interest of promoting inmate responsibility and prudent management of money, conserving the resources of the state, and defraying the burgeoning cost of inmate medical care. See 28 N.J. Reg. 1543.
The classification of inmates who receive income from outside sources as nonindigent is "rationally related" to the NJDOC's legitimate interests set forth above. The Court finds that requiring inmates who have funds to pay for services such as legal photocopying to pay for such services, teaches fiscal responsibility and alleviates some of the financial burden which would otherwise be imposed upon the taxpayers of New Jersey. See also Johnson v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 885 F. Supp. 817 (D. Md. 1995)(the "federal courts are not to second-guess the wisdom of prison regulations that do not violate constitutional norms").
Accordingly, the Court finds that the classification of inmates, who do not have any funds in their account and who cannot work, but are able to receive funds from an outside source, as nonindigent, and requiring those inmates to use the funds derived from an outside source for the payment of legal photocopying and medical care does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim will be dismissed.
C. Due Process
Plaintiff also contends that he has "a Constitutionally protected property interest in money given to them by family and friends." (Complaint PIV, p. 3-A). He alleges, therefore, that requiring the use of these funds derived from outside sources for the payment of legal photocopying and medical care violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment, both of which proscribe the deprivation of a property interest without due process of law. See Sandin v. Conner, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995).
Not "every state action carrying adverse consequences for prison inmates automatically activates a due process right." Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9, 50 L. Ed. 2d 236, 97 S. Ct. 274 (1976). While an inmate does have a protected property interest in the funds in his or her prison account, an inmate does not have a right not to use such funds for the payment of services. Johnson, 885 F. Supp. at 821 (due process is not violated when deductions are made from an inmate's account "quite simply because they have purchased something on their own initiative."). See also Scott v. Angelone, 771 F. Supp. 1064, 1067-68 (D. Nev. 1991)(inmate not denied due process of law when account charged for medical visits where inmate had prior notice of policy).
In this case, Mr. Robinson has not alleged that he has been charged fees for legal photocopying or medical care without prior notice that they would be charged. Instead, he merely asserts that he must pay for the legal photocopying and medical services rendered with the money received from his family and friends. In other words, Plaintiff seeks to have the taxpayers of the State of New Jersey pay for these services, notwithstanding his ability to pay. The Plaintiff's complaint, therefore, fails to allege a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth or the Fifth Amendments.
D. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986
Finally, Mr. Robinson claims that the Defendant has violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986. This statute is clearly inapplicable in this case. Liability under section 1986
occurs when anyone having knowledge of a conspiracy of wrongs to be committed under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, has the power to prevent such wrongs, but fails to do so. See Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1985, in turn, proscribes conspiracies to deprive persons of constitutionally protected rights. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338, 91 S. Ct. 1790 (1971); Rogers v. Mount Union Borough by Zook, 816 F. Supp. 308 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
Plaintiff has not alleged anything remotely related to a conspiracy to violate his civil rights or Defendant's failure to prevent "any of the wrongs consipired to be done." See 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Moreover, since "section 1986 is a companion statute to section 1985," Church of Human Potential, Inc. v. Vorsky, 636 F. Supp. 93, 96 (D.N.J. 1986), Plaintiff's failure to allege a violation of section 1985 in this case necessarily causes his section 1986 claim to fail as a matter of law. See Rogers, 816 F. Supp. at 314 ("a § 1986 suit may only be maintained in tandem with a § 1985 claim").
Based upon the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted will be granted and Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed.
Dated: July 19, 1996
STEPHEN M. ORLOFSKY
United States District Judge
This matter having come before the Court on July 19, 1996, on the motion of Defendant, William Fauver, to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs, Barry Robinson, James T. Gibbone, II, and Richard Linsky, appearing pro se, and Janine L. Long, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, State of New Jersey, Department of Law and Public Safety, appearing on behalf of the Defendant; and,
The Court having considered the Plaintiffs' complaint, and the briefs filed in support of, and in opposition to Defendant's motion;
For the reasons set forth in this Court's Opinion filed with this Order;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED on this 19th day of July, 1996, that Defendant's motion is GRANTED, and the complaint of Plaintiff, Barry Robinson, is dismissed with prejudice; and,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims of Plaintiffs, James T. Gibbone, II, and Richard Linsky, are dismissed without prejudice.
STEPHEN M. ORLOFSKY
United States District Judge