Lifland, District, Judge
Presently before the Court is defendants' motion to vacate this Court's Order entered March 31, 1993. Plaintiff opposes defendants' motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny defendants' motion.
Defendants have referred the Court to certain cases which they feel support their position that an action to collect a judgment against members of a controlled employer group is governed by the limitations period set forth in § 1451(f) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 ("MPPAA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., and is not governed by the statute of limitations for enforcement of judgments. Defendants assert that these cases were inadvertently omitted from their initial brief, and move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate this Court's prior Order.
The Court has reviewed the additional cases cited by defendants on this relatively obscure issue, and is not persuaded that the Court's Order dated March 31, 1993 should be vacated. Defendants direct the Court's attention to Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1987); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension v. Mississippi Warehouse Corporation, 1992, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14829 (D. Ill. 1992); and Connors v. Peles, 724 F. Supp. 1538 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
The Johnson case is not on point. In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held that the MPPAA six-year statute of limitations for enforcement of a withdrawal liability assessment preempted the Montana Probate Code which required that all claims against an estate be brought within four months of notice to the creditors. 830 F.2d at 1016. In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit did not address the limitations period applicable to the enforcement of a judgment that had been previously entered against one member of an employer group.
Defendants also rely on Mississippi Warehouse in support of their position. As in this case, the plaintiff in Mississippi Warehouse sought to enforce, against other controlled group members, a judgment previously obtained against an employer. The action was brought ten years after withdrawal liability was assessed. The Court held that the plaintiff was bound by the six-year limitations period of the MPPAA.
The Court finds Mississippi Warehouse unpersuasive. The Court reasoned that if a pension fund brings an action under § 1451(a), then it must be bound by the limitations period set forth in § 1451(f). This Court believes that the better view is that the initial action brought by a pension plan to obtain a judgment of withdrawal liability must be brought within the six-year limitation period set forth in § 1451(f). However, once a judgment is obtained it can be enforced against other controlled group members in the same way it could be enforced against an alter ego, that is, pursuant to the statute of limitations governing enforcement of judgments.
Defendants question this Court's conclusion that members of a controlled group are, in effect, "statutory alter egos." Able Truck, slip op. at 12. Defendants argue that controlled group members are not pro se alter egos and that controlled group liability is an independent cause of action, distinct from a claim based on alter ego liability. In support of their position defendants rely on Connors v. Peles, 724 F. Supp. 1538 (W.D. Pa. 1989). Defendants note that the Connors Court stated:
The ERISA "common control" statute . . . is a separate legal claim or cause of action under ERISA whereby two or more businesses under common control may be liable for withdrawal liability. The cause of action is entirely a creature of ERISA - that it is distinct from an "alter ego" claim requires no decision.