Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (Newark) (D.C. Crim. No. 88-198)
Becker, Greenberg and Van Dusen, Circuit Judges.
VAN DUSEN, Senior Circuit Judge.
In this case, defendant-appellant Barry Sussman appeals from an order of the district court denying his Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) motion for correction of illegal sentence.*fn1 For the reasons which follow, we will affirm.
On July 26, 1988, defendant pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to one count of credit card fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), and four counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1342. The crimes to which defendant pled guilty occurred in 1986. On September 22, 1988, defendant was sentenced to a five-year prison term on the credit card fraud count, to suspended prison terms of three years each on the four mail fraud counts, and was ordered to make restitution of $35,000.00. Because defendant pled guilty to crimes which occurred in 1986, and thus before the November 1, 1987, effective date of the sentencing guidelines, the district court did not sentence him thereunder.
On June 19, 1989, defendant filed the underlying Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) motion for correction of illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence was illegal because it was not imposed under the guidelines, which, according to defendant, would have given him a lower sentence.*fn2 The district court denied his motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The sentencing guidelines were promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which provided that they were to take effect on November 1, 1986.*fn3 Pub.L. No. 98-473, § 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2031-32 (1984). The Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub.L. No. 99-217 § 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985), later changed this date to November 1, 1987.*fn4 The Sentencing Reform Act itself does not make clear whether the sentencing guidelines were to be applied solely to offenses committed after their effective date or also to offenses, such as those to which defendant pled guilty, which were committed before their effective date but for which sentencing occurred after their effective date. However, on December 7, 1987, Congress enacted the Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub.L. No. 100-182, 101 Stat. 1266 (1987), section 2(a) of which states that the Sentencing Reform Act applies only to offenses committed after November 1, 1987. See Gallardo v. Quinlan, 874 F.2d 186, 188 (3d Cir. 1989) (per curiam); United States v. Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d 122, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1988).
Defendant argues that in 1986, when he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty and prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Act of 1987, the law as set out in the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Reform Amendments Act provided that the sentencing guidelines were to apply to any offense for which sentencing occurred after November 1, 1987. Thus, he argues that to apply section 2(a) of the Sentencing Act of 1987 to preclude him from being sentenced under the guidelines would violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the Constitution.
We reject the defendant's argument because we conclude that Congress, at the time it provided for the sentencing guidelines through enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, intended that they only apply to offenses committed after their effective date, thus obviating any Ex Post Facto problem. We recognize that support for an opposing argument is found in section 235 of Pub.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2031-32 (1984), the statute providing for the effective date of the sentencing guidelines, which continues to provide:
"(b)(1) The following provisions of law in effect on the day before the effective date of this Act shall remain in effect for five years after the effective date as to an individual convicted of an offense . . . before the effective date . . . :
(F) The maximum term of imprisonment in effect on the effective date for an offense committed ...