claims, the Court should not bar the claims because the actions have been consolidated. The Court agrees.
Rule 13(a) exists essentially for the convenience of the federal courts. It is designed to prevent the fragmentation of litigation, multiplicity of actions and to conserve judicial resources. See, e.g., Great Lakes Rubber, 286 F.2d at 633-34 ("Rule 13(a) and the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction are designed to abolish the same evil . . . piecemeal litigation in the federal courts"); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1082 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 966, 62 L. Ed. 2d 379, 100 S. Ct. 455 (1979) ("the civil procedure rule providing for compulsory counterclaims forces parties to raise certain claims at a time and place chosen by their opponents or to lose them, but the rule is the result of a balancing between competing interests; the convenience of the party with a compulsory counterclaim is sacrificed in the interest of judicial economy"); 6 Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1409, p. 46 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1994) ("the reason for [Rule 13(a)] is to enable the court to settle all related claims in one action, thereby avoiding a wasteful multiplicity of litigation on claims arising from a single transaction or occurrence"). While no court in the Third Circuit has ruled on this issue, a number of courts in other circuits have determined that consolidation obviates the concerns of Rule 13(a), thereby making dismissal inappropriate. See, e.g., Branch v. Federal Depositary Insurance Corporation, 825 F. Supp. 384, 401 (D. Mass. 1993) (where second filed action contained compulsory counterclaims but was consolidated with first filed action, "dismissal of [second filed action] would not serve the purposes of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 13(a)"); Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 740 F. Supp. 492, 496 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (where second filed action contained compulsory counterclaims, but the first filed action had been consolidated with second action, dismissal found not to "further any of the policies behind Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 13(a)"). Accordingly, it appears to this Court that dismissal of the Landlords' claims would fail to serve the interest of judicial economy as that interest has been satisfied by the consolidation of these actions.
According to the Landlords' complaint, Bally Entertainment is the parent of Bally H&T, which in turn owns the remaining plaintiffs, Jack LaLanne, Holiday and Scandinavian. Neither Bally Entertainment nor Bally H&T appear to be parties to any of the leases. However, the Landlords' complaint alleges that the two Bally entities should be liable because they controlled and dominated Jack LaLanne, Holiday, and Scandinavian to the extent that the Court should "pierce the corporate veil."
The complaint alleges in relevant part as follows:
Upon information and belief, Bally Entertainment controls and operates the business of Bally's [H&T] as a single business enterprise. In particular, and upon information and belief, . . . Bally Entertainment, through its directors, officers and employees, dominates, controls and otherwise operates Bally's [H&T] as its agency and instrumentality, and is therefore liable for the obligations of Bally's [H&T].