85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985), the Court stated that: "the Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties or relations.'" [Citations omitted.]
The Third Circuit has further elaborated on the methods by which a plaintiff may demonstrate the factual basis giving rise to jurisdiction. Plaintiff must prove either that defendant's actions gave rise to the cause of action being sued upon (specific jurisdiction), or that defendants have 'continuous and systematic' contacts with the forum (general jurisdiction). Provident, supra at 437.
The standard for specific in personam jurisdiction has been set out in the case of McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223, 78 S. Ct. 199 (1957). The Supreme Court held that California properly asserted jurisdiction over defendant, noting "it is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State." Id. at 223. The Court observed that "with this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines." Id. at 223. New Jersey courts have also found that direct mail solicitation has been held to confer personal jurisdiction "beyond doubt" over a non-resident defendant. Kugler v. Market Development Corp., 124 N.J. Super. 314, 318, 306 A.2d 489 (Ch. Div. 1973).
It has been held that in cases involving trademark infringement, the wrong takes place where the "passing off" occurs. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 871, 1 L. Ed. 2d 76, 77 S. Ct. 96, 111 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468 (1956); Hertz System, Inc. v. Hervis Corp., 549 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Scott Paper Company v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184 (D.Del. 1974). The Court in Scott analogized a trademark claim to libel cases and held that the trademark claim arises wherever injury from the infringing advertisement occurs. Id. at 190, footnote 6.
Jurisdiction may also be conferred over non-residents in tort cases based upon a single deliberate contact with New Jersey where that contact resulted in the alleged injury. Starline Optical Corp. v. Caldwell, 598 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 (D.N.J. 1984); Blessing v. Prosser, 141 N.J. Super. 548, 359 A.2d 493 (App. Div. 1976); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp., 182 N.J. Super. 376, 440 A.2d 1372 (Law Div. 1981); Beckwith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 182 N.J. Super. 376, 440 A.2d 1372 (Law Div. 1981). This result is consistent with the Hanson v. Denckla, supra, decision adopted by the New Jersey courts, that a voluntary action which is calculated to have an effect in the forum state is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction upon the defendant. Certisimo v. Heidelberg Company, 122 N.J. Super. 1, 8, 298 A.2d 298 (Law Div. 1972), affirmed 124 N.J. Super. 251, 306 A.2d 79 (App. Div. 1973).
The Court concludes from the preceding analysis that defendant's deliberate attempt to enter, advertise and promote itself in New Jersey by direct mail solicitation is sufficient to confer specific personal jurisdiction over defendant. However, the Court finds, for the following reasons, that venue in New Jersey is inappropriate.
Venue is proper only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the "claim arose". The statute controlling venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, provides in pertinent part:
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.