Petrella, Baime and VILLANUEVA, JJ.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Petrella, P.J.A.D.
Plaintiffs Jeal Sugarman and the West Englewood Residents Association (Association) appeal from a determination by the Law Division in a suit in lieu of prerogative writ, which sustained a grant of variances by the Township of Teaneck Board of Adjustment (Board) to Congregation B'Nai Yeshurun (Congregation). The plaintiffs had appealed the Board's determination to the Teaneck Township Council (Township). However, since plaintiffs failed to file briefs or a record before the hearing date, the Township was unable to act and deemed the Board's decision to have been affirmed.
On their appeal from the judgment of the Law Division dismissing their complaint, plaintiffs contend that (1) the entire proceeding must be voided because a Board member who was a former affiliate member of the Congregation, should have been disqualified for her conflict of interest; (2) the Board's approval of the application was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable; (3) the Congregation did not satisfy the "special reasons" requirement of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d; (4) the proposed variances were detrimental to the public good and impaired the intent of the zone plan and zoning ordinance; and (5) the Congregation's nursery school constituted a separate conditional use and required a separate variance.
This matter is before this court for the second time. The history of the 1988 application is set forth in our earlier decision in which the Association intervened and participated as an objector. On July 31, 1990, we reversed the judgment of the Law Division setting aside the Board's denial of variances and reinstated the Board's determination substantially for the reasons stated in its comprehensive resolution dated June 30, 1988, as well as for reasons stated in our decision. Congregation B'Nai Yeshurun v. Tp. of Teaneck, A-4655-88.
The Congregation sought to expand its synagogue, a pre-existing conditional use, to accommodate its current membership for worship as well as for ritual and social gatherings without severe overcrowding. The structure which was rejected by the Board in 1988 was a proposed four-story brick building with a flat roof, topped by an eight-foot high air-conditioning tower. That proposal necessitated the demolition of single-family homes owned by the Congregation and the destruction of existing landscaping.
The most recent application was submitted in 1991 and made various modifications in the size of the building. It proposed construction of a two- story building, with a maximum of thirty-five feet in height, including the air-conditioning (as contrasted with a forty-foot height and eight additional feet for an air-conditioning, heating and ventilation unit in the prior application), with a sloping roof-line and various overhangs and terraces. The intent was to create an illusion, using the natural terrain, that the building was in the scale of surrounding single-family development. Under the 1991 proposal the existing synagogue and one of the single-family homes is retained and incorporated into the design. In addition, the all- purpose room which was originally to accommodate 425 people in rows and 275 people at tables, was reduced so that it would accommodate 194 people at tables. Although the ordinance required forty parking spaces, the proposal contained thirty parking spaces, a slight increase over the prior application.
 We deal first with the claim that a Board member should have disqualified herself. The most troublesome aspect of this appeal is the issue of whether the participation of Board member Anne Senter was improper either, as a conflict of interest or because of the appearance of impropriety, and whether this should void the Board's action.
There are two significant matters. First, Senter's affiliate membership did not exist at the time of the hearings. Second, although plaintiffs' attorney asked Senter about her affiliation with the Congregation at the beginning of the initial hearing, there was no specific request, objection or motion made for Senter to recuse herself or make any decision on the issue. Senter replied to plaintiffs' attorney that she was not then a full or associate member of applicant, nor was she a member of any Teaneck orthodox congregation. She said she participated in a private prayer group that met in a private home. Apparently her husband was not a member of the Congregation. Senter did acknowledge that she had previously been an affiliate member, but ceased this affiliation to avoid any appearance of impropriety. The affiliate membership was described as one which entitled her to receive mail about social events, holidays, educational programs and charity drives. Despite her associate membership, Senter was still required to pay nonmember prices if she attended any of the Congregation's events. She was also an affiliate member of other congregations for the same purposes. Following Senter's response, appellants' attorney proceeded to discuss another matter.
Plaintiffs raised the objection that Senter's prior affiliate membership was a personal interest requiring disqualification, for the first time before the trial judge. Plaintiffs relied on N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69, which states in pertinent part: "... No member of the board of adjustment shall be permitted to act on any matter in which he has, either directly or indirectly, any personal or financial interest...." *fn1 Before the Law Division judge, the plaintiffs referred to the record from a prior proceeding in which Senter had disclosed that she, her children and husband sometimes attended services at the Congregation's synagogue because it was the only local congregation that offered weekday morning worship. She also indicated that the last time she had been a full member was in 1970.
The Law Division judge rejected the concept that attendance by one spouse at the Congregation's services necessarily bound the other. He also concluded that Senter's own interest was not sufficient to create a conflict in that (1) she had given up affiliate membership in favor of her position on the board; and (2) her reasons for maintaining the affiliate membership had been motivated by social concerns and her interest in the local Orthodox Jewish community. The judge found that the objectors had failed to make an accurate record to support their claim of conflict and characterized their position as "an attempt at a second bite at a well-chewed apple." He nonetheless termed the question a close-call.
 If an actual conflict of interest exists a Board member must disqualify himself or herself. McVoy v. Board of Adjustment, Montclair, 213 N.J.Super. 109, 116, 516 A.2d 634 (App.Div.1986). If a personal interest requiring disqualification exists, neither the failure to object nor the existence of sufficient votes absent that member's vote would change the requirement that the entire proceeding would be voidable. Aldom v. Roseland, 42 N.J.Super. 495, 507-508, 127 A.2d 190 (App.Div.1956). See also Szoke v. Board of Adjustment, Monmouth Beach, 260 N.J.Super. 341, 345, 616 A.2d 942 (App.Div.1992).
 Nonetheless, whether the particular interest involved here requires disqualification is a fact question which depends upon the particular circumstances involved. Aldom, supra, 42 N.J.Super. at 503, 127 A.2d 190. Current membership in a synagogue or church would be a disqualifying interest. See McVoy, supra, 213 N.J.Super. at 111-112, 516 A.2d 634; Zell v. Roseland, 42 N.J.Super. 75, 81, 12 ...