Argued January 2l, l998 Before Judges Long, Kleiner and Kimmelman. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: The opinion of the court was delivered by Long, P.j.a.d.
 In l994, plaintiff Tanisha Sykes ("Sykes") was a student at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey ("Rutgers"). Sykes lived in a dormitory apartment on Rutgers' Busch Campus in New Brunswick. On the morning of February 3, 1994, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Sykes went out to Parking Lot #58 to start her car. When her car would not start, she headed back to her dormitory. On the way, she slipped and fell on an "accumulation of ice" in the parking lot and was injured.
On September 21, 1995, Sykes filed a complaint against Rutgers alleging that her "fall, and resulting bodily injuries" were caused by its "negligence and carelessness." Specifically, she charged that Rutgers "failed to protect against the condition by failing to properly inspect, repair, supervise, control and remedy or warn of the same."
On May 19, 1997, Rutgers filed a motion for summary judgment contending that, as a public entity, it is shielded from liability by common law snow-removal immunity and the weather-immunity provision of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:4-7.
In opposition, Sykes contended that the "immunities claimed by Rutgers are not absolute." Relying on Bligen v. Jersey City Housing Authority, 131 N.J. 124 (1993), Sykes urged that statutory weather- immunity provided by N.J.S.A. 59:4-7 does not apply when, as in her case, an accident occurs in a parking lot and not on a "street" or "highway" and that the policy reasons behind common law snow-removal immunity do not apply to the Busch campus parking lot because it constitutes only a "finite, bounded area" from which to remove snow.
Following oral argument, the trial Judge entered an order denying Rutgers' motion for summary judgment finding the case "almost indistinguishable" from Bligen. By our leave, Rutgers appeals contending that the trial Judge erred in failing to recognize its immune status.
There are two possible roads to snow-removal immunity; one is the Tort Claims Act and the other is the common law. The relevant provision of the Tort Claims Act is N.J.S.A. 59:4-7 which provides:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused solely by the effect on the use of streets and highways of weather conditions.
The Supreme Court in Bligen denied Tort Claims Act coverage to the Jersey City Housing Authority for a fall on an icy parking lot because the internal driveways and parking areas of a public housing complex are not "streets" or "highways" as contemplated by the Act.
Sykes asks us to analogize the Busch Campus parking lot to the facts in Bligen in order to conclude that Tort Claims Act immunity is unavailable. However, the Court in Bligen specifically declined to enunciate a rule broader than the facts before it:
The precise scope of the statutory terminology is not before us. Our Conclusion that the internal driveway servicing defendant's apartment complex is not a "street" or "highway" does not resolve whether other roadways servicing public facilities are the essential equivalent of public streets covered by the immunity.
We need not grapple with this issue because we have concluded that regardless of Rutgers' entitlement to Tort Claims Act immunity, it is clearly entitled to the common law immunity established in Miehl v. Darpino, 53 N.J. 49 (l968). That immunity was not invalidated by the Tort Claims Act. Rochinsky v. State of New Jersey Department of Transportation, ll0 N.J. 399, 4l4 (l988).
We recognize that the Supreme Court in Bligen refused to afford common law snow-removal immunity to the defendant housing authority. In so doing, it acknowledged that the imposition of liability on public entities responsible for the removal of snow on a network of . . . roadways could be limitless." Bligen, supra, 131 N.J. at 133. However, the Court opined that the driveways and parking lots in a public housing authority, which is "a finite area from which to remove the snow do not present that problem." Id. at 131. In addition, the Court distinguished the facts in Bligen from the previous snow-removal immunity cases by ...