over the safety of continued operation of the Agusta 109
helicopters" since the October 10, 1989 crash. Compl. ¶ 38.
Defendants argue that such a cause of action is "frivolous" and
should be "summarily dismissed." We agree. Helicopter Air
Services has not opposed the motion, which will be granted.
The motion to remand turns on two issues. First, defendant
Agusta S.p.A. removed on the basis that it is an Italian
corporation, owned by the Italian government, and so qualifies
for removal as a "foreign state." Plaintiffs challenge Agusta's
status as a "foreign state." Second, plaintiffs argue that the
presence of a non-diverse New Jersey defendant, Paramount
Aviation, makes removal improper. Defendants argue that removal
is proper at the sole discretion of the "foreign state,"
despite the presence of a non-diverse defendant. We find that
defendant Agusta S.p.A. was entitled to remove this action
regardless of the presence of a non-diverse defendant, and will
therefore deny the motion to remand.
The key question regarding plaintiffs' claim for
reimbursement of worker's compensation benefits is whether
defendants received statutory notice from plaintiffs. Because
we find that plaintiffs did not provide the expressly provided
statutory notice, we will grant summary judgment for defendants
on this claim.
The threshold question raised by defendants on their motion
to dismiss is whether a corporation can ever recover damages
flowing from the death of its employees. Defendants argue that
courts have unanimously held that a corporation may not recover
for losses arising from the death (as opposed to injury) of its
employees; and that no matter what theories of liability
plaintiffs invoke, at bottom this is a wrongful death action,
and corporations are not a statutorily approved beneficiary of
such damages. No matter how properly plaintiffs may have stated
a claim for strict liability or negligence, for example, the
basis of their claim is the damages they have suffered from the
death of their three employees, and defendants assert that that
is an impermissible basis for recovery by a corporation. We
agree and will dismiss the complaint.*fn1
Defendants also attack plaintiffs' theories of liability in
Count VI, "wilful destruction and spoilation of evidence, and
breach of agreement to preserve trial evidence and fraud"; and
Count VIII, "willful, intentional interference with contractual
employment relations." These counts name only the Agusta
defendants. We find that New Jersey does not recognize the
cause of action in Count VI, and plaintiffs fail to state a
claim against these defendants under Count VIII. These counts
would therefore be dismissed even if plaintiffs were entitled
to seek damages arising from the death of their employees.
The following facts are drawn from the complaint and are
accepted as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss:
13. Sometime prior to 1984, the Defendants Agusta
designed a seven place twin turbine helicopter
known as the Agusta 109 ("109").
14. The 109 was designed with four metal rotor
blades consisting of a front aluminum spar and
aluminum honeycomb filler with an aluminum outer
15. The military variant of the 109 was designated
the Agusta "109K," and sold to international
military establishments, except in the United
States, and were equipped with the same main rotor
blades. . . .
16. The main rotor blades were designed, built and
sold with a represented
service life of 3,000 hours between replacement.
17. Shortly before the introduction of the 109 and
109K, and long before either aircraft achieved
3,000 hours on the main rotor blades, the Agusta
Defendants received reports of design and
manufacturing defects that resulted in cracks
developing in the main rotor blades.
18. The cracks, some of which were usually
invisible to the unaided eye, were generally
accompanied by vibrations of varying magnitude,
which could not be adjusted out of the helicopter
through normal maintenance techniques.
19. At all times, the Agusta Defendants held
themselves out as experts in the design,
construction and maintenance of helicopters and
the ultimate authority on the 109 and 109K, upon
which expertise the Plaintiffs, the United States
Government, and the Italian equivalent of the
Federal Aviation Administration relied.
20. Long prior to 1989, the Defendant Paramount
acquired the rights to operate the 
helicopter in charter service under the Paramount
certificate of authority.
21. Paramount then arranged and performed
management and maintenance of the 
helicopter, operation of the helicopter under Part
135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations in
helicopter taxi service, and was responsible for
the scheduling, inspections, maintenance and
overhaul of the helicopter and its components.
22. From the very first day the helicopter was
delivered to a retail customer and regularly prior
to October 10, 1989, the helicopter suffered
vibrations identified as emanating from the main
rotor blades, especially during translational lift
— that period when the flight of the helicopter
changes from forward flight to hover and vice
23. Consultations and maintenance performed by and
with the Agusta Defendants, by predecessor
lessees, Paramount and the Plaintiffs about this
vibration resulted in no improvement in the
vibration, but rather assurances were given in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Morristown, New Jersey
and elsewhere, that the vibration was within
normal limits and the  helicopter was safe
for normal operation.
24. Notwithstanding the assurances given by the
Agusta Defendants to Paramount, the Plaintiffs,
and predecessor lessees, Agusta and Paramount knew
that other Agusta 109 and military and 109K
helicopters with similar vibrations had suffered
catastrophic or near catastrophic rotor blade
25. Notwithstanding the assurance afforded, the
Agusta Defendants and Paramount knew that the very
sister ship to the  helicopter [that crashed
and killed plaintiffs' employees] had suffered a
crack in a main rotor blade after similar reports
of vibration only one year before October 10,
26. Notwithstanding the[se] assurances . . ., the
Agusta Defendants and Paramount knew that the
inevitable result of the vibration would be rotor
blade failure and the certain loss of life and
serious personal injury resulting therefrom.
27. In August 1989 and again in September of 1989,
the helicopter [that crashed] was brought to the
Agusta Defendants for further examination of the
rotor system vibration, and again the Agusta
Defendants assured Paramount and the flight crew
that the vibration was within normal limits.
28. Aboard the helicopter [at the time of the
crash] were three passengers, Stephen Hyde, Mark
Etess and Jonathan Benanav, all of whom were
29. At the time of his death, Stephen Hyde was
employed by Plaintiffs Taj Mahal, Castle and Plaza
as Chief Executive Officer, and in that capacity
had overall responsibility for the entire Atlantic
City casino operations of the Plaintiffs.
30. At the time of his death, Mark Etess was
employed by the Taj Mahal as its Chief Operating
Officer, and in that capacity had overall
responsibility for the completion and opening of
that casino, together with its day to day
operations, including the planning and development
of mega events, casino business development,
operations and accounting and implementation of
31. At the time of his death, Jonathan Benanav was
employed by the Trump Plaza as Vice President in
charge of non-casino operations and was
responsible for all food and beverage services in
that casino and was to assume the role as head of
all non-casino operations of the Plaintiffs'
Atlantic City casino operations.
32. All of the decedents were employed in
capacities critical to the successful operation of
the Plaintiffs, were key employees upon whose
services the Plaintiffs relied and depended for
the successful continuation of their business
33. All of the decedents were crucial management
personnel without whose services the Plaintiffs
have and will suffer financial damages including,
but not limited to:
a. Loss of the value of their services;
b. Loss of revenue;
c. Increased expenses and cost of operation;
d. Higher costs for replacement personnel;
e. Financial losses far exceeding the cost to
the Plaintiffs for the services of the
f. Damages to the casino operations as a result
of managerial inefficiency;
g. Loss of mega events and the resultant loss
h. Other damages as yet unfolding, both as to
category and amount.
34. The Plaintiffs were under contract to the
deceased Hyde and Etess to pay half of their
salaries for a period of two years following their
death, and as a result of the death of Hyde and
Etess, the Plaintiffs have [paid] and will pay
substantial sums of money pursuant to the[se]
Id., ¶¶ 13-34.