On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (D.C. Crim. Nos. 92-00102-08, 92-00102-09).
Before: Becker, Hutchinson and Cowen, Circuit Judges.
Along with numerous other co-defendants, Robert Joseph Carr, Jr. ("Carr") and Walter Orlando Cardona-Usquiano ("Cardona") were charged in a multi-count indictment with participating in a money laundering conspiracy. Carr was charged with and convicted of three counts: conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 ("Count 1"); money laundering on July 11, 1990, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2), by attempting to transport $186,000 in cash outside of the United States ("Count 21"); and failure to file a Customs Service currency report, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316 and 5322, for attempting to export more than $10,000 in currency on July 11, 1990 ("Count 22"). Cardona was charged with and convicted only of Count 1, the conspiracy count.
Both Carr and Cardona appeal their convictions on Count 1 by arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they shared the knowledge and intent necessary to establish guilt of conspiracy. Carr also challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction on Count 21, the attempted money laundering count. Furthermore, both appellants take issue with the district court's denial of a downward adjustment in their respective sentences for being a minimal or minor participant in the offense of conviction.*fn1 We find no error in the orders of the district court and will affirm the convictions and sentences imposed.
We will limit our presentation of the factual background to evidence involving Carr and Cardona, as well as their interaction with Javier Gonzalez, the kingpin of the conspiracy, and several other co-defendants. The conspiracy was revealed to the government by a cooperating witness who engaged in numerous money laundering transactions with the conspirators beginning in February, 1989 and ending in January, 1991. Javier Gonzalez, the kingpin, and his wife Doris Gonzalez owned and operated two businesses in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during the course of this conspiracy--a travel agency ("Jav G. Travel") and a beer distributorship. Their daughter Margareth Gonzalez, another co-defendant, worked at Jav G. Travel during this time period.
Carr had formerly been employed for approximately twelve years as a ticketing manager with an airline company that provided commercial flights to Colombia. He met Javier Gonzalez, who frequently travelled to South America for business purposes, while working at his former job. At trial Carr testified that he was friendly with Javier Gonzalez, he regularly flew with him as a travelling companion, and he had been employed as a tour coordinator for Jav G. Travel. Cardona, a Colombian national, was a tenant in a duplex house owned by Javier Gonzalez.
The United States Customs Service commenced an undercover investigation of Javier Gonzalez in early 1989. A cooperating witness represented himself to Javier Gonzalez as a money launderer of cocaine drug trafficking proceeds. Over the next two years, the cooperating witness provided Gonzalez with large quantities of cash to wire outside the country to the Cayman Islands and Colombia, as well as large quantities of fresh $100 bills which were exchanged for quantities of bills of smaller denomination plus a commission. All of the individual transactions involved sums well in excess of $10,000, and the total amount exchanged or wired out of the country over the two year period was in excess of $1,250,000. No Currency Transaction Reports ("CTR"), which are required to be filed with the government for any cash transaction of greater than $10,000, were prepared by Javier Gonzalez or Jav G. Travel for any of the transactions. Law enforcement canines trained to respond to drugs reacted positively to the bills provided by Gonzalez after all monetary exchanges for small denomination bills, except in one instance when a dog was not available.
A. Evidence Relating to Carr
Evidence introduced at trial established that on March 29, 1989 the cooperating witness brought $45,000 in $100 bills to Javier Gonzalez, represented the cash as illegal drug proceeds, and requested that it be deposited into a Cayman Islands bank account. The money could not be deposited in cash so it was divided into five checks, ranging from $8,500 to $9,500, the last two of which were deposited on May 19, 1989. Carr's passport showed that he traveled to the Cayman Islands on May 18, 1989 and departed on May 20, 1989. Carr's airline ticket was issued by Jav G. Travel and paid for by Javier Gonzalez.
On August 24, 1989 the cooperating witness exchanged $150,000 in $100 bills with Javier Gonzalez for bills of smaller denomination. Carr's passport reveals that he traveled from Philadelphia to Cali, Colombia on August 28, 1989 and returned on August 29, 1989. Javier Gonzalez paid for the trip and accompanied Carr.
The cooperating witness exchanged $100,000 in $100 bills on February 20, 1990 with Javier Gonzalez for bills of smaller denomination. Carr's passport stamps showed that he arrived in Cartagena, Colombia four days later on February 24, 1990 for a one-day stay. Again, Javier Gonzalez financed the trip and traveled with Carr to Colombia.
A similar exchange of $200,000 in $100 bills for bills of smaller denomination took place on April 24, 1990. Carr traveled from Philadelphia to Cali, Colombia the next day, April 25, 1990, with Javier Gonzalez. Carr's passport showed an exit stamp dated April 27, 1990 indicating his departure from Colombia. With respect to all these trips, Carr testified that he did not carry any money for Gonzalez out of the country and that he went along with Gonzalez only as a travelling companion.
The next exchange of $100 bills for bills of smaller denomination, totalling $90,000, took place between the cooperating witness and Doris Gonzalez on May 1, 1990. The next day, surveillance agents observed Carr visit Jav G. Travel. On May 3, 1990 Carr reported his passport lost or stolen at the passport agency in Philadelphia. The passport allegedly lost or stolen contained numerous stamps indicating trips of very short duration to Colombia, which might raise the suspicions of customs inspectors. At the same time, Carr applied for an emergency same-day replacement passport alleging that he was scheduled to travel to the United Kingdom the next day for a seven day trip. To support this allegation, Carr showed the passport agency an airline ticket issued through Jav G. Travel in his name. In fact, Carr traveled not to England but to Colombia on May 4, 1990, staying for only one day. Carr's "lost" passport was found in his residence on the date of his arrest.
In June and July, 1990, wiretaps were placed on telephone lines at Jav G. Travel and the beer distributorship. On July 9, 1990, the cooperating witness exchanged $190,000 in $100 bills with Doris Gonzalez at the travel agency for bills of smaller denomination. The following day, July 10, 1990, Margareth Gonzalez called Carr and told him that "tomorrow is the big day." Appendix ("App.") (Carr) at 178. On July 11, 1990, Javier Gonzalez, Carr, and a female companion departed Philadelphia International Airport en route to Cali, Colombia via Atlanta and Miami. In the airline departure area, Gonzalez was seen transferring a blue carry-on bag and a wad of bills to Carr.
Mr. Carr and his companion sat in coach, separated from Gonzalez who was in first class. At a layover in Miami, all passengers including Carr were stopped by U.S. Customs. Customs advised Carr that a Currency Monetary Instruments Report ("CMIR") must be filed to show the transportation of cash in excess of $10,000 out of the United States. In response to a declaration request, Carr told Customs that he was carrying only $4,000 in cash and that he did not possess cash in excess of $10,000.*fn2 During a lawful search, Customs found $180,000 in $100 bills with serial numbers matching those on bills provided by the cooperating witness on May 1, 1990 in two coffee mugs and a talcum container in Carr's blue carry-on bag. An additional sum of $6,000 in $100 bills was found on Carr. Javier Gonzalez was not detained.
Carr was not placed under arrest. When questioned about the money, Carr told U.S. Customs officials that he had picked up the bag from a train station locker in Philadelphia after an anonymous phone call. Carr stated that the bag was not his, that he did not know who owned the bag, and that he was expecting a call at a hotel in Cali, Colombia to instruct him where to deliver it. After several hours of questioning, Carr was released in Miami. Javier Gonzalez had continued on to Colombia.
After he was released, Carr called Jav G. Travel and spoke to Margareth and Doris Gonzalez. Carr told Doris Gonzalez that "I just got out of Customs," and that "if he calls you . . . it's all gone." App. (Carr) at 187-88. Doris Gonzalez became upset on the phone. Later that evening, Javier Gonzalez spoke to his wife Doris who told him that Carr had called from Miami and told her that "they took everything." Id. at 194. After a grand jury returned a sealed indictment naming him on the three money laundering counts, Carr was arrested at his mother's home in Philadelphia where he was living.
B. Evidence Relating to Cardona
Evidence introduced at trial showed that Cardona was born in Medellin, Colombia, arrived in the United States on May 31, 1989, and was a legal permanent resident. During the course of the money laundering conspiracy, Cardona was living in a duplex house in Philadelphia owned by Javier Gonzalez.
Completion of the April 20, 1990 exchange of bills between the cooperating witness and Javier Gonzalez was delayed for several hours because Gonzalez was short $14,500. After Gonzalez asked the cooperating witness to return in several hours, a call was placed from Jav G. Travel to a phone number registered to Cardona. Shortly thereafter, Cardona and a co-defendant, who was carrying a dark green shopping bag, arrived at Jav G. Travel, stayed a few minutes, and then departed. Company records showed no legitimate business transaction took place between Jav G. Travel and either of the visitors on that date. When the cooperating witness returned, he was provided with the $14,500 and his commission in $5, $10, and $20 bill denominations. Gonzalez told the cooperating witness that he had been short because he did not want to accept and exchange $1 bills. On this date, no drug-sniffing canine was available to ascertain whether any drugs had contaminated the particular bills.
Cardona was also observed entering Jav G. Travel on four other occasions around the time cash transfers were taking place between the cooperating witness and Javier Gonzalez. On March 8, 1990, Cardona entered Jav G. Travel carrying a box with a co-defendant. Cardona was also seen entering Jav G. Travel with a co-defendant on April 17, April 23, and April 26, 1990. On two of these occasions the co-defendant was carrying a bag, while on the third occasion Cardona was carrying a black bag. No evidence was presented concerning the contents of the box or the bags. Records seized from the travel agency reveal that no legitimate business transaction was consummated between the parties on any of these dates.
On May 28, 1992, a search warrant was executed at Cardona's residence in Philadelphia. Cardona and a co-defendant were arrested. Police found $22,900 in cash in small denominations hidden in various places in Cardona's master bedroom. Cash totalling approximately $10,500 in $1, $5, $10, and $20 denominations was found in several hiding places in the common basement of the duplex house. Also found in the basement were eleven boxes of glassine bags commonly used to package drugs for street sale. No evidence of drugs being found in the house was presented at the trial, but a narcotics dog did alert to the presence of drugs on the currency found in Cardona's bedroom and the basement.
When questioned by police, Cardona denied knowing Gonzalez even though Gonzalez owned the house in which Cardona was living. This statement was controverted by tape-recorded evidence indicating Gonzalez had introduced the cooperating witness to Cardona on July 5, 1990. Records seized from Jav G. Travel on May 28, 1992 contained money order receipts showing the transfer by Cardona and his wife from the United States to various individuals also named Cardona in Colombia of sums in the amount of $20,600 for 1989, $45,140 for 1990, $14,040 for 1991, and $15,700 for 1992. Cardona's 1990 federal tax return, which indicated that he was self-employed as a consultant, reported $18,364 in taxable income.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and (e) to consider these appeals of the defendants' convictions and sentences imposed. Both Carr and Cardona appeal their convictions on the conspiracy count, arguing that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they shared the knowledge and intent necessary to conspire to launder money. We employ the following standard of review when considering a sufficiency of evidence challenge after a conviction:
An appellate court must sustain the verdict of a jury if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, to uphold the jury's decision. In determining whether evidence is sufficient, we will not weigh evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Appellate reversal on the grounds of insufficient evidence should be confined to cases where the failure of the prosecution is clear. The evidence need not be inconsistent with every Conclusion save that of guilt, so long as it establishes a case from which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy burden.
United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
The government must establish a unity of purpose, an intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together in order to convict a criminal defendant of conspiracy. United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 321 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 415 (1992), and __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 627 (1992), and __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 1388 (1993). However, a conviction for conspiracy does not require that every element of the crime be proven with direct evidence. See id. Rather, the government can rely entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove that an alleged conspirator had the knowledge and intent necessary to commit the crime. Id. ; United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96-98 (3d Cir. 1992). When the government relies purely on circumstantial evidence, however, "the inferences drawn must have a logical and convincing connection to the facts established." Casper, 956 F.2d at 422 (citing United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1087, 110 S. Ct. 1152, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1990)).
The conspiracy count of the indictment alleged that the co-defendants knowingly and intentionally engaged in three related criminal objectives: (1) impeding United States efforts to collect accurate reports and information relating to domestic currency transactions in excess of $10,000; (2) conducting financial transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) designed to conceal and disguise the nature, source, location, ownership, and control of proceeds of specified unlawful activity, namely the felonious sale and distribution of illegal drugs; and (3) transporting and transferring money from Philadelphia outside the United States to the Cayman Islands and Colombia in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2). The convictions can be upheld on appeal if there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Carr and Cardona knowingly and intentionally committed acts furthering any of the three objects of the conspiracy. See Griffin v. United States, __ U.S. __, __, 116 L. Ed. 2d 371, 112 S. Ct. 466, 469-74 (1991) (guilty verdict in a multiple-object conspiracy need not be set aside even though the evidence is not adequate to support the conviction as to one of the objects); United States v. Vastola, 989 F.2d 1318, 1330-31 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, viewed in hindsight the evidence need not prove that Carr and Cardona each committed acts furthering all three objectives of the conspiracy.
Without discussing all the evidence tending to prove Cardona's guilt, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardona engaged in at least the last two of the three criminal conspiracy objectives. With respect to the second conspiracy objective, engaging in domestic money laundering transactions, evidence showed that Cardona made numerous trips to Jav G. Travel immediately prior to an exchange of money between the cooperating witness and Javier or Doris Gonzalez. Evidence produced at trial conclusively established as fact that large money transfers took place, that no CTR's were filed, that over $33,000 in small denomination bills was found in Cardona's apartment on the date of his arrest, that drug packaging equipment was confiscated at his apartment, and that trained drug-sniffing canines reacted positively to the small denomination bills provided by the conspirators.*fn3 Although the visits made by Cardona to Jav G. Travel are only circumstantial evidence of guilt, the frequency and nature of the trips provide a "logical and convincing connection to the facts established" at trial, Casper, 956 F.2d at 422. The presence of such a large quantity of cash in Cardona's residence, which trained canines alerted to, along with the presence of drug packaging equipment, provides further circumstantial evidence directly linking Cardona to the money laundering conspiracy and indicating that he knew the money involved was derived from illegal drug trafficking. See United States v. Ramirez, 954 F.2d 1035, 1039-40 (5th Cir.) (jury could permissibly infer that money found at defendant's residence represented proceeds of illegal activity from evidence tending to show that defendant was a member of a drug trafficking ring), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 3010 (1992).
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we also conclude that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardona conspired to illegally transfer money outside of the United States to his native Colombia, the third objective of the conspiracy. Money order receipts obtained from Jav G. Travel revealed transfers totalling $45,140 from Cardona to people presumed to be members of his family in Colombia in 1990 alone. No CTR's or CMIR's were filed for any of those transactions. That same year, Cardona reported only $18,364 in income to the government on his tax return. When viewed in light of the totality of the evidence, including the confiscation of drug packaging equipment from his residence, such a large amount of money sent by a person with limited income to Colombia via wire transfers was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Cardona of participating in the money laundering conspiracy. See United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1989) (evidence of defendant's use of a wire service to transfer $22,000 in cash to Haiti over a five month period, combined with evidence of drug trafficking, was sufficient to convict on money laundering count); United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990) (government's introduction into evidence that money laundering defendant had no legitimate source of income was proper, but not dispositive, to raise inference that funds came from illegal drug distribution activities).
Based on all of the circumstantial evidence, we believe that a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardona intentionally agreed to work with the other conspirators towards a common goal--the laundering of illegal drug proceeds. Accordingly, we will uphold Cardona's conviction on the conspiracy count.
In addition to being convicted on the conspiracy count, Carr was also convicted of Count 21, attempted money laundering, and Count 22, failing to file an export currency transaction report. On appeal Carr challenges only his convictions on the conspiracy count and the attempted money laundering count.
We can sustain Carr's conviction on the conspiracy count if, in addition to determining that the government provided sufficient evidence to prove that he agreed with the conspirators to launder money, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of attempted money laundering as charged in Count 21 because this count corresponds to the third object of the conspiracy. See ...