The opinion of the court was delivered by: WALLS
In a previous opinion and order, 926 F. Supp. 1213 (D.N.J. 1996), the Court granted all the parties' motions for partial summary judgment on choice of law in part. With regard to the issue of how to interpret the standard pollution-exclusion clause in certain comprehensive general liability ("CGL") contracts (the "'sudden' issue"), it determined that Illinois law applies to a waste site in Granite City, Illinois (the "Granite City site") and New Jersey law applies to a waste site in Portland, Oregon (the "Portland site"). Moreover, with regard to the issue involving timeliness of notice of an occurrence or notice of a claim or suit involving the two sites (the "late-notice issue"), it ruled that New Jersey law applies to the Granite City site and Oregon law applies to the Portland site.
Of the seven insurers who made motions for partial summary judgment, three--Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's and other British Companies ("Lloyd's"), International Insurance Co. ("IIC"), and International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. ("ISLIC") --now move for reconsideration.
I. Standard of review for a motion for reconsideration
Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Local Rule 12(I) states that
[a] motion for reargument shall be served and filed within 10 days after the entry of the order or judgment.... There shall be served with the notice a brief setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Judge ... has overlooked.
U.S.D.C.N.J. Gen. R. 12(I).
A Rule 59(e)/12(I) motion must rely on one of three major grounds: 1) an intervening change of controlling law; 2) the availability of new evidence not available previously; or 3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. North River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Here, Lloyd's, IIC, and ISLIC implicitly invoke only the third ground.
A party should not use a motion for reconsideration to reargue the motion or present evidence which should have been raised before. Moreover, "[a] party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court's decision, and 'recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.'" G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990) (quoting Carteret Savings Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989), appeal dismissed, 919 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1992)). When a motion for reconsideration raises only a party's disagreement with a decision of the Court, that dispute "should be dealt with in the normal appellate process, not on a motion for reargument under" Rule 12(I). Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.N.J. 1988).
In Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Ass. Ins. Co., 134 N.J. 96, 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1993), the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that
we conclude that in determining the choice-of-law rule to govern casualty-insurance contracts, such as the CGL policies in this case, we look first to ... section 193. As stated previously, that section provides that the law of the state that "the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk ... [governs unless] some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties ...." However, in certain cases when the "subject matter of the insurance is an operation or activity" and when "that operation or activity is predictably multistate, the significance of the principal location of the insured risk diminishes ...." In such situations, the governing law is that of the state with the dominant significant relationship according to the principles set forth in ... section 6.
Id. at 111 (citations omitted).
In its previous opinion, this Court--following Gilbert Spruance --first applied § 193 of the Restatement and then § 6. After a § 193 analysis, the Court determined that the parties understood that, during the term of the contracts, the principal location of the insured risk at the Granite City site was in Illinois and that the principal location of the insured risk at the Portland site was in Oregon. See 926 F. Supp. at 1223-25. Therefore, the Court ruled that Illinois law should apply to the Granite City site and Oregon law to the Portland site, unless, with regard to the particular issues at stake in this litigation, some other state has a more significant relationship under the § 6 principles to the transactions and parties.
There are seven factors the Court must apply in a § 6 analysis. For convenience, the Court followed the lead of the Third Circuit and reduced the factors to five "interest groups." See General Ceramics, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 656 (3d Cir. 1995). These include:
(1) the purposes and policies behind each of the competing rules of law and the interests of each respective state in having its particular rules govern,
(2) where interstate or foreign commerce is involved, the desirability of promoting mutually harmonious relationships between governmental entities,
(3) the protection of justified expectations of the parties and the parties' needs for predictability of result,
(4) the basic policy underlying the particular field of law involved, and
(5) the concerns of judicial administration, such as which of the competing rules will simplify the determination and ...