in employment against members of certain classes." Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1995). Courts, including the Third Circuit, routinely use the case law under the three statutes interchangeably. Id. ; see DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 724 n.5 (3d Cir.) (relying on both ADEA and Title VII cases when addressing ADEA claim), cert. denied, 133 L. Ed. 2d 210, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995).
When addressing the question of individual liability under the ADA, ADEA and Title VII, courts look to case law under all three statutes. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1995); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 52 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (dicta); Thelen v. Marc's Big Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 267 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (dicta); United States Equal Employ't Opportunity Comm'n v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 (7th Cir.1995); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109, 114 S. Ct. 1049, 127 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1994).
As indicated, the ADEA, ADA and Title VII definitions of "employer" are virtually identical. Numerous courts of appeals have considered the question of employee liability in cases under the ADEA, ADA and Title VII. The majority of these courts have rejected the concept of employee liability. See Stults, 76 F.3d at 655, Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17 (2d Cir. 1995); Gary v. Long, 313 U.S. App. D.C. 403, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 L. Ed. 2d 493, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995); AIC Sec'y Investigations, 55 F.3d at 1279-82; Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995); Smith, 45 F.3d at 403 n.4; Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 491, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994); Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. Numerous district court decisions in the Third Circuit have likewise rejected employee liability. See Johnakin v. City of Philadelphia, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 445, *2, No. 95-1588, 1996 WL 18821, at *6 (E.D.Pa. 18 January 1996) (listing cases in the Third Circuit which have limited liability to the employer); see also Clarke v. Whitney, 907 F. Supp. 893, 895 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Ascolese v. SEPTA, 902 F. Supp. 533, 538 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Clark v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 885 F. Supp. 694 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 882 F. Supp. 1529, 1531 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Verde v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F. Supp. 1329, 1334-1335 (E.D.Pa. 1994).
The Third Circuit has not addressed the issue of individual liability under the ADA and the ADEA. The Third Circuit has, however, addressed the issue of individual liability under Title VII. See Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3892, No. 94-7509, 1996 WL 36283 (3d Cir.), vacated, 74 F.3d 1459 (3d Cir. 1996).
In Sheridan, the plaintiff, a hotel employee, argued the district court had erred by dismissing her Title VII claims against the hotel's general manager. 1996 WL 36283 at * 12. The plaintiff argued, because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) defined the term "employer" to include "any agent" of an employer and the hotel's general manager was an "agent" of the hotel, the hotel's general manager could be held personally liable under Title VII. Id. The Third Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument:
Arguments such as Sheridan's have been considered by many of the other courts of appeals in cases under Title VII, as well as the [ADEA] and the [ADA], which contain definitions of an "employer" ... that mirror that of Title VII. Many of these courts appear to have completely rejected the concept of employee liability.... We follow the great weight of authority from other courts of appeals and hold that an employee cannot be sued.