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Lepage's Inc. v. 3M

March 25, 2003

LEPAGE'S INCORPORATED; LEPAGE'S MANAGEMENT COMPANY, L.L.C., APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
v.
3M (MINNESOTA MINING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY); KROLL ASSOCIATES, INC. MINNESOTA MINING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE



On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 97-03983) District Judge: The Honorable John R. Padova

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sloviter, Circuit Judge

PRECEDENTIAL

Argued July 12, 2001 BEFORE: SLOVITER, ALITO, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

Reargued En Banc October 30, 2002 BEFORE: BECKER, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, SCIRICA, NYGAARD, ALITO, McKEE, AMBRO, FUENTES, SMITH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, with whom Becker, Chief Judge, Nygaard, McKee, Ambro, Fuentes, and Smith, Circuit Judges, join:

Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company ("3M") appeals from the District Court's order entered March 14, 2000, declining to overturn the jury's verdict for LePage's in its suit against 3M under Section 2 of the Sherman Act ("§ 2"). 3M raises various objections to the trial court's decision but essentially its position is a legal one: it contends that a plaintiff cannot succeed in a § 2 monopolization case unless it shows that the conceded monopolist sold its product below cost. Because we conclude that exclusionary conduct, such as the exclusive dealing and bundled rebates proven here, can sustain a verdict under § 2 against a monopolist and because we find no other reversible error, we will affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3M, which manufactures Scotch tape for home and office use, dominated the United States transparent tape market with a market share above 90% until the early 1990s. It has conceded that it has a monopoly in that market. LePage's, *fn1 founded in 1876, has sold a variety of office products and, around 1980, decided to sell "second brand" and private label transparent tape, i.e., tape sold under the retailer's name rather than under the name of the manufacturer. By 1992, LePage's sold 88% of private label tape sales in the United States, which represented but a small portion of the transparent tape market. Private label tape sold at a lower price to the retailer and the customer than branded tape.

Distribution patterns and consumer acceptance accounted for a shift of some tape sales from branded tape to private label tape. With the rapid growth of office superstores, such as Staples and Office Depot, and mass merchandisers, such as Wal-Mart and Kmart, distribution patterns for second brand and private label tape changed as many of the large retailers wanted to use their "brand names" to sell stationery products, including transparent tape. 3M also entered the private label business during the early 1990s and sold its own second brand under the name "Highland."

LePage's claims that, in response to the growth of this competitive market, 3M engaged in a series of related, anticompetitive acts aimed at restricting the availability of lower-priced transparent tape to consumers. It also claims that 3M devised programs that prevented LePage's and the other domestic company in the business, Tesa Tuck, Inc., from gaining or maintaining large volume sales and that 3M maintained its monopoly by stifling growth of private label tape and by coordinating efforts aimed at large distributors to keep retail prices for Scotch tape high. *fn2 LePage's claims that it barely was surviving at the time of trial and that it suffered large operating losses from 1996 through 1999.

LePage's brought this antitrust action asserting that 3M used its monopoly over its Scotch tape brand to gain a competitive advantage in the private label tape portion of the transparent tape market in the United States through the use of 3M's multi-tiered "bundled rebate" structure, which offered higher rebates when customers purchased products in a number of 3M's different product lines. LePage's also alleges that 3M offered to some of LePage's customers large lump-sum cash payments, promotional allowances and other cash incentives to encourage them to enter into exclusive dealing arrangements with 3M.

LePage's asserted claims for unlawful agreements in restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act, monopolization and attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and exclusive dealing under § 3 of the Clayton Act. After a nine week trial, the jury returned its verdict for LePage's on both its monopolization and attempted monopolization claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and assessed damages of $22,828,899 on each. It found in 3M's favor on LePage's claims under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act. 3M filed its motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, arguing that its rebate and discount programs and the other conduct of which LePage's complained did not constitute the basis for a valid antitrust claim as a matter of law and that, in any event, the court's charge to the jury was insufficiently specific and LePage's damages proof was speculative. *fn3 The District Court granted 3M's motion for judgment as a matter of law on LePage's "attempted maintenance of monopoly power" claim but denied 3M's motion for judgment as a matter of law in all other respects and denied its motion for new trial. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, No. CIV. A.97-3983, 2000 WL 280350 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2000). The Court subsequently entered a judgment for trebled damages of $68,486,697 to which interest was to be added. LePage's filed a cross appeal on the District Court's judgment dismissing its attempted maintenance of monopoly power claim.

On appeal, the panel of this court before which this case was originally argued reversed the District Court's judgment on LePage's § 2 claim by a divided vote. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, Nos. 00-1368 and 00-1473 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2002). This court granted LePage's motion for rehearing en banc and, pursuant to its practice, vacated the panel opinion. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, Nos. 00-1368 and 00-1473 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2002) (order vacating panel opinion). The appeal was then orally argued before the court en banc.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a) because LePage's brought these claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We exercise plenary review over an order granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 154 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1998). When, as here, a defendant makes such a motion, a court should grant it "only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability." Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, we review the evidence on the appeal in the light most favorable to LePage's. As the historical facts are not in sharp dispute, and our opinion turns largely on legal determinations, we review questions of law underlying the jury verdict on a plenary basis. Bloom v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 41 F.3d 911, 913 (3d Cir. 1994).

Our review of a jury's verdict is limited to determining whether some evidence in the record supports the jury's verdict. See Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1265 (3d Cir. 1994) ("A jury verdict will not be overturned unless the record is critically deficient of that quantum of evidence from which a jury could have rationally reached its verdict.").

III. MONOPOLIZATION -- APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).

A private party may sue for damages for violation of this provision and recover threefold the damages and counsel fees. Id. § 15.

Because this section is in sweeping language, suggesting the breadth of its coverage, we look to the Supreme Court decisions for elucidation of the standard to be used in cases alleging monopolization. Elucidation came in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), where the Court declared that a defendant company which possesses monopoly power in the relevant market will be found in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act if the defendant willfully acquired or maintained that power. Id. at 570-71.

In this case, the parties agreed that the relevant product market is transparent tape and the relevant geographic market is the United States. *fn4 Moreover, as to the issue of monopoly power, as we noted above, 3M concedes it possesses monopoly power in the United States transparent tape market, with a 90% market share. In fact, the evidence showed that the household penetration of 3M's Scotch-brand tape is virtually 100%. Therefore we need not dwell on the oft-contested issue of market power. See Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1805, 1807 (1990) ("In monopoly enforcement under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the pivotal inquiry is almost always whether the challenged party has substantial market power in its relevant market.").

The sole remaining issue and our focus on this appeal is whether 3M took steps to maintain that power in a manner that violated § 2 of the Sherman Act. A monopolist willfully acquires or maintains monopoly power when it competes on some basis other than the merits. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985).

LePage's argues that 3M willfully maintained its monopoly in the transparent tape market through exclusionary conduct, primarily by bundling its rebates and entering into contracts that expressly or effectively required dealing virtually exclusively with 3M, which LePage's characterizes as de facto exclusive. 3M does not argue that it did not engage in this conduct. It agrees that it offered bundled rebates and entered into some exclusive dealing contracts, although it argues that only the few contracts that are expressly exclusive may be considered as such. Instead, 3M argues that its conduct was legal as a matter of law because it never priced its transparent tape below its cost.*fn5

This is the most significant legal issue in this case because it underlies 3M's argument. In its brief, 3M states "[a]bove-cost pricing cannot give rise to an antitrust offense as a matter of law, since it is the very conduct that the antitrust laws wish to promote in the interest of making consumers better off." Appellant's Br. at 30. For this proposition it relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993). It is an argument 3M repeated frequently during its oral argument before the en banc court. Counsel stated, "if the big guy is selling above cost, it has done nothing which offends the Sherman Act . . . ." Tr. of Oral Argument, Oct. 30, 2002, at 11. This was the theory upon which 3M's counsel responded to all the questions from the court. When asked whether its theory is that because no one contended that 3M sold below its cost, that is "the end of the story," its counsel responded, "[w]ith the exception of the inconsequential express contract, absolutely." Id.

It is therefore necessary for us, at the outset, to examine whether we must accept 3M's legal theory that after Brooke Group, no conduct by a monopolist who sells its product above cost -- no matter how exclusionary the conduct -- can constitute monopolization in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The history of the interpretation of § 2 of the Sherman Act demonstrates the lack of foundation for 3M's premise.

Although § 2 of the Sherman Act may have received less judicial and scholarly attention than several of the other more frequently invoked antitrust provisions, the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, has made clear the type of conduct that will be held to constitute monopolization in violation of § 2.

The modern era begins with the decision by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Alcoa"). Because four members of the Supreme Court were disqualified, the Supreme Court was required to apply the provision of the Expediting Act, Section 29 of Title 15, U.S.C., 1940 ed., currently 28 U.S.C. § 2109, to certify the case to the three most senior judges of the relevant circuit. *fn6 Under the statute, the decision of that court was "final and conclusive," thus equating it to a decision of the Supreme Court.

At the time in question, Alcoa was the sole domestic producer of aluminum and thus had a monopoly that the Government sought to disband. In the opinion on liability, the court enunciated certain principles that remain fully applicable today. One such principle is that it does not follow that a company that has a monopoly has "monopolized" the market because "it may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon it." Id. at 429. As the court explained, "persons may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly, automatically so to say: that is, without having intended either to put an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from arising when none had existed; they may become monopolists by force of accident." Id. at 429-30. On the other hand, the court then quoted Justice Cardozo's statement in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932), that "size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the past." Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430.

The court determined that Alcoa, which controlled over 90% of the aluminum market, had utilized its size for abuse. The court, noting that there had been at least "one or two abortive attempts" by others to enter the industry, concluded that Alcoa "effectively anticipated and forestalled all competition, and succeeded in holding the field alone." Id. at 430. Finding Alcoa in violation of § 2, the court continued:

Nothing compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the field. It insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel. Id. at 431.

One year later, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), the Supreme Court endorsed the Alcoa decision when upholding a jury verdict finding a § 2 violation. The government brought a criminal action against various tobacco companies that between 1931 and 1939 accounted at all times for more than 68%, and usually for more than 75%, of the nation's domestic cigarette production. Defendants were convicted and fined after the jury found they had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to control the price of leaf tobacco, to acquire less expensive supplies of tobacco they did not need in order to deprive rival manufacturers of cheaper brands, to control cigarette prices, and to force cigarette distributors to treat rival brands less favorably.

The court of appeals affirmed, finding the verdicts to be supported by sufficient evidence. The Supreme Court granted the tobacco companies' petitions for certiorari only as to their § 2 claims, seeking to answer the specific question "whether actual exclusion of competitors is necessary to the crime of monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 784. Answering that question in the negative, the Court stated that "[n]either proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of existing or potential competitors is essential to sustain a charge of monopolization under the Sherman Act." Id. at 810. Furthermore, and importantly, the Court explicitly "welcome[d] this opportunity to endorse" certain passages from Judge Hand's opinion. Id. at 813.

Of particular relevance, the American Tobacco Court endorsed Judge Hand's understanding of the Sherman Act, namely that the Act contemplated the notion that " 'unchallenged economic power deadens initiative' " and " 'that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress.' " Id. (quoting Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427). It further quoted Alcoa for the previously mentioned propositions that monopolies can be "thrust" upon entities rather than achieved and that specific intent under § 2 was not required " 'for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.' " Id. at 813-14 (quoting Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 432).

Section 2 of the Sherman Act was next considered by the Supreme Court in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). The United States had brought a civil suit against the publisher of the Lorain Journal, the only business disseminating news and advertising in the town of Lorain, Ohio, alleging that it attempted to monopolize in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act because it refused to sell advertising to persons that patronized the small radio station that was established in a nearby community. The Supreme Court held that although a trader has discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal "[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly," id. at 155 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)), the action of the Journal constituted a purposeful means of regaining its previous monopoly over the mass dissemination of news and advertising. Id. Because this was an attempt to monopolize in violation of § 2, the Court approved the entry of an injunction ordering the Journal to print the advertisements of the customers of the radio station.

Thereafter, in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), the Supreme Court reiterated that monopoly power alone is not necessarily unlawful. The Court summarized its prior cases, stating that § 2 of the Sherman Act required two elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 384 U.S. at 570-71.

In Grinnell, the United States filed a civil suit against several companies that offered central station protective services, such as fire and burglary protective devices, alleging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Referring to the two-pronged test under § 2, the Court found that both prongs had been satisfied. Not only did the companies have monopoly power (87% of the accredited central station service business), but also they largely achieved this power through the aid of pricing practices, acquisitions of competitors, and non-competition covenants, all of which were deemed to be "unlawful and exclusionary practices." Id. at 576.

The Court's later decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), is even more pertinent to the case before us. In Aspen Skiing, a case that also reached the Court only on the § 2 violation, Ski Co., the owner of three of the four major downhill skiing facilities in Aspen, Colorado, discontinued its prior practice of cooperating with the owner of the fourth facility by issuing an interchangeable 6-day pass that could be used on any of the four facilities. It replaced that pass with a 3-area, 6-day ticket featuring only its mountains. It offered the plaintiff, Highlands, owner of the fourth facility, reinstatement of the 4-area ticket only if Highlands would accept a fixed percentage of the revenue that was considerably below Highlands' historical average based on usage. Ski Co. took additional actions that made it extremely difficult for Highlands to market its own multiarea package to replace the joint offering, and Highlands' share of the market declined along with its revenues from associated skiing services. The jury found that Ski Co. possessed monopoly power and awarded Highlands a substantial money judgment as treble damages. The court of appeals affirmed, holding there was sufficient basis in Ski Co.'s actions to demonstrate an abuse of its monopoly power.

In the Supreme Court, Ski Co. argued "that even a firm with monopoly power has no duty to engage in joint marketing with a competitor, that a violation of § 2 cannot be established without evidence of substantial exclusionary conduct, and that none of its activities can be characterized as exclusionary." Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 600. The Supreme Court agreed with the legal proposition, but referred to its earlier opinion in Lorain Journal where it held that a monopolist's right to refuse to deal was not unqualified. Id. at 600-01. After reviewing all the circumstances, it affirmed the judgment for Highlands in a unanimous opinion. It held that the jury had ample basis to reject Ski Co.'s business justification defense and noted that Ski Co. failed to offer any efficiency justification whatever for its pattern of conduct. Id. at 608. The Court stated, "[a]lthough Ski Co.'s pattern of conduct may not have been as 'bold, relentless, and predatory' as the publisher's actions in Lorain Journal, the record in this case comfortably supports an inference that the monopolist made a deliberate effort to discourage its customers from doing business with its smaller rival." Id. at 610 (quoting Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 149 (citation omitted)).

In a significant passage about the conduct that constitutes monopolization in violation of § 2, the Court stated that when the issue is monopolization rather than an attempt to monopolize, "evidence of intent is merely relevant to the question whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as 'exclusionary' or 'anticompetitive' -- to use the words in the trial court's instructions -- or 'predatory,' to use a word that scholars seem to favor." Id. at 602. The Court continued, "[w]hichever label is used, there is agreement on the proposition that 'no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.' " Id. (quoting Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 432).

In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451(1992), 18 independent service organizations ("ISO's") that serviced Kodak copying and micrographic equipment brought an antitrust action against Kodak for its policies that sought to limit the availability of Kodak parts to ISO's. They alleged Kodak's policies were unlawful under both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court considered the issues under the two provisions separately. In its analysis under § 2, the Court first held that Kodak's control of nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service market was sufficient to support a claim of monopoly power (an issue that is conceded here). As to the issue whether Kodak adopted its parts and service policies as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, the Court stated that there was evidence that Kodak "took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market." Id. at 483. Thus, Kodak could escape liability under § 2 only if it could explain its actions on the basis of valid business reasons, an issue as to which there were factual questions which made the district court's grant of summary judgment for Kodak inappropriate. Id.

This extensive review of the Supreme Court's § 2 decisions is set forth to provide the background under which we must evaluate 3M's contention that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), a decision that was primarily concerned with the Robinson-Patman Act, not § 2 of the Sherman Act. In Brooke Group, Liggett, a cigarette manufacturer responsible for the "innovative development" of generic cigarettes, claimed that Brown & Williamson, which introduced its own line of generic cigarettes, "cut prices on generic cigarettes below cost and offered discriminatory volume rebates to wholesalers to force Liggett to raise its own generic cigarette prices and introduce oligopoly pricing in the economy segment [of the national cigarette market]." Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 212. It filed a Robinson-Patman action on the basis of these allegations. Brown & Williamson's deep price discounts or rebates were concededly discriminatory, not cost justified, and resulted in substantial loss to it. The Supreme Court majority held that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence of injury to competition. Id. at 243. The Court also held that the evidence did not show that Brown & Williamson's alleged scheme "was likely to result in oligopolistic price coordination and sustained supracompetitive pricing in the generic segment of the national cigarette market. Without this, Brown & Williamson had no reasonable prospect of recouping its predatory losses and could not inflict the injury to competition the antitrust laws prohibit." Id. *fn7

Unlike 3M, Brown & Williamson was part of an oligopoly, six manufacturers whose prices for cigarettes "increased in lockstep" and who "reaped the benefits of prices above a competitive level." Id. at 213. Brown & Williamson had 12% of the oligopolistic market. Its conduct and pricing were at all times necessarily constrained by the presence of competitors who could, and did, react to its conduct by undertaking similar price cuts or pricing behavior. *fn8

Assuming arguendo that Brooke Group should be read for the proposition that a company's pricing action is legal if its prices are not below its costs, nothing in the decision suggests that its discussion of the issue is applicable to a monopolist with its unconstrained market power. Moreover, LePage's, unlike the plaintiff in Brooke Group, does not make a predatory pricing claim. 3M is a monopolist; a monopolist is not free to take certain actions that a company in a competitive (or even oligopolistic) market may take, because there is no market constraint on a monopolist's behavior. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 601-04.

Nothing in any of the Supreme Court's opinions in the decade since the Brooke Group decision suggested that the opinion overturned decades of Supreme Court precedent that evaluated a monopolist's liability under § 2 by examining its exclusionary, i.e., predatory, conduct. Brooke Group has been cited only four times by the Supreme Court, three times in cases that were not even antitrust cases for propositions patently inapplicable here. *fn9 In the only antitrust case of the four, NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998), the Court considered whether the per se rule applicable to group boycotts under § 1 of the Sherman Act should be applied "where a single buyer favors one seller over another, albeit for an improper reason." Id. at 133. Holding that the rule of reason applies, the Court quoted Brooke Group for the proposition that "[e]ven an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal anti-trust laws." Id. at 137 (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225). The opinion does not discuss, much less adopt, the proposition that a monopolist does not violate § 2 unless it sells below cost. Thus, nothing that the Supreme Court has written since Brooke Group dilutes the Court's consistent holdings that a monopolist will be found to violate § 2 of the Sherman Act if it engages in exclusionary or predatory conduct without a valid business justification.

IV. MONOPOLIZATION -- EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT

A. Illustrative Cases

Before turning to consider LePage's allegation that 3M engaged in exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct and the evidence it produced, we consider the type of conduct § 2 encompasses.

As one court of appeals has stated: " 'Anticompetitive conduct' can come in too many different forms, and is too dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have enumerated all the varieties." Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reversing in part the district court's dismissal of complaint and holding that radio station's claim that defendants made misrepresentations to advertisers and the government in order to protect its monopoly stated § 2 Sherman Act claim).

Numerous cases hold that the enforcement of the legal monopoly provided by a patent procured through fraud may violate § 2. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965); see also Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-478-SLR, 2001 WL 652016 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2001) (patentee could have violated § 2 by bringing infringement action on patent procured by fraud). Predatory pricing by a monopolist can provide a basis for § 2 liability. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reversing district court's directed verdict and ordering new trial on § 2 claims due to evidence that company had 90% of rotary electric shaver market, existence of substantial entry barriers, and company had drastically reduced prices to eliminate potential competitors). A monopolist's denial to competitors of access to its "essential" goods, services or resources has been held to violate § 2. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (finding § 2 violation where monopolist utility company refused to sell wholesale to municipalities and refused to transfer competitors' power over its lines); see also Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding corporation liable under § 2 for refusing to lease Chicago Stadium to plaintiff, a potential buyer of the Chicago Bulls basketball team, after determining Stadium to be essential to professional basketball in Chicago area). An arbitrary refusal to deal by a monopolist may constitute a § 2 violation. See Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979) (remanding case to district court for fact-finding to determine whether defendant possessed monopoly power and unlawfully refused to deal in violation of § 2). Even unfair tortious conduct unrelated to a monopolist's pricing policies has been held to violate § 2. See Int'l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980) (upholding treble damages antitrust award against airline with monopoly power after finding sufficient evidence that airline placed false, deceptive, and misleading advertisements discouraging public patronage of travel group charters).

A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 876, 154 L.Ed. 2d 850 (2003), presents a good illustration of the type of exclusionary conduct that will support a § 2 violation. That court upheld the jury's award to plaintiff Conwood of $350 million, which trebled was $1.05 billion, against United States Tobacco Company ("USTC") because of USTC's monopolization. USTC was the sole manufacturer of moist snuff until the 1970's when Conwood, Swisher, and Swedish Match, other moist snuff manufacturers, entered the moist snuff market. Not unexpectedly, USTC's 100% market share declined and it took the action that formed the basis of Conwood's complaint against USTC alleging, inter alia, unlawful monopolization in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.

The evidence that the district court and the court of appeals held proved that USTC systematically tried to exclude competition from the moist snuff market included the following: USTC (1) removed and destroyed or discarded racks that displayed moist snuff products in the stores while placing Conwood products in USTC racks in an attempt to bury Conwood's products; (2) trained its "operatives to take advantage of inattentive store clerks with various 'ruses' such as obtaining nominal permission to reorganize or neaten the moist snuff section" in an effort to destroy Conwood racks; (3) misused its position as category manager (manages product groups and business units and customizes them on a store by store basis) by providing misleading information to retailers in an effort to dupe them into carrying USTC products and to discontinue carrying Conwood products; and (4) entered into exclusive agreements with retailers in an effort to exclude rivals' products. Id. at 783.

On appeal, USTC -- like 3M -- did not challenge that it had monopoly power and agreed that the relevant product was moist snuff and the geographic market was nationwide. Id. at 782-83. Instead, USTC contended that Conwood had failed to establish that USTC's power was acquired or maintained by exclusionary practices rather than by its legitimate business practices and superior product. Id. at 783. Both the district court and the court of appeals rejected USTC's argument, finding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find willful maintenance by USTC of monopoly power by engaging in exclusionary practices in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 788.

Similarly, 3M sought to meet the competition that LePage's threatened by exclusionary conduct that consisted of rebate programs and exclusive dealing arrangements designed to drive LePage's and any other viable competitor from the transparent tape market.

B. Bundled Rebates

In considering LePage's conduct that led to the jury's ultimate verdict, we note that the jury had before it evidence of the full panoply of 3M's exclusionary conduct, including both the exclusive dealing arrangements and the bundled rebates which could reasonably have been viewed as effectuating exclusive dealing arrangements because of the way in which they were structured.

Through a program denominated Executive Growth Fund ("EGF ") and thereafter Partnership Growth Fund ("PGF "), 3M offered many of LePage's major customers substantial rebates to induce them to eliminate or reduce their purchases of tape from LePage's. Rather than competing by offering volume discounts which are concededly legal and often reflect cost savings, 3M's rebate programs offered discounts to certain customers conditioned on purchases spanning six of 3M's diverse product lines. The product lines covered by the rebate program were: Health Care Products, Home Care Products, Home Improvement Products, Stationery Products (including transparent tape), Retail Auto Products, and Leisure Time. Sealed App. at 2979. In addition to bundling the rebates, both of 3M's rebate programs set customer-specific target growth rates in each product line. The size of the rebate was linked to the number of product lines in which targets were met, and the number of targets met by the buyer determined the rebate it would receive on all of its purchases. If a customer failed to meet the target for any one product, its failure would cause it to lose the rebate across the line. This created a substantial incentive for each customer to meet the targets across all product lines to maximize its rebates.

The rebates were considerable, not "modest" as 3M states. Appellant's Br. at 15. For example, Kmart, which had constituted 10% of LePage's business, received $926,287 in 1997, Sealed App. at 2980, and in 1996 Wal-Mart received more than $1.5 million, Sam's Club received $666,620, and Target received $482,001. Sealed App. at 2773. Just as significant as the amounts received is the powerful incentive they provided to customers to purchase 3M tape rather than LePage's in order not to forego the maximum rebate 3M offered. The penalty would have been $264,000 for Sam's Club, $450,000 for Kmart, and $200,000 to $310,000 for American Stores.

3M does not deny that it offered these programs although it gives different reasons for the discounts to each customer. Instead it argues that they were no more exclusive than procompetitive lawful discount programs. And, as it responds to each of LePage's allegations, it returns to its central premise "that it is not unlawful to lower one's prices so long as they remain above cost." Appellant's Br. at 36 (citing Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222).

However, one of the leading treatises discussing the inherent anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates, even if they are priced above cost, notes that "the great majority of bundled rebate programs yield aggregate prices above cost. Rather than analogizing them to predatory pricing, they are best compared with tying, whose foreclosure effects are similar. Indeed, the 'package discount' is often a close analogy." Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 794, at 83 (Supp. 2002).

The treatise then discusses the anticompetitive effect as follows:

The anticompetitive feature of package discounting is the strong incentive it gives buyers to take increasing amounts or even all of a product in order to take advantage of a discount aggregated across multiple products. In the anticompetitive case, which we presume is in the minority, the defendant rewards the customer for buying its product B rather than the plaintiff 's B, not because defendant's B is better or even cheaper. Rather, the customer buys the defendant's B in order to receive a greater discount on A, which the plaintiff does ...


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