the resulting physical injuries and damages suffered by the plaintiffs as a result thereof. See Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial ("Plaintiffs' Brief") at 4-6. Plaintiffs allege that the Inn was negligent in (a) failing to warn the Nebels of recent daytime robberies in Atlantic City; (b) failing to provide a security patrol on the premises during the daylight hours; (c) failing to provide a properly operating door lock; (d) failing to provide a perimeter barrier or fence between the motel rooms along Filbert Avenue and the street; and (e) failing to provide functional and operational closed circuit surveillance cameras and monitors.
In an attempt to rebut this admitted testimony, defendants offered the opinion of Mr. Chernikoff that the subject incident was an "off the wall" event which none of plaintiffs' proposed security measures or techniques would certainly have prevented.
Plaintiffs submit that Mr. Chernikoff's opinion was mere "opinion" and "speculation" unsupported by factual analysis of either the crime committed or the security precautions taken by the Inn.
Id. at 6. There was testimony by plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Shellow, that during the years 1980 to 1985 Atlantic City had the highest crime rate, per capita, in the United States. Rather a dubious distinction. Plaintiffs suggest that since the jury found Dr. Shellow's postulation that the security practices at the Inn were deficient in light of the statistical probability of crime as presented at trial to be eminently credible, (the jury found the defendants to be "negligent") there is no compelling palpable or articulable reason why the jury would not find Dr. Shellow's opinion that this failure to provide adequate security was a substantial contributing factor to the occurrence of the subject incident (plaintiffs' nomenclature for proximate cause) to be equally credible. Thus, plaintiffs conclude, "in light of this evidence [and the jury's decision on negligence], the jury's conclusion that there was no proximate cause is against the greater weight of the evidence." Id. at 7. We believe that the applicable standards for proximate causation in negligent security and failure to rescue cases have been misconstrued. Under the proper test, however, defendants have proffered no bona fide evidence on the issue of "increased risk of harm," but plaintiffs have provided such evidence, as we shall discuss, infra.
We agree that the jury's conclusions are at variance with the evidence presented. However, a more significant problem is presented by this motion for a new trial. Now, at this post-trial phase of the litigation, plaintiffs have for the first time called to our attention a line of tort cases that the New Jersey Supreme Court terms "lost chance of survival" or "rescue" actions.
See, e.g., Hake v. Manchester Township, 98 N.J. 302, 311, 486 A.2d 836 (1985). The "lost chance" theory holds acts (or the lack thereof as the case may be) of "nonfeasance" as a basis of liability in certain limited factual situations, in abrogation of the general common law rule that one is under no duty to come to the aid of an imperiled stranger, even where that human being faces imminent mortal danger and the rescuer faces little or no risk in attempting to save life. In such negligent omission cases, New Jersey courts formulate the test for a finding of proximate cause as to whether or not the specific acts of nonfeasance complained of may be viewed as a "substantial factor" contributing to the loss. However, in the specific context of lost chance and negligent security cases, "substantial factor" is articulated in terms of negligence which increases the risk of harm to the plaintiff. We believe this to be the correct and accurate depiction of the proximate cause standard to be applied in a hybrid lost chance/negligent security case such as the one at bar, yet the jury was never charged in precisely those terms.
In light of this newly discovered law which was unbeknownst to the Court at the time of trial and our belief that the jury's verdict was against the substantial weight of the evidence, a miscarriage of justice has occurred. These grounds present compelling reasons for the grant of a new trial and such a reconsideration is absolutely necessary. Consequently, plaintiffs' motion for a new trial shall therefore be granted.
A. The Standards Controlling a Motion for a New Trial
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) provides that new trials may be granted "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States". Under prevailing federal law, new trials may be granted if the trial judge "is of the opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict." Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941).
A new trial may also be granted even where an entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict is inappropriate. Roebuck v. Drexel University, 852 F.2d 715, 735 (3d Cir. 1988). Judgment n.o.v. may be granted only where the evidence was insufficient for the jury to consider. A new trial may be granted when, in the "opinion of the trial court, the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence, thus making a new trial necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 735-36 (citations omitted).
A district court's discretion is limited in that the court may not replace its opinion for that of the jury. Id. at 735 n.35 (citation omitted). However, the exclusive domain of the jury is not invaded by a careful analysis of what inferences the jury could actually draw from the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 736. Where the inferences to be drawn from the testimony as presented border on "mere speculation," a new trial becomes necessary. Id.
Further, a verdict can be manifestly against the weight of the evidence even where the evidence was such that reasonable people could reach a verdict as the jury did. J. Friedenthal, M. Kane and A. Miller, Civil Procedure 555 (West. 1985) (citation omitted). Under such circumstances, the trial judge may weigh the evidence and grant a new trial. Id. (citing Bevevino v. Saydjari, 574 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1978); Yeatts, supra). A motion for a new trial is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge, however, the court may not replace its opinion for that of the jury. See Roebuck, 852 F.2d at 735 n. 35 (citing Lind v. Schenley Industries, 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960)).
In addition, a new trial may be granted based on an allegation of legal error that is supported by a controlling decision not called to the court's attention at time of trial which was unknown to the moving party due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. 6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice para. 59.08 at 59-89 (1987). See also 11 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2805 (1973). As the Ninth Circuit once observed:
One of the purposes of a motion for a new trial is to call to the court's attention errors that may have been committed during the trial, whether those errors be such as have been discovered since the trial, or were committed in opposition to the moving party's contentions asserted at the trial. In other words, the motion may not only be made on the grant of newly discovered evidence, but upon newly discovered law; in fact, the trial court may, during the term at which the judgment was rendered, on its own motion, set aside its judgment and grant a new trial.
Sulzbacher v. Continental Casualty Co., 88 F.2d 122, 124 (8th Cir. 1937). See also Henderson v. S.C. Loveland Co., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 658, 661 (N.D. Fla. 1975) ("Newly discovered law may, in particular instances and cases, serve as the basis for the granting of a motion for a new trial.")
B. An Innkeeper's Duty
The common law rule that private individuals had no duty to protect another from criminal attack traces its genesis to the seemingly ancient jurisprudential distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and the traditional disinclination of the courts to construct liability rules involving the latter for fear that no workable standards were attainable. Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowners' Liability for Failure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 Ariz. L.Rev. 727, 735 (1979). A policy reason frequently offered in support of this doctrine was that "the courts were far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior to be greatly concerned with one who merely did nothing, even though another might suffer harm because of his omission to act." W. Prosser, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 373 (5th ed. 1984). Out of this seemingly wooden distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance emerged four discrete lines of cases which developed important exceptions to the general rule to ameliorate its often brutally harsh consequences: (a) affirmative conduct cases (the duty to avoid affirmative acts which make the situation of a person in difficulty or peril any worse);
(b) cases involving the prevention of aid by others (the duty to take reasonable care that he does not prevent others from rendering assistance);
(c) cases imposing an obligation to exercise control over the conduct of third persons (a duty arising from public policy considerations that certain relationships which are protective by nature require a defendant to guard his charge against harm from others);
and (d) cases involving the duty to aid one in peril (the moral and occasionally legal responsibility to come to the aid of another human being who is in danger).
Plaintiffs rely exclusively on opinions falling into this fourth category of nonfeasance cases to support their argument that proximate cause is implicit in the jury's finding that defendants breached their duty of care. As we have discussed supra, under New Jersey "rescue" cases, the proper question as to proximate cause is whether the negligent omission complained of increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff and whether that increased risk was a "substantial factor" in producing the resulting injury. See Plaintiffs' Brief at 7 (relying on Hake v. Manchester Township,10 98 N.J. 302, 486 A.2d 836 (1985), and its conceptual/legal antecedents and progeny).
We believe that it would be intellectually disingenuous to depend solely upon this fourth category of cases to resolve the within motion without recognizing and considering the third category as a conceptually distinct doctrinal body, given the radically different substantive justifications for rescue cases, as distinguished from negligent security cases. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 742 n.242 ("This Article does not consider good samaritan cases as a subset of negligent security litigation").
Because the facts of this case present elements of both negligent security and rescue, we rely on both lines of authority to reach our conclusion.
Under New Jersey law, an innkeeper is not an absolute insurer of the safety of its guests. Johnson v. Kolibas, 75 N.J. Super. 56, 64, 182 A.2d 157 (1962). Rather, an owner or operator of an inn is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to render its premises reasonably safe for use of its guests. Wolfe v. Chateau Renaissance, 141 N.J. Super. 59, 63, 357 A.2d 282 (1976). "In the final analysis, the issue is whether, under all the circumstances, the innkeeper in [question] provided for its guests reasonable protection against injuries from criminal acts." Courtney v. Remler, 566 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 (D.S.C. 1983). However, the degree of care which an innkeeper must exercise for the safety, convenience or comfort of its guests may vary with the grade and quality of the accommodations offered. Hassan v. Stafford, 472 F.2d 88, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1973).
III. PROXIMATE CAUSE
A. Proximate Cause In A Negligent Security Case
Federal courts consider New Jersey law to hold that a third person's intervening criminal act does not interrupt the causal chain if the defendant could reasonably foresee the possibility of intervening criminal conduct. New Jersey Bank, NA v. Bradford Securities Operations, Inc., 690 F.2d 339, 347-48 (3d Cir. 1982). See also, Berko v. Freda, 172 N.J. Super. 436, 438, 412 A.2d 821 (1980) ("The intervening criminal act of a third person does not insulate a defendant if such intervening act is reasonably foreseeable.") Defendants essentially concede that the possibility of an intervening criminal act was eminently foreseeable, but contend that the security measures undertaken by the Inn were "reasonable" in light of the risk presented, or alternatively, that each device or technique suggested by plaintiffs would have been ineffectual in preventing or reducing the risk of the subject crime. Defendants' Opposition at 7. A closer examination of the nature of proximate cause in the conceptually unique context of negligent security cases reveals that the jury's verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence.
In negligent security cases, it is not necessary that the particular consequences of the negligent act be foreseen so long as it is foreseeable that some injury may ensue. Instead, "proximate cause may be established by demonstrating that according to the common experience of mankind, the resulting injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligent act." Chomatopoulos v. Roma DeNotte Social Club, 212 N.J. Super. 447, 453-54, 515 A.2d 296 (1985) (failure of illegal gambling establishment to provide a private security force which would deter and/or control foreseeable altercations among its patrons was a proximate cause of gambler's injury). New Jersey courts recognize the confusing nature of proximate cause in negligent security cases:
The much cited decision of Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp.13, [ 141 U.S. App. D.C. 370, 439 F.2d 477 (1970)] . . . observed that the Goldberg court
seemed to use the word foreseeable interchangeably with possible, and agreed that it would be folly to impose liability for mere possibilities. But we must reach the question of liability for attacks in the sense that they are probable and predictable. Certainly, then, we do not intend an absolute obligation to prevent all crime.