The opinion of the court was delivered by: ALFRED M. WOLIN
This matter is opened before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff Broadcast Music Inc. ("BMI"), and various copyright owners, for a default judgment against defendants DeGallo, Inc., doing business as Club Cocomo, and Mario DePalola. This matter has been decided upon the written submissions of the plaintiff, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons given below, the Court will grant plaintiff's motion and enter a default judgment in this case. However, plaintiff's request for statutory damages will be granted only in part. The request for attorneys fees will be denied pending documentation by plaintiff of the fees actually incurred.
The plaintiff's papers disclose the following facts. Plaintiff is in the business of licensing the right to publicly perform copyrighted musical compositions. Through agreements with the plaintiff copyright owners, BMI has acquired the right to license their musical works. The licenses are granted to concert halls, hotels, nightclubs, etc. in exchange for blanket license fees.
Defendants operate a nightclub in Lyndhurst, New Jersey, called the Club Cocomo. In March 1993, BMI learned that plaintiffs' copyrighted songs were being performed by live performers and in recorded form at the nightclub. Declaration of Lawrence E. Stevens, dated November 16, 1994 ("Stevens Aff."). Over a period extending from August 11, 1993 to March 11, 1994, BMI sent numerous letters to defendants informing them that they were violating the copyrights in the plaintiffs' songs, and requesting that defendants enter into a standard licensing agreement and pay a fee for a blanket license. Id., Exhibits A-G. Representatives of BMI called the Club Cocomo on the telephone and visited the establishment several times. Id. Despite these efforts, defendants did not enter into a licensing agreement with plaintiffs. A representative from BMI attended the Club Cocomo in March 1994 and heard seven of the plaintiffs' songs being performed. Declaration of Christopher Donohue, dated November 22, 1994.
Based on the foregoing facts, plaintiffs' filed their complaint in this Court seeking statutory damages of $ 2,000 for each of the seven infringing performances heard by Donohue for a total of $ 14,000, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). They also ask for a permanent injunction against further infringement of their copyrights, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502. Finally, they seek costs and reasonable attorneys fees, as provided by 17 U.S.C. § 505.
Based on the plaintiffs' papers cited above, and after review of the record as a whole, the Court finds that plaintiffs have properly supported their motion for a default judgment. Defendant has had notice of the action and of this motion as prescribed the Rules. The facts alleged in the pleadings are assumed to be true, Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990), and, in any event, are amply corroborated by plaintiffs' affidavits. The Court finds that defendant has infringed plaintiffs' copyrights in the songs listed in Donohue's declaration. Moreover, the Court finds that the infringement was willful as contemplated by 17 U.S.C. § 504 (c)(2). Accordingly, the Court will assess statutory damages against defendants, jointly and severally. Furthermore, because there appears to be a danger of continuing infringement, the Court will permanently enjoin defendants from further violations of the copyrights. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Niro's Palace, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 958, 963 (N.D. Ill. 1985). However, because the damages are obviously not a sum certain, the Court must make its own determination as to the amount to be awarded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). The Court finds that the factual record before it in the form of affidavits and documentary evidence is sufficient to make this determination. Therefore, no Rule 55(b) hearing will be necessary in this case.
The Court does not concur with plaintiffs' assessment of the proper amount of the statutory penalty in this case. Congress has provided that a plaintiff may elect to receive statutory damages for infringement of a copyright in an amount not less than $ 500 per infringement, and not to exceed $ 20,000. Id. § 505(c)(1). Where the infringement is willful, the Court may augment the damages to $ 100,000. Id. § 505(c)(2). The district court has wide discretion as to the damages actually awarded. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984); see F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231-32, 97 L. Ed. 276, 73 S. Ct. 222 (1952). Where the infringement is willful, relevant factors include the amount of loss to the copyright holder and the need to deter future violations. Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 623 F. Supp. 889, 892 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
The Court's wide discretion in this field does not mean that it is without standards to guide it, however. The Court notes that the statute was designed to deal with infringers ranging from relatively small nightclubs, such as the one presented here, to large scale pirates, broadcasting across the country on electronic media. With due allowance for the level of culpability involved, the penalty must be proportionate to the extent of the infringement.
The Court must be guided, therefore, by cases in which other courts have assessed statutory damages against the owners of nightclubs, restaurants, private clubs, and other places open to the public, who have infringed copyrights in musical works by allowing them to be performed without paying the copyright holder a licensing fee. In surveying these cases, the Court observes that a rough measure may be derived by calculating the amount of damages awarded as a multiple of the licensing fee the copyright holder originally sought to make the infringer pay. Indeed, plaintiffs imply the appropriateness of basing the damages on the licensing fee avoided by the infringer when they argue that "defendants should be 'put on notice that it costs less to obey the copyright laws than to violate them.'" Plaintiff's Brief at 7 (quoting Rodgers, 623 F. Supp. at 892) (further citations omitted).
It appears that, in the narrow class of cases dealing with willful, unauthorized, musical performances in public establishments, the damages awards range from two times the licensing fee to five times the licensing fee.
See Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie Club, Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1227 (7th Cir. 1991) (three times the license fee); Morley Music Co. v. Cafe Continental, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (three times the license fee); Fermata Int'l Melodies, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (three times the license fee), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1567 (5th Cir. 1990); Rilting Music v. Speakeasy Enters., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 550, 557-58 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (slightly less than two times the license fee); Golden Torch Music Corp. v. Pier III Cafe, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 772, 774 (D. Conn. 1988) (five times the license fee); Music City Music v. Alfa Foods, Ltd., 616 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Va. 1985) (slightly more than two times the license fee). This list of cases does not constitute an exhaustive survey of performance infringement cases nationwide, but it does establish a rough baseline for what the other courts have done.