . . this Court's Order filed February 6, 2002." (6/3/03 Order.)
By June, 2003, though, plaintiffs had begun seeking broader discovery because they had "a suspicion that what Mr. Holloway is telling us about how Miss Andre became this wealthy in 1999 is untrue." (Pls.' Ex. G at 19:10-17.) They had taken the deposition of Holloway in March, 2003 and had learned that Andre had "three and a half million dollars in her bank in 1999," but had not learned the "origin of that wealth." (Pls.' Ex. G at 20:7-12.) As a result, the Court provided in the June 3, 2003 Order that the scope of permissible discovery from other third party subpoenaed witnesses about Ms. Andre "may be enlarged as reasonably necessary" to:
(1) establish a baseline for Laura Andre's income, assets, and liabilities as of June, 1997 and continuing to date; and
(2) to track particular transactions which may tend to be probative of plaintiffs' allegations of post-judgment co-mingling or concealment of assets owned or controlled by defendant Gregory Holloway.
(6/3/03 Order at 3-4.)
The deposition of Laura Andre began on August 6, 2003 at 10:55 a.m. in Voorhees, New Jersey with Michael Zindler, Esquire and David Fitzsimons, Esquire appearing on behalf of plaintiffs, and David Lipshutz appearing on behalf of Andre. (Pls.' Ex. J.) After Mr. Lipshutz continuously objected questions on the basis that they exceeded the permissible scope of discovery, and instructed Ms. Andre to not answer them, (see Pls.' Ex. J at 5:23, 13:19-20, 14:20-21, 15:17-18, 16:5-6, 20:5-7, 26:3-9, 34:12-13, 36:3-4, 39:1-8, 50:5-7, 52:3-4, 65:4-5), the parties called the Court for clarification at 12:20 p.m., (see id. at 72:25-73:8).
The Court immediately heard the arguments of the parties via telephone, and then ruled as follows:
. . . [T]he impasse between the parties this morning has to do with whether the witness Miss Andre can be questioned about her financial dealings whereas the predicate she says that her husband had no financial stake in those dealings. And we're only talking about dealings since June of 1997. It seems that there are more questions here than answers about the blending of assets between husband and wife. . . .
And so I am going to permit discovery about the nature of Miss Andre's financial activities from June of `97 until the present time because from what I'm hearing there's no explanation that's apparent that would put her assets out of bounds from being deemed joint assets or at least partially joint assets and therefore subject to execution. I'm not making any finding that she actually has anything that's subject to execution in this case, but I am saying that there are many more questions in my mind and I think they're reasonable questions in plaintiffs' counsels' mind about whose assets these are and if they're Gregory Holloway's assets in part then they may be subject to execution in satisfaction of the $6 million judgment. And I don't know any way to really carve out which aspects of Miss Andre's financial dealings are within the purview of discovery and which ones are outside of it because the whole thing just seems so mysterious. And I really don't think that I could accurately say well, transactions A, B and C are suspicious enough that the plaintiffs have a reasonable basis for taking discovery, while transactions D, E and F don't seem to rise to that level. I don't think I would be doing the parties a favor by trying to make that kind of a guess.
And so I do think that the discovery deposition should go forward and that it should be reasonably far reaching with regard to Miss Andre's financial dealings after June of `97 and that will either put to rest once and for all the suspicion that the plaintiffs entertain or it will further it, but that's the purpose of discovery. If it could be done in a way that really gets to the heart of the matter and it gets Miss Andre under oath about whether her husband did or did not have a role in those decisions and in those investments then I think, you know, it can be finished in an afternoon I would guess.
If I'm understanding the parties' arguments correctly, I'm going to come down on the plaintiffs' side in permitting the deposition to go forward in a reasonable way that gets to the heart of the financial transactions post June of `97 and that Miss Andre explain under oath whether Mr. Holloway did or did not have a role, whether Mr. Holloway has a financial interest in any of those transactions. And so that would be my ruling.
(Pls.' Ex. H at 14:13-17:15.) The Court ordered that the deposition continue for its remaining 5 1/2 hours, even if it meant that the deposition continued into the following day. *fn3
After the telephone conference, though, counsel for Ms. Andre requested that the deposition be adjourned for the day because his client was "not physically feeling well right now" because of a "family type emergency last night at her house." (Pls.' Ex. J at 73:23-74:2.) Plaintiffs' counsel questioned the asserted reason for the delay, but consented to it. (Id. at 75:1-19.)
On August 7, 2003, all counsel appeared for the deposition, but Ms. Andre did not. (Pls.' Ex. K.) Her counsel had not requested an adjournment of the deposition from plaintiffs' counsel or from the Court, (id. at 2:1-3:9), but asserted that the delay was warranted because Ms. Andre was unhappy with the Court's August 6th decision and wanted him to contest it because "the scope of the deposition is a critical juncture," (id. at 4:1-23).
The Court did not receive any reconsideration request until minutes before another telephone hearing that was held on August 11, 2003. The request was faxed to the Court by Ms. Andre's attorney, not filed. Counsel for Ms. Andre urged the Court to again determine "[t]he threshold question [which] is the scope of discovery that's allowable for Ms. Andre." (Andre 8/11/03 Ltr.; Pl.'s Ex. I at 7:23-25.) The Court agreed to provide the parties a chance to support their positions with record evidence and appear at a September 8, 2003 hearing. Counsel for plaintiffs and for Ms. Andre did so, and plaintiffs moved for sanctions for Ms. Andre's failure to appear at her August 7, 2003 deposition and for her use of the present unorthodox reconsideration request to further delay her deposition.
The Court has considered the positions of the parties and will (1) require Ms. Andre to provide a scope of discovery of all matters relevant to the plaintiffs' right of execution upon the Holloway judgment and of all matters relevant the source of her wealth for the entirety of the period that she has been associated with Mr. Holloway, personally or professionally, and (2) shift reasonable fees and costs to Ms. Andre that plaintiffs incurred because they appeared at the August 7, 2003 deposition which she unilaterally decided to cancel and because they needed to oppose and argue the present motion.
A. Scope of Discovery
Ms. Andre has asked this Court to reconsider the scope of permissible discovery in this case, arguing that this Court impermissibly expanded its scope during its August 6, 2003 oral ruling. Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Andre has improperly filed this motion for reconsideration and that this Court, in any event, properly expanded the scope of discovery from Ms. Andre. The Court agrees with plaintiffs that this motion was submitted in an unorthodox and inappropriate manner, *fn4 but for purposes of clarity in this matter, will again consider the scope of permissible discovery from Laura Andre.
1. Subject matter
When the Court was initially presented with the discovery issues regarding Ms. Andre, the Court sought to narrowly tailor the subject matter within the scope of discovery to balance Ms. Andre's status as a non-party with her potential liability for post-judgment claims. Ms. Andre had settled all claims against her from this lawsuit in June, 1997, and the Court sought to respect her settlement and the representations that she had substantial personal wealth from sources completely separate from Mr. Holloway. However, the Court also noted from the start that discovery was warranted from Ms. Andre in spite of her settlement because she could still be liable "upon a new claim for fraud" if she was involved in concealing assets to avoid payment of Mr. Holloway's judgment. (See 2/6/02 Order ¶¶ 1, 5.) The Court thus ordered that discovery was permissible from her regarding "all matters relevant" to plaintiffs' right of execution upon the Holloway judgment, and explained that such relevant matters would involve questions about Holloway's assets and about transactions between Holloway and Andre. (Id.)
Since the Court's February 6, 2002 Order, though, the Court has become increasingly aware that an expanded scope of discovery is needed for obtaining meaningful discovery from Ms. Andre. Her husband, defendant Holloway, provided three days of deposition testimony, but was unresponsive to most questions about his financial dealings with Ms. Andre. He continually refused to answer questions about Ms. Andre's wealth *fn5 or claimed that he did not know or was unable to remember anything pertinent about Ms. Andre's financial dealings. *fn6 His deposition revealed, though, that Ms. Andre has had resources to invest in multi-million dollar real estate since 1997 *fn7 and has, along with Mr. Holloway's parents, *fn8 paid all the living expenses of the family. Mr. Holloway testified that Ms. Andre had "a substantial net worth" of "several million at least" in the late 1990s, (id. at 240:23-241:4), but was could not identify the source of her wealth and "refus[ed] to answer any questions about Laura Andre's employment, job history, income, assets, anything. Period." (Pls.' Ex. A at 10:20-25.) The Court had been led to believe that she was independently wealthy because of prior wealth from a previous marriage, but plaintiffs recently found that she had only received a 1986 Jeep Cherokee and some jewelry from the 1993 divorce settlement. *fn9 (See Pls.' Ex. J at Ex. 2.) Deposition also revealed that Mr. Holloway himself, who testified that he had no assets by the time of his marriage to Ms. Andre, (Pls.' Ex. C, Holloway Dep. at 308:6-9), once had "millions of dollars," (id. at 299:3-6). He provided no clear reason for their sudden disappearance in the late 1990s.
What the plaintiffs have been entitled to as part of post-judgment discovery ever since this Court's Order of February 6, 2002, and what they have been denied, is reliable factual information to establish the June 1997 baseline for the assets of Andre and Holloway. Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable pursue their theory that Holloway and Andre have blended their assets, such that assets nominally owned or controlled by Andre are also owned (beneficially, constructively or as a matter of fact) by Holloway and thus subject to execution. Holloway's professed amnesia about how his fiancé/wife became wealthy and he became poor as the decade of the 1990s progressed requires a plenary exposition of this witness's factual knowledge about her financial situation and his.
This Court need not now determine whether Ms. Andre, or Mr. Holloway, has been involved in concealing or transferring assets to avoid the six-million dollar judgment, nor need the plaintiffs demonstrate at this time that Ms. Andre's assets are also Mr. Holloway's for purposes of execution. It may prove true that Ms. Andre is an independently wealthy individual who has maintained her own businesses honestly and independently from Mr. Holloway or, it may not. However, the Court finds that the discovery in this case has raised more questions about her involvement than it has provided answers. By providing no meaningful and reliable information on the subject, Mr. Holloway has actually increased the suspicions about the source of Ms. Andre's wealth, which must necessarily be understood to make sense of Mr. Holloway's financial situation. Mr. Holloway's failure of recollection about obviously important financial facts of his own marriage also requires his spouse, Ms. Andre, to provide all financial facts within the scope of discovery. In a case where Ms. Andre has been linked to Mr. Holloway as wife, business partner, and at one time, co-defendant, where all of Mr. Holloway's assets have disappeared, and where Ms. Andre has had access to large amounts of money, the origins of which are unexplained, since Mr. Holloway's assets disappeared, the source of Ms. Andre's wealth is highly relevant and is discoverable.
Thus, this Court will order that Ms. Andre's deposition be reconvened and will order that the scope of her deposition be expanded to include "all matters relevant to the plaintiffs' right of execution upon the Judgment entered by this Court on June 27, 1997 against defendant Gregory Holloway in the amount of $6,097,015" as ordered on February 6, 2002, and all matters relevant to the extent and sources of Ms. Andre's wealth (including her income, expenses, assets and liabilities). The Court will further order that Ms. Andre's deposition may exceed seven hours because more time is needed for a fair examination of all relevant topics.
In initially formulating the scope of permissible discovery, the Court sought to respect the post-judgment nature of the allegations by limiting the scope of discovery to matters after the June 27, 1997 consent order was entered. The Court now finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated that they may inquire into the sources and extent of Ms. Andre's wealth that she has had during the entirety of the period that she has been associated with Mr. Holloway, personally or professionally.
The discovery that Mr. Holloway and Ms. Andre have provided to this point present no reason for limiting discovery to the post-June 1997 period. Instead, because they have consistently refused to answer questions about the pre-June 1997 period which are obviously necessary to establish the June 1997 baseline, and have failed to provide any source for Ms. Andre's wealth during the post-June 1997 period, the source and extent of Ms. Andre's wealth, and the extent of her financial dealings with Mr. Holloway, during the entirety of their relationship are unexplained and suspicious. The Court sees no reason to limit plaintiffs to post-June 1997 discovery at this stage as such a limitation will only serve to cloud the relevant and critical questions at issue here. In order to determine whether, at any time since June of 1997, Mr. Holloway's assets and Ms. Andre's assets have been blended, it is important and probative to understand their financial pictures before June of 1997 as well. Plaintiffs must be permitted to learn about Ms. Andre's financial condition when she met Mr. Holloway and throughout her relationship with Mr. Holloway to be able to dispel, or confirm, their suspicions that Ms. Andre and Mr. Holloway have engaged in fraudulent behavior to avoid the present judgment, as well as to determine all relevant sources of Holloway's current assets and income for purposes of post-judgment execution.
Thus, the Court will explicitly confirm that the scope of discovery includes the entirety of time that Ms. Andre and Mr. Holloway have been associated. The Court is unable to identify at this juncture a specific date that Ms. Andre and Mr. Holloway met, so will simply order that the entirety of time they knew each other, personally or professionally, is open to discovery. *fn10
B. Sanctions for Failure to Appear
The Court will also order Ms. Andre to pay plaintiffs' reasonable expenses and fees caused by her failure to appear at the August 7, 2003 hearing without good cause and by her continued delay of the deposition through the present unorthodox and unmerited reconsideration request. The Court finds that such expenses and fees include those associated with:
(1) the August 7, 2003 deposition appearance,
(2) the August 11, 2003 telephone conference about Ms. Andre's reconsideration motion sent to the Court in an unorthodox manner at the last minute,
(3) the plaintiffs' opposition to Ms. Andre's motion, received by the Court on August 29, 2003, and
(4) the September 8, 2003 hearing on Ms. Andre's motion.
The Court will require plaintiffs to submit an affidavit of reasonable fees and expenses within fourteen days of the date of this Opinion and Order, will provide Ms. Andre fourteen days to respond, and will then determine what fees and expenses are reasonable without further hearing. *fn11
The district court has discretion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) to hold a non-party deponent in contempt of court for failure to attend a court-ordered deposition and may order payment of expenses an attorneys' fees caused by the failure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1); *fn12 Gen. Ins. Co. of America v. Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc., 126 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1997). A finding of contempt must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has acted in willful "disobedience . . . to its lawful . . . order." 18 U.S.C. § 401(3); *fn13 Int'l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832 (1994); Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1333, 1340 (3d Cir. 1995). The "lawful order" may be a court's subpoena or discovery order requiring a nonparty to be deposed. General Insurance, 126 F.3d at 221; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e). *fn14
Here, it is clear that Laura Andre was aware of this Court's order that she be deposed. She had notice of the court-ordered deposition and appeared for the first day on August 6, 2003. (Pls.' Ex. J.) Then, after the Court ordered that the deposition continue, she canceled the remainder of the day's deposition, asking "that we continue tomorrow morning." (Id. at 73:23-74:15.) The next morning, though, she unilaterally decided not to appear without good cause. (See Pls.' Ex. K.) She did not seek an extension from this Court; she did not seek consent of counsel; she simply did not appear. Her attorney explained that:
I certainly understand that these gentlemen are entitled to take Miss Andre's deposition, however, the scope of the deposition is a critical juncture and it has to be decided. And to my client it was not decided correctly yesterday.
Well, strike that. It was decided correctly yesterday. It wasn't decided based on correct information that was supplied.
(Id. at 4:10-17.) *fn15 Counsel for Ms. Andre, though, did not immediately file a motion for a stay or for reconsideration of the scope of discovery or seek a stay of the Court's order. Instead, on August 11, 2003, as discussed above, her attorney sent a facsimile to the Court minutes prior to a scheduled telephone conference urging the Court to reconsider its decision. *fn16 When counsel for Ms. Andre again asked the Court to consider "the scope of discovery that's allowable for Ms. Andre," the Court replied:
How many times do I have to address this issue? I want her discovery taken from stem to stern. There doesn't seem to be, on Ms. Andre's part and Mr. Holloway's part, a forthcomingness about their financial dealings because her wealth appears to be unexplained.
(Id. at 8:1-5.) Counsel for Ms. Andre continued to argue for reconsideration of the scope of discovery based on record evidence and an in-person oral argument.
After hearing from counsel for plaintiffs and for Ms. Andre, this Court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Andre sought to intentionally avoid an order of this Court, and stall discovery in this matter, by unilaterally failing to appear at the August 7, 2003 deposition and by advancing her unmerited and unfiled reconsideration submission. The Court also finds that appropriate sanctions here are the reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees that the plaintiffs incurred when they appeared on August 7, 2003, when they were faced with the last-minute reconsideration submission provided during the August 11, 2003 telephone conference, and when they were forced to oppose and argue, again, the scope of appropriate discovery from Ms. Andre in their written submission and in their oral arguments on September 8, 2003. The Court will determine the reasonableness of plaintiffs' incurred fees in a future order. *fn17
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that plaintiffs may seek discovery from Ms. Andre of all matters relevant to the plaintiffs' right of execution upon the six-million dollar Holloway judgment and of all matters relevant to the extent and sources of Ms. Andre's wealth, including her income, expenses, assets and liabilities, for the entirety of the period that she has been associated with Mr. Holloway, personally or professionally. The Court also finds that Ms. Andre deliberately refused to appear at her deposition in violation of this Court's Order, and filed the present meritless motion. As a result, this Court will order that her deposition continue and will require her to pay the reasonable fees and expenses incurred by plaintiffs in connection with her failure to appear on August 7, 2003 and in connection with the present motion.
The accompanying order is entered.
JEROME B. SIMANDLE United States District Judge
This matter came before the Court upon the letter request of David M. Lipshutz, Esquire, attorney for Laura Andre, non-party, for reconsideration of the Court's oral Order of August 6, 2003, arguing that it inappropriately determined the scope of discovery permissible from Laura Andre; and plaintiffs having sought sanctions for Ms. Andre's failure to appear at deposition on August 7, 2003; and the Court having considered the submissions of counsel in support and opposition and having heard the oral arguments of counsel on September 8, 2003 with plaintiffs appearing through Michael Zindler, Esquire and David Fitzsimons, Esquire, and Laura Andre appearing through David Lipshutz, Esquire;
IT IS, this 29th day of September, 2003, hereby
ORDERED that with respect to discovery sought from non-party Laura Andre, whether by deposition or document request, the scope of such discovery regarding Laura Andre and her related corporations, shall include:
(1) all matters relevant to the plaintiffs' right of execution upon the Judgment entered by this Court on June 27, 1997 against defendant Gregory Holloway in the amount of $6,097,015, and
(2) all matters relevant the sources and extent of Ms. Andre's wealth (including income, expenses, assets and liabilities), for the entirety of the period that she has been associated with Mr. Holloway, personally and professionally; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' application for sanctions for Ms. Andre's failure to appear at her deposition and for her present motion be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and Ms. Andre is ADJUDGED in violation of this Court's Order that she provide deposition testimony by refusing to appear at her August 7, 2003 deposition and for stalling her deposition by filing a meritless request for reconsideration; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ms. Andre shall be ordered to pay the reasonable counsel fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs in connection with their appearance at the August 7, 2003 deposition, their appearance for the August 11, 2003 telephone conference call, their opposition papers submitted for this motion, and their appearance in Court on September 8, 2003; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' counsel submit by Friday, October 10, 2003 an affidavit consistent with L. Civ. R. 54.2 with records of the hours of counsel and expenses associated with their August 7, 2003, August 11, 2003, and September 8, 2003 appearances and their opposition papers, including the tasks performed, the hourly rates, and the amounts billed, and that Ms. Andre shall have until Friday, October 24, 2003 to file any objection to the amount of fees and costs sought by plaintiffs, and the Court will determine the amount of such sanctions without further hearing; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' deposition of Ms. Andre shall reconvene at a time and place of plaintiffs' choosing within fourteen (14) days hereof and that it may exceed the seven-hour limit established in Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2); and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the date for hearing on plaintiffs' motion to add Laura Andre and her related corporations as defendants is ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE, and that plaintiffs' submission supporting the motion will be due thirty days after the conclusion of Ms. Andre's deposition.
JEROME B. SIMANDLE United States District Judge