Heights for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel on which to construct low income housing. That application was denied. Id. at 254. The Court found that the plaintiff had standing and noted that, had the Court granted relief, there was a "substantial probability" that low income housing would be built. Moreover, the plaintiff's complaint was neither a generalized grievance nor was it dependent on speculation about third parties. Id. at 264 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that the plaintiff had "adequately averred an 'actionable causal relationship' between Arlington Heights' zoning practices and his asserted injury." Id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 507). The Arlington Heights Court also found that the MHDC had standing to assert the "right to be free of arbitrary or irrational zoning actions." Id. 429 U.S. at 263 (citations omitted).
Defendants raise several factual arguments against plaintiff's standing in the case at bar. Among these are that plaintiff had no interest in any Borough property, nor did he have a firm offer to buy a Borough home. Defendants also note that the discussions regarding the home apparently took place in 1976, some ten years before the complaint was filed. Defendants offer these facts to support their argument that plaintiff has suffered no "injury," the first requirement for standing. However, defendants' arguments pose a "Catch-22" for plaintiff. It is arguable that it would have been absolutely futile for plaintiff to continue his attempt to buy a home in the Borough in light of the Club rule. Plaintiff's initial discussion with Ms. Perkins was allegedly discontinued because of the Club rule. Any homeowner (a Club member under the rule) would be forced to violate the Club rule in order to sell a home to a non-Club member. Even if plaintiff could purchase a home, it would be violative of the Club rule for plaintiff to lease the land upon which the home stood, absent his admittance to the Club. This court will not require that plaintiff undertake the futile act of negotiating an offer to purchase a home when he is barred as a non-Club member from owning such a home. The complaint alleges that plaintiff pursued Club membership from 1976 through 1985. (Complaint at paras. 16-18). Therefore, the complaint does not lack an allegation of direct injury merely because 10 years have passed since plaintiff's failed attempt to purchase a home in the Borough.
Plaintiff alleges a personal injury as a result of the effect of the Club rule. He alleges denial of an opportunity to purchase a home in the Borough of Pine Valley because he is not a member of the Pine Valley Golf Club. Withdrawal of the rule in question by defendants would provide part of the redress plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff's allegations indicate that the Club rule is prohibiting the possibility of his pursuing residency in the Borough. It appears on the face of the complaint that the Club rule, and no other cause, has created this barrier for plaintiff. Therefore, under Warth and Arlington Heights, plaintiff has standing to challenge the Club rule.
V. STATE LAW CLAIMS
Plaintiff has brought pendent state law claims under the New Jersey Constitution, Article 1, para. 1 (natural and unalienable rights) and Article 8, § 3 (use of public monies) as well as a claim for the common law tort of interference with prospective economic advantage. Defendants seek dismissal of these claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant Magee seeks dismissal of the claims against him on the basis of a lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
A. ARTICLE 1 CLAIM
Plaintiff brings a cause of action under Article 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. In light of the court's earlier analysis of plaintiff's equal protection claim under the federal Constitution, the court finds that plaintiff states a cause of action under Article 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. See Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353 (1982) (New Jersey Constitution at least as protective of civil rights as federal Constitution); Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 294, 495 A.2d 376, 389 (1985) (Article 1 embodies the concept of equal protection under the law). See also McKenney v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 316, 412 A.2d 1041, 1047 (1980). Defendants' Club rule restricting residence in the Borough on the basis of Club membership must be shown to be "justified by an appropriate state interest" in order to pass muster under the New Jersey State Constitution. Exxon Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 196 N.J. Super. 183, 192-93, 481 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Law Div. 1984); (citing Taxpayer's Assn. of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., 80 N.J. 6, 37, 364 A.2d 1016, 1033, 71 N.J. 6 (1976)). Therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's Article 1 claim is denied.
B. ARTICLE 8, SECTION 3 CLAIM
Plaintiff brings a claim against defendants for misuse of public monies under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 8, section 3 of the New Jersey Constitution. Defendants challenge plaintiff's standing to bring such a claim. Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania resident, not a New Jersey taxpayer. While the cause of action is one under state law, Article III (federal constitutional) standing requirements still apply. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985); Urban League of Essex County v. Township of Mahwah, 147 N.J. Super. 28, 33, 370 A.2d 521, 524 (App. Div. 1977), certification denied, 74 N.J. 278, 377 A.2d 682 (1977).
Plaintiff's alleged injury does not pertain in any way to defendants' use of public monies. The Supreme Court has not allowed taxpayer suits in the absence of an alleged direct injury resulting from the enforcement of the taxing provision. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678, 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1974). See also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 67 L. Ed. 1078, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923). Therefore, plaintiff's causes of action under Article 8 of the New Jersey Constitution are dismissed due to plaintiff's lack of standing.
C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM
The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage provides a remedy for those who suffer a business injury at the hands of a third party. Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 157 N.J. Super. 173, 384 A.2d 859 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 510, 391 A.2d 523 (1978) (unlawful interference with real estate brokerage business). Plaintiff has failed to plead facts which demonstrate the "loss of an economic advantage" or of a "business economic advantage" or a "business injury." See Schultze v. Chevron Oil Co., 579 F.2d 776, 777 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 58 L. Ed. 2d 657, 99 S. Ct. 577 (1978) (sale of service station). Therefore, plaintiff's tortious interference claim is dismissed.
D. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The Club defendants assert that the claims against defendant Magee must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The complaint alleges that Mr. Magee was manager of the Club at some or all of the times relevant to the complaint and that Mr. Magee personally informed plaintiff of the restrictive Club rule in 1976. (Complaint at para. 16). Mr. Magee's affidavit indicates only that he has "not lived or worked in the State of New Jersey since 1982." (Affidavit of Edward S. Magee, October 1, 1986 at para. 4). In order to carry out a managerial job at the Club, it is reasonable to infer that Mr. Magee would have had to regularly avail himself of the privilege of conducting business activities in the forum state. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958). Thus Mr. Magee invoked the "benefits and protections" of the laws of New Jersey. Id. Such purposeful activities give rise to sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state to establish this court's jurisdiction over defendant Magee. See Adams v. Governor's Committee on Post Secondary Education, 504 F. Supp. 30, 31-32 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Minichiello Realty Assoc. v. Britt, 460 F. Supp. 896, 899 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd 605 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1979). The motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims against defendant Magee for lack of personal jurisdiction is therefore denied.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's equal protection and due process claims under the Fifth Amendment is granted; defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's equal protection and due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment is denied; defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's privileges and immunities claim under Article IV, § 2 is granted; defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim under Article 1 of the New Jersey Constitution is denied; defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim under Article 8 of the New Jersey Constitution is granted; defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim of tortious interference is granted; and defendants' motion to dismiss all claims against defendant Magee is denied.
An appropriate order will be entered.
This matter having come before the court on the motions by defendants for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12; and
The court having reviewed the submissions and oral arguments of the parties; and
For the reasons stated in this court's opinion filed this date;
IT IS on this 21st day of September, 1988 hereby ORDERED that:
1. The motions of defendants Pine Valley Golf Club; Ernest L. Ransome, III; Edward S. Magee, Jr.; Borough of Pine Valley; Walter S. Shelly; John R. Ott, Jr.; and William K. Chapman for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), with respect to plaintiff's federal claims brought under Article IV, § 2, of the United States Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and with respect to plaintiff's claims brought under Article 8 of the New Jersey Constitution and plaintiff's claim of tortious interference, are GRANTED.
2. The motions of defendants for dismissal of plaintiff's claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 of the New Jersey Constitution are DENIED.
3. The motion of defendant Magee for dismissal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) is DENIED.