Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; D.C. Civil Nos. 89-2935, 89-2685.
Sloviter, Becker and Stapleton, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of two civil rights actions. In the action with Carl Gurley as the lead plaintiff, eight terminated employees assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that their discharge by Barbara Hafer, the Auditor General of Pennsylvania, was political and therefore violated their due process and First Amendment rights. In the action with James C. Melo as the lead plaintiff, eight other terminated employees, who similarly allege a violation of their civil rights by Hafer, further allege that Hafer and James West, the acting United States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, conspired to deprive them of their civil rights. The Melo plaintiffs also assert state law claims against West.
This appeal requires us to consider whether a claim for monetary relief brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be maintained against a state official in her individual capacity, whether a claim under the same statute may be maintained against a federal official when he is alleged to have conspired with a candidate for state office, and whether a scope of employment certification issued by the government in a claim brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act is reviewable.
Facts and Procedural History
The eight plaintiffs whose complaints were consolidated into the Melo action allege that they were employed in various capacities through January 1989 in the Pennsylvania Auditor General's Office, during which time they had compiled satisfactory work records. The complaints allege that sometime after John Kerr, a former employee in the Auditor General's Office, admitted that he received payments to influence either hiring or promotion decisions for 21 employees in the Auditor General's Office, acting United States Attorney West provided a list of the 21 employees to Donald Bailey, the then-Auditor General, in a confidential letter dated on or about January 21, 1988. The letter stated that "we can express no opinion on whether these listed individuals knew of the purchase of their job" and it contained the request "that you keep these names strictly confidential, not use them for any type of media disclosures other than necessary to appropriate administrative proceedings, and make them available only to your most trusted employees on a need-to-know basis." Melo App. at 11. Bailey subsequently conducted an investigation of the 21 employees through his Chief Counsel, James L. McAneny, and McAneny concluded that the Melo plaintiffs committed no wrongdoing nor were they aware of any wrongdoing committed on their behalf.
On or about April 30, 1988, Hafer was nominated as the Republican candidate for Auditor General and Bailey, the incumbent, was nominated as the Democratic candidate. The complaints allege that the Melo plaintiffs were registered Democrats and West was a registered Republican. They allege that during the election campaign between Hafer and Bailey, West provided Hafer with a copy of the letter he sent to Bailey and advised Hafer that the 21 employees on the list "bought their jobs"; that West was "motivated by a desire to assist [Hafer] in the November, 1988 election and to create and/or foster a campaign issue that favored Ms. Hafer"; and that West provided the list with "a knowledge, understanding and expectation that . . . Ms. Hafer, if elected, would fire all of the people on the list." Melo App. at 13. Hafer allegedly stated on numerous occasions during the campaign that she received the "jobs-bought" list from West and that, if elected, she would fire all employees on the list.
Hafer was elected as Auditor General in November 1988. According to the complaints, on February 1, 1989, Hafer, without conducting any additional investigation to determine the alleged involvement of the Melo plaintiffs in the job-buying scheme, fired 18 employees whose names appeared on the "jobs bought" list, including all eight Melo plaintiffs. In her letters terminating the Melo plaintiffs' employment, Hafer stated that the dismissal was "necessary based on information gathered by my office as well as through cooperation with other governmental agencies as a result of an investigation of your involvement in a job buying and/or a job promotion scheme in the Auditor General's Office." Melo App. at 14. The Melo plaintiffs allege that Hafer did not follow the provisions in the Auditor General's Policy and Procedure Manual, in effect since on or about January 1986, which includes procedural protections and a "just cause" requirement for dismissals.
The complaints also allege that an article in the February 2, 1989 edition of the Patriot-Capital News quoted both Hafer, as stating that she was firing 18 employees who had paid "up to $5,000 each for their jobs under a previous administration," and West, as stating that "he appreciated Ms. Hafer's definitive action in firing the eighteen employees."
The factual allegations and legal claims against Hafer alleged by the Gurley plaintiffs are similar to those made by the Melo plaintiffs. The Gurley plaintiffs allege that they had been continuously employed at the Auditor General's Office in various capacities until February 21, 1989 and had performed their work satisfactorily; that all but one of them were registered Democrats; that all had been supporters of Bailey in the November 1988 election for Auditor General; and that on February 21, 1989, Hafer discharged them without explanation. Unlike the Melo plaintiffs, they have not sued West and make no allegations as to him.
The claims made by the plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are that their firing by Hafer deprived them of their right to procedural and substantive due process and interfered with their First Amendment freedom of political association. The Melo plaintiffs also allege that Hafer and West engaged in a conspiracy to deprive them of due process and equal protection of the law, and they include the state law claims against West of defamation and interference with contractual relations. Each Melo plaintiff requests $2 million in compensatory damages, $1.5 million in punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees stemming from the alleged violations of their civil rights. They do not request any form of injunctive relief. Each Gurley plaintiff requests $500,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. Six of the Gurley plaintiffs also request reinstatement without back pay.
The procedural sequence of events is relevant to an understanding of the nature of the district court's disposition. The complaints were filed in April and May of 1989. Hafer filed her answers on June 14, 1989.*fn1 On July 6, 1989, the district court ordered both the Melo and the Gurley plaintiffs to submit joint discovery schedules by July 12, 1989, not to extend beyond September 28, 1989. However, on July 14, 1989, the court deferred the filing of a joint discovery schedule and ordered Hafer to submit her motion for summary judgment by August 9, 1989. The court consolidated the actions on July 18. West moved to stay discovery in the Melo actions on July 20, but the district court never acted on this motion.
On July 28, 1989, West filed a motion in the Melo action to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, contending, inter alia, that the Melo plaintiffs' section 1983 claim was barred because they had not alleged facts sufficient to establish a conspiracy between Hafer and West whereby he was acting under color of state law. Concurrently, the Director of the Torts Branch of the Department of Justice filed a certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), stating that "on the basis of information presently available with respect to the occurrences referred to therein, defendant James J. West at all times relevant was acting within the scope of his employment as an employee of the United States." Melo App. at 195. The government also filed a motion to substitute itself for West on the Melo plaintiffs' state law claims of defamation and contractual interference, again pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), and thereafter to dismiss these claims on the ground that under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) the government had not waived its sovereign immunity for claims for defamation and contractual interference.
On August 9, 1989, Hafer filed a consolidated motion for summary judgment against both the Melo and Gurley plaintiffs, contending, inter alia, that because she was sued only in her official capacity, the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and further contending that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim for conspiracy. The Melo plaintiffs, in response to West's motion for summary judgment or dismissal, argued that the court should allow a continuance of discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), as they had no personal knowledge of what transpired between West and Hafer and would therefore not be able to submit affidavits based on the "personal knowledge" of the affiants in order to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Attached to the response was a declaration of James C. Melo to that effect. Again, in their joint response to Hafer's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs stated that they did not have adequate time to conduct discovery, although they did not attach the affidavit thereto.
In three separate orders issued on September 28, 1989, the district court granted Hafer's motion for summary judgment, granted the government's motion to substitute itself for West and to dismiss the Melo plaintiffs' state tort claims, and declared as moot West's motion for summary judgment. On the same day the court denied as moot the Melo plaintiffs' motion to remand the case that had been removed from state court. See note 1 supra.
In a subsequent opinion, the court explained its orders. It held that the plaintiffs' section 1983 claims were barred because they had sued Hafer in her official capacity and that she was not a "person" for purposes of section 1983. The court held that the Melo plaintiffs had not alleged facts showing that the alleged conspiracy between Hafer and West involved some racial or other class-based discriminatory animus, and that therefore their claim based on equal protection, if treated as filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), failed. Finally, the court held that substitution of the government for West as a defendant to the Melo plaintiffs' state law claims was "necessitated" by the Federal Tort Claims Act in light of the government's certification that West was acting within the scope of his employment, and that those claims were then dismissed because claims against the United States for defamation and contractual interference are expressly excluded under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) from the sovereign immunity waiver in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Both the Melo and the Gurley plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal, which we have consolidated for our review. We have jurisdiction over the district court's ...