[265 NJSuper Page 497] On February 27, 1987, plaintiff was injured while attempting to board a ski lift at defendant's ski resort, Vernon Valley. Functionally,
chairlifts consist of a series of metal and wooden chairs which are suspended from a wire cable. They are spaced evenly apart along the cable which rests on wheels attached to tall steel towers. At the bottom and top of the mountain, there is a large wheel which reverses the direction of the cable to enable the chairs to go up and down the mountain. The skier skis to a waiting area to board the lift. As the chair comes closer, the skier sits down onto the chair and is picked up off the snow and transported up the mountain. A safety bar across the front of the chair is lowered into place to prevent the skier from falling out of the chair.
Plaintiff was in the boarding area of the ski lift when the accident occurred. As she was waiting for the chair, an unidentified skier skied into the path of the chair. He struck the chair intended to transport plaintiff up the mountain. As a result, the chair began to swing and struck plaintiff causing serious injury. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendant ski area was negligent in its operation and supervision of the ski lift. Plaintiff moved in limine for an order declaring defendant to be a common carrier in the operation of the ski lift.
This issue has not been addressed by any reported decisions in New Jersey. Plaintiff seeks to have this court adopt the reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeals of California in Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.App. 4th 1499, 3 Cal.Rptr. 2d 897, (1992) that a ski area is a common carrier in the operation of its ski lifts and the highest standard of care applies
There are two New Jersey statutes which regulate ski areas, N.J.S.A. 5:13-1 et seq. (hereinafter "Ski Act") and N.J.S.A. 34:4A-1 et seq. (hereinafter "Ski Lift Safety Act"). Neither act resolves the issue presently before this court. The Ski Act imposes duties on ski area operators and skiers involving the act of skiing. The Ski Lift Safety Act authorizes the adoption of standards for the construction, operation and inspection of ski lifts.
Plaintiff asserts that the New Jersey Ski Lift Safety Act of 1975 was modeled after a similar statute in New Hampshire originally
enacted in 1957. Plaintiff derives this assertion from the similarity between the statements of purpose of the two acts. N.J.S.A. 34:4A-2 and N.H.R.S.A. 225-1:1. However, the definition of a ski area operator is significantly different in that a provision of the New Hampshire statute was added in 1965 to specifically provide that ski area operators shall not be deemed to be common carriers. Plaintiff argues that since the New Jersey Legislature was relying largely on the New Hampshire statute when it adopted the Ski Lift Safety Act, the absence of a comparable provision excluding common carrier liability evidences an intent to impose such liability.
There is nothing in the legislative history of the Ski Act or the Ski Lift Safety Act which indicates such an intent. However, the similarity between the New Hampshire and New Jersey statutes indicates that the Legislature was aware of the New Hampshire law and presumably they were also aware of the 1967 New York law which also specifically excludes ski lift operators from common carrier liability. N.Y.Trans.Law Sec. 2(6).
It is a long-standing tenet of statutory construction that the legislature will not be said to change the common law without clear statutory language. See State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 432 A.2d 74 (1981). Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 34:4A-4 specifically provides that the Ski Lift Safety Act shall not "reduce or diminish the standard of care imposed upon passenger tramway operators under existing law."
New Jersey case law provides little assistance in this matter; however, a number of other courts have grappled with this issue. In 1959, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court decided Grauer v. New York, 9 A.D. 2d 829, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 647 (1959). The court held that the state of New York would be deemed to be a common carrier in the operation of a chair lift at a state park. The court noted that in the operation of the chair lift, "(a) fee was charged for transportation and the public was invited to ...