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Arthrotek, Inc. v. Medi Peth Medical Lab

January 27, 1999


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Joel A. Pisano United States Magistrate Judge


Before the Court is plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendant filed opposition, and the Court decides the motion on the papers pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. *fn1


Plaintiff alleges that it had a straightforward agreement with defendant for the provision of medical equipment. Plaintiff further alleges that it delivered the equipment, but defendant refuses to pay. The facts are that simple.

Plaintiff filed suit on April 13, 1998, and defendant answered on June 8, 1998. After reviewing defendant's answer, plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on August 12, 1998. After several extensions were granted by Judge Walls's chambers, defendant ultimately filed opposition to plaintiff's motion on September 15, 1998. Plaintiff filed a short letter brief in reply on September 18, 1998. Finally, on January 20, 1999, the parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned.

Attached to plaintiff's brief in support of the motion for summary judgment is a certification by Joel P. Pratt, president of plaintiff Arthrotek, Inc. Therein, Pratt asserts that during spring 1996 plaintiff and defendant reached an agreement concerning two IES Systems (Pratt Cert. ¶ 3). The goods were to be paid for by defendant and delivered by plaintiff to Lackland Airforce Base in Texas (Pratt Cert. ¶ 3). Pratt further certifies that on or about May 17, 1996, plaintiff delivered the two systems to their intended destination in Texas (Pratt Cert. ¶ 3). Repeatedly, plaintiff claims to have invoiced defendant and made written demands for payment, but defendant refuses to pay (Pratt Cert. ¶¶ 7-11). The parties' alleged agreement calls for a service charge of 1.5% per month for any amount outstanding past thirty days (Pratt Cert. ¶ 6). As a result, defendant allegedly now owes the original amount from the contract, $89,167, plus $31,367.21 in service charges through July 1, 1998, together with interest and costs (Pratt Cert. ¶ 11).

Interestingly, defendant does not dispute any of the above allegations. Although defendant's opposition brief sets forth black- letter law of summary judgment, the papers are devoid of any factual allegations and do not refute in any way plaintiff's version of the parties' agreement.


Summary judgment is governed by the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which states, in relevant part, that [t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Procedurally, and regardless of who bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Countryside Oil Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 474, 480 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The Third Circuit has emphasized that a stringent standard is imposed when a plaintiff moves for summary judgment. See National State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992). Specifically, "where the movant bears the burden of proof at trial and the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine factual issue, the district court should deny summary judgment even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented." Resolution Trust Co. v. Gill, 960 F.2d 336, 340 (3d Cir. 1992).

In Gill, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined a case in which the government, moving for summary judgment before the district court, sought an order stating that it was entitled to certain funds on deposit with First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Pittsburgh. See Gill, 960 F.2d at 340. The government argued before the district court that it was entitled to those funds because it had properly served a notice of levy prior to the account holder's withdrawing the monies. See id. at 338-40. The non-moving party did not oppose the government's motion for summary judgment. See id. The district court observed that the account holder had put forth no evidence that the levy was not made before she withdrew the funds. See id. at 340. Unsurprisingly, the district court then held that the government--the moving party--was entitled to summary judgment. See id.

The Third Circuit reversed, holding that summary judgment is not appropriate simply because the non-moving party puts forward no evidence. See id. at 342. The Court observed that the district court did not find unmistakably that the levy preceded the closing of the accounts or the issuance of the checks, facts that would need to be firmly established under the relevant administrative levy statute. See id. Rather, the district court only found that the levy preceded the account holder's receipt of the checks. See id. Therefore, summary judgment for the moving party was not appropriate. See id.

Likewise, the Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in National State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 979 F.2d 1579 (3d Cir. 1992). There, plaintiff below sought summary judgment, claiming that defendant Federal Reserve Bank of New York had breached its duty of ordinary care. See id. at 1583. The case involved a check kiting scheme in which National State Bank, the depositor bank, (1) received a check by an account holder, (2) waited the customary several days to see if it would be dishonored by the payor bank (where the funds backing the check were allegedly located), and (3) then made the funds available for withdrawal by the account holder. See id. at 1580-81. The problem was that, for some reason, the defendant never forwarded the checks to the payor bank, who thus never had an opportunity to inform plaintiff that there were insufficient funds to cover the check. See id. After the payor bank ...

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