counsel fees. This conclusion is buttressed by the Brennan court's observation that "considering the complexities of internal union remedies . . . and recourse to the courts, and the penalties for lack of legal or technical sophistication, we cannot believe that intervenors were intended to proceed pro se." Brennan, 554 F.2d at 599. While Brennan involved a union election and this case involves the protection of Bollitier's due process rights, this comment is telling as to the direction we should follow.
Finally, we are concerned about the policy implications of awarding Bollitier any attorney's fee. Because this is a common benefit case, the holding of the Court of Appeals in Cunningham, a statutory fee-shifting case involving a pro se litigant, is not dispositive. Dicta in Cunningham suggests, however, several policy reasons why Bollitier should not recover: first, pro se litigants do not face the same financial burdens as those who retain a lawyer; second, pro se litigants lack the objectivity and detachment of counsel to ward against frivolous litigation; and third, valuation of the pro se litigant's time is problematic and arbitrary. See Cunningham, 664 F.2d at 386. In sum, we do not want to create a false incentive for future pro se plaintiffs to bring these actions without the advice and counsel of competent attorneys by holding out the mirage of "attorney's fees". Cf. Hall, 412 U.S. at 16 (White, J., dissenting) ("The award of fees in the occasionally successful and meritorious case will not be worth the litigation the Court's decision will invite and foster."). Consequently, we will deny Bollitier's request for $ 240,000 for time expended on this litigation in its entirety.
Bollitier also requests reimbursement for $ 613 in other costs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Our disposition of this request is guided by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 which generally limits costs to certain enumerated items. See Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 13 L. Ed. 2d 248, 85 S. Ct. 411 (1964) ("discretion given district judges to tax costs should be sparingly exercised with reference to expenses not specifically allowed by statute"). Because transportation, phone calls, and mailing charges are not among the enumerated items and not items typically included in costs, we will deny Bollitier's request for $ 225 regarding those expenses. Printing and exemplification are, however, among the enumerated items in the statute. Under Local Rule 23(G)(9) of this Court, "fees for exemplification and copies are taxable when (i) the documents are admitted into evidence or necessarily attached to a document required to be filed and served in support of a dispository motion, and (ii) they are in lieu of originals which are not introduced at the request of opposing counsel." Bollitier has submitted no evidence that his printing and exemplification expenses meet that requirement.
It is Bollitier's burden to submit the verified Bill of Costs with "all invoices in support of the request for each item." Local Rule 23(B). Consequently, we will deny Bollitier's request for $ 388 regarding those expenses.
We turn to attorney Baybick's petition, which seeks $ 13,602 in attorney's fees.
As a threshold matter, Local 676 objects to Baybick's petition because Baybick withdrew from the litigation on his own motion and thus lacks standing to seek an award of fees now. We disagree with this contention. See Mayberry v. Walters, 862 F.2d 1040, 1043 (3d Cir. 1988) (counsel who withdraws prior to trial is entitled to reasonable compensation for services while acting as plaintiff's counsel); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 1973) [ Lindy I ] (cause of action for award of attorney's fees under the equitable fund doctrine accrues to attorney), on remand, 382 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated, 540 F.2d 102, 110 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1976) (in banc) [ Lindy II ] (same). In light of our disposition of Bollitier's claim for an attorney's fee and costs, we see no conflict between Baybick's petition and Bollitier's interest.
We are not, however, prepared to award Baybick the entire sum he seeks. Our "first inquiry should be into the hours spent by the attorney -- how many hours were spent in what manner. . . ." Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167. Baybick bears the burden of proving with sufficient precision the number of his hours allocable to the one claim Bollitier ultimately prevailed on against only one defendant, Local 676. See Pawlak, 713 F.2d at 979. "Thus the need for adequate time records is plain." In re Fine Paper Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 596 (3d Cir. 1984). We then "must attempt to value those services." Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167. We have read Baybick's petition, which is rather vague under the circumstances, and make the following findings.
1. We will allow 30 hours for his initial consultation with Bollitier, his review of records, preparation of the complaint, and review of Local 676's answer.
2. We will allow 10 hours for preparation of the discovery memorandum and reviewing documents with Bollitier.
3. We will allow 16.5 hours in preparation time for the motion on summary judgment because Baybick did block Local 676's motion on the one ground that Bollitier ultimately prevailed on.
4. We will not allow any of the additional time claimed by Baybick. Some of that time is expressly allocable to claims against Joint Council 53 and the International Union against whom Bollitier did not prevail. Other time is expressly allocable to the preliminary injunction Bollitier failed to secure or the fruitless motion in limine for damages which could have been avoided if Bollitier had originally requested damages.
5. We find that Baybick's hourly rate of $ 75.00 is reasonable given Baybick's experience, the difficulty of the litigation, and the community market rate in Camden and Burlington Counties.
6. We will disallow Baybick's request for postage, photostating, and a deposition transcript for the same reasons we disallowed similar claims by Bollitier. We will allow his request for $ 70.00 for filing and service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1) (1982).
In sum, then, we will enter an order denying Bollitier's motion and granting Baybick an award of $ 4237.50 in attorney's fees and $ 70 in costs for a total of $ 4307.50.
Very truly yours,
JOHN F. GERRY, C.J.U.S.D.C.