counts, and their counsel to sit through a trial estimated to take 12 months, when the proof that concerns them could be put forward in a matter of days. The possibilities of delay caused by scheduling problems of counsel and extended cross-examination in a 21-defendant trial will be somewhat reduced by the severance. The specter of managing 21 defendants and their counsel also presents difficulties to the court system in terms of providing adequate physical space. The system would be strained to provide a courtroom large enough to hold all these people and to provide rooms for consultation among counsel.
The confinement of RICO charges to one trial will assist each of the several juries in compartmentalizing the evidence put before it. The court recognizes that the total time spent in court on the several trials, mandated by this severance plan, may equal the 12-month estimate of the 21-defendant trial. However, use of several different juries, each for a shorter duration of time, is an important factor in increasing the efficiencies and the abilities of each jury to reach a fair result. The inevitable delays caused by illness and scheduling problems of jurors will become much more manageable in the context of shorter trials. The likelihood of obtaining a diverse cross section of the population in the selection of a jury is heightened by greater availability of jurors to serve in trials that do not interrupt employment as severely as would the estimate one year interruption in the case at bar. An exceedingly long trial mitigates against the jury's ability to devote its full attention to the trial and to properly evaluate and recollect all the evidence. Of course, in the exceptional case, a lengthy trial cannot be avoided and is in fact the best mechanism to achieve a fair trial for all parties. However, the indictment in the case at bar does not present the exceptional case. Based upon considerable experience in presiding over jury deliberations, this court is confident that the severance plan will better enable each jury to play its central role in achieving the goal of a fair trial.
b. Firearms Charges
i. Title 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202
The court is concerned about the prejudicial effect of a trial that includes firearms charges which require proof of previous felony convictions. Title 18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(1) makes possession of firearms by a previously convicted felon an offense. Counts 107-110 charge various RICO defendants with this offense. The court finds that presenting evidence or even the mere fact of a prior felony conviction to a jury would be prejudicial. The court recognizes the evidence may be "otherwise admissible," and that some courts employ such a test to determine if prior conviction evidence may come in. See United States v. Sanko, 787 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Begun, 446 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir. 1971). However, to avoid the possibility of prejudice resulting from admission of such evidence, the court will conduct a two-stage trial. The first stage of the trial will consist of the presentation of the entire RICO case, jury deliberations, and a verdict, on all the counts except 107-110. The second stage will include the trial of counts 107-110, those counts requiring proof of a prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1). This approach, which is suggested as a possible solution to the prior conviction prejudice problem in the government's brief, M.O.L. in Opposition 88, has been employed by the District of Minnesota and cited with approval by the third circuit in dicta. United States v. Busic, 587 F.2d 577, 585 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 398, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381, 100 S. Ct. 1747 (1980)(citing United States v. Franke, 331 F. Supp. 136 (D.Minn. 1971)). This court's bifurcation ruling pertains only to the preclusion of submitting prior conviction evidence for the purpose of proving § 1202 offenses, and in no way serves as a ruling on the question of admitting prior conviction evidence for any other purpose.
ii. Title 26 U.S.C. § 5861
The firearms charges under 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (possession of unregistered and unidentified firearms (counts 111-114) need not be tried separately from the bulk of the charges, since they do not require proof of a prior conviction. Firearms charges are recognized to be related to narcotics activity to the extent necessary to allow joinder of such charges under Rule 8(b). Sanko, 787 F.2d at 1251 (proof of firearms possession admissible in a narcotics trial as evidence that motive of possession is related to narcotics activity); United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1979)(judicial notice of relationship between narcotics dealing and firearms); Begun, 446 F.2d at 33 (9th Cir. 1971)(firearms evidence would be admissible on narcotics charges).
2. Majuri Firearms Trial
Defendants Vastola, Brocco, and Massaro, are all charged with firearms offenses and narcotics offenses. Majuri is also charged with a firearms offense, count 108. Majuri is not specifically indicted for narcotics or extortion, but is named in two gambling counts and the RICO conspiracy count. The RICO conspiracy count does not specifically identify firearms with the enterprise as charged. The court could, within its discretion, allow joinder of all firearms charges against RICO defendants, because the enterprise is alleged to be involved in narcotics activity. See, e.g. Sanko, 787 F.2d at 1251. However, that would be an unfair extension of the Sanko line of cases. The firearms charges against Majuri appear on the face of the indictment to be totally unrelated to narcotics activity. Therefore, in order to be sure to avoid prejudice to Majuri, the court, under the authority of Rule 14, will conduct a separate trial on the firearms charges against Majuri. United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 833 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911, 98 S. Ct. 2248, 56 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1978). In conclusion, with the exception of the Majuri firearms count, all RICO defendants will be tried on all counts charged in a joint bifurcated trial. The first stage will include all counts charged except counts 107-110; counts 107-110 will be tried in the second stage. In addition, Majuri's firearms count will be tried separately.
3. Other Individual RICO Defendants' Motions to Sever
The court notes that two of the RICO defendants, Majuri and Stone, move for a severance. Majuri argues that unless he is tried in a single trial, he will be deprived of his right to call several co-defendants as witnesses. Four factors are to be considered by the court in evaluating this motion: (1) likelihood of co-defendant's testifying; (2) degree to which such testimony may be exculpatory; (3) degree to which testifying co-defendant would be impeached; and (4) judicial economy. Boscia, 573 F.2d at 832. More than the showing of a possibility that a co-defendant will testify is required. Provenzano, 688 F.2d at 198. Majuri has alluded to co-defendant affidavits, but none have been provided in support of the motion. The alleged testimony of co-defendants, although contradictory to the government's case, would not be of a highly exculpatory nature, nor would it be beyond impeachment. See Boscia, 573 F.2d at 832; but see United States v. Ditizio, 530 F. Supp. 175, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1982)(statements against penal interest to be made by co-defendants are adequate grounds for severance). Upon considering all of the Boscia factors, the court denies Majuri's motion. The motion is not supported by affidavits and the court finds that it would be highly speculative to sever on the basis of such limited information.
Defendant Stone seeks an indefinite continuance or severance on the basis of severe health risks of trial. The court will reserve opinion on this motion pending a report from counsel following a court-ordered examination of Stone by an independent physician.
4. Non-RICO Defendants' Motions to Sever
Defendant Sanzaro's motion to sever is mooted by the court's severance plan. Count 31 names Sanzaro as an extortion victim. Only RICO conspiracy defendants are named in count 31. Counts 48, 80-82, name Sanzaro as a defendant in Western Union Telephone wire fraud and conspiracy. His defense is in no way antagonistic to the defense of the Count 31 defendants. Even if they had not been severed, Sanzaro could not show what is required in order to obtain severance for mutually antagonistic defenses. See Provenzano, 688 F.2d at 193 (such defenses must be irreconcilable and mutually exclusive); United States v. Crawford, 581 F.2d 489, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1978)(Mutually antagonistic defenses found to exist where the sole defense of each was the guilt of the other.).
The motions to sever by non-RICO defendants for the most part are mooted by the court's severance plan; to the extent any motion is not moot, it is denied.
5. Order of Trials and Continuance Motion
The court suggests that the trials proceed in the order indicated above at part III-A. This order is based on the numerical order of counts in the indictment. The RICO trial is scheduled after the non-RICO trials due to the unavailability of Michael Rosen, Esquire, counsel for defendant Vastola. See United States v. Gaggi, No. 555 84 Cr. 63, order (S.D.N.Y. August 13, 1987). All counsel are to appear on September 8, 1987, at 9:30 a.m. to discuss the order of trials in this matter. Counsel should be prepared to make realistic time estimates for each trial. The first non-RICO trial will commence on October 13, 1987, and will be followed by all other non-RICO trials. The RICO trial will commence on March 7, 1988, assuming the availability of Mr. Rosen.
The motion by Mr. Rosen on behalf of defendant Vastola for an extension beyond the above-indicated dates is denied. The court has reviewed the expert report obtained by defense counsel and recognizes that the quantity of tape recordings to be screened is voluminous; however, the court is confident that an organized effort by defense counsel, along with the seven-month continuance of the RICO case, will allow for full and proper preparation of the defense. The original indictment was returned September 19, 1986. RICO defendants had nine months to prepare for pretrial motions, and will have seven months to prepare for trial. The motion for a continuance beyond the dates listed above is denied.
IV. MOTIONS FOR PRETRIAL HEARINGS AND DISCOVERY
A. Defendants' (Levy and Fisher) Motion for Brady Material
Defendants Levy and Fisher are indicted in three counts of the indictment: count 28, 18 U.S.C. § 894 (extortion conspiracy), and counts 33 and 34, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (interference with commerce by extortion conspiracy). These counts pertain to collection of an extension of credit to John LaMonte d/b/a Out of the Past, Ltd., in connection with the MCA transaction and collection of usurious interest payments on a $ 50,000 loan to LaMonte. The defendants' Brady request seeks "information indicating that Morris Levy and Howard Fisher were extorted and controlled by certain named and unnamed members of the Genovese crime LCN family." Notice of Motion to Compel Discovery, Exhibit D (Letter dated February 10, 1987). Defendants allege such material to include: (a) writings, recordings, and photographs, (b) names, addresses, and telephone numbers of people with knowledge of the extortion; and of (c) confidential informants (CI-1 through CI-13) already named in affidavits in support of wiretap applications; (d) agents' notes; (e) relevant audio and video tapes; and (f) relevant notes, memos and reports. The factual basis of the request is derived from material already disclosed to the defense which includes affidavits in support of wiretaps in several districts: Southern District of New York, Northern District of New York, Eastern District of New York, and District of New Jersey. See Defendants' Exhibits H-L. These affidavits contain information indicating that confidential informants had information regarding the relationship between Levy and La CosaNostra ("LCN"), and the relationship between John LaMonte and the government. It appears that these wiretaps were conducted pursuant to a government investigation of the Genovese family. The affidavits show confidential informants had knowledge of Levy's activities and believed that he was under the control of a Vincent Gigante of the Genovese family, that his life had been threatened, and that he had tried to sever his relationship with the Genovese family. The affidavits also show that the informants believed that Levy's brother had been killed some 20 years ago in a mistaken attempt on Levy's life. The affidavits also indicate that Levy had dealings both with John LaMonte and the Genovese family over an extended period of time, including 1984 and 1985. The affidavits providing this information refer to five confidential informants: CI-2, 3, 7, 8, and 9. Affidavit of Leon Borstein, paras. 30-40, filed April 24, 1987; see also Defendants' Exhibit H, para. 64. The government does not question the genuineness of these threats to Levy. It is the affidavits of government agents which articulate the threats. Defendants seek the requested information (a) to establish defenses including duress, entrapment, and due process outrageous conduct, (b) to support a dismissal motion based on grand jury misconduct, and (c) to support a severance motion based on incompatible defenses. The government opposes the Brady motion.
Brady "is not a discovery rule but a rule of fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation." United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984)(citation omitted). It requires the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. "Exculpatory evidence includes material that goes to the heart of the defendant's guilt or innocence as well as that which might well alter the jury's judgment of credibility of a crucial question of a witness." Id. at 260. The government has a continuing duty to identify exculpatory material and provide it to the defense. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987). The government's determination as to the existence of Brady material is subject to review under a constitutional error standard. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111-14, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).
The Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") has represented to the court that he has not personally reviewed the investigations associated with the affidavits containing information on Levy, nor has he had detailed discussions with other government agents or attorneys who are intimately familiar with those investigations. Therefore, this court will employ its "Elizabeth Wiretaps" approach, used on a prior occasion in this case, and order the AUSA to review the government investigations concerning Levy for Brady information and to report its findings to the court within 15 days of the date of the attached order. See United States v. Vastola, No. 86-301, letter opinions (D.N.J. May 21, 1987; June 25, 1987).
The court adds the following guidance to the AUSA in its investigation and development of a report to the court. The defendants have not made an adequate showing to justify the release of the identity of confidential informants. United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923, 71 L. Ed. 2d 465, 102 S. Ct. 1282 (1982). For the purposes of this motion, the court finds that the defendants have not shown that the informant's identities are essential to a fair determination of a cause. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 77 S. Ct. 623 (1957). The ultimate determination of the viability of the defendants' duress and entrapment defense will be made at trial. See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 626 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1977). In the meantime, this court will not disturb the government's confidential informant privilege, Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59, on the basis of highly speculative assertions that the confidential informants possess exculpatory material not already in the record. Jiles, 658 F.2d at 198-99. In the event that the government calls a confidential informant as a witness, information pertinent to veracity must be made available at or shortly before appearance at trial. United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1048, 104 S. Ct. 725, 79 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1984); see also United States v. Dansker, 565 F.2d 1262, 1264 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052, 98 S. Ct. 905, 54 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1978)(where the credibility of a key witness was placed in question by written affidavits, an evidentiary hearing should be conducted to determine if Brady material was being withheld).
The court also notes that defendants have called to the court's attention certain occurrences in the case of United States v. Canterine, No. 87-57 (S.D.N.Y.), which defendants assert have an impact on this case. Supplemental Affidavit In Support of Motion to Compel at 4-5 and Exhibit R (July 10, 1987). Defendants allege that agents in the Canterine case who withheld Brady information from the defense are also involved in the Vastola investigation. The AUSA is ordered to investigate this allegation and file a separate ex parte report with the court, identifying these agents and describing the roles, if any, of these agents in the Vastola investigation. Such report should be filed within 15 days of the attached order.
In conclusion, defendants' motion to compel is denied, and the government is ordered to review the above described material and file the requested reports.
B. Defendants' Joint Motion For Pretrial Proffer Of A Single Conspiracy
Defendants seek an order requiring the government to make a pretrial proffer that one RICO conspiracy (and not multiple RICO conspiracies) is charged in the indictment. The government opposes this request, relying on the proposition that the good faith allegation of a single conspiracy in the indictment allows the government the opportunity to proceed to trial on that charge. Somers, 496 F.2d at 729-30; see also Maker, 751 F.2d at 626; United States v. Gallagher, II, 602 F.2d 1139, 1142 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S. Ct. 729, 62 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1980) (citation omitted)("The sufficiency of an indictment 'may not be properly challenged by a pretrial motion on the ground that it is not supported by adequate evidence.'"). District courts have specifically applied this principle to RICO conspiracy indictments. Persico, 621 F. Supp. at 857; Boffa, 513 F. Supp. at 473. However, as the defense points out, some courts have undertaken pretrial scrutiny of the indictment either to assist the court in controlling the case or to prevent the prejudicial effect of misjoinder of a RICO conspiracy count. See Castellano, 610 F. Supp. at 1397 ("Limited [pretrial] review enables a court to protect persons from the enormous burdens and risks of a major trial, without significantly or improperly limiting the government's right to prosecute."); United States v. Gallo, No. 86-452 (Tr. 27)("I can't rule on these things without, . . . getting an analysis of what your theory is, what you plan to prove and what you're going to use to prove it."). But see United States v. Donsky, 825 F.2d 746, 752 (3d Cir. 1987)(footnote omitted)("We do not, however, believe that the district court's decision in this case, which required proof delineating what the government intended to prove at trial as to each of the various defendants, was proper."). The court is sensitive to the concerns that fueled the pretrial scrutiny of the indictment in the above noted cases. However, the court finds that a pretrial proffer or hearing would be premature. In the event that the government's case is insufficient as to the proper allegations and proof of a single RICO conspiracy or involvement of a particular defendant, the court will entertain appropriate motions at the conclusion of the government's case. Defendants' motion is denied.
C. Defendants' Joint Motion for a James Hearing
Defendants also seek a James hearing in order to ascertain if statements of co-conspirators (Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)) are admissible.
A co-conspirator statement may be admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) if it meets three conditions: (1) there must be independent evidence establishing the existence of the conspiracy and connecting the declarant and defendant to it; (2) the statement must have been made in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) it must have been made in the course of the conspiracy.
United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 344, 78 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1983)(citation omitted).
A pretrial hearing to establish such a foundation for a co-conspirator statement is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Id. at 246. The third circuit, under certain circumstances, has allowed such statements to be admitted subject to the government making the required showing before the close of its case. United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032, 100 S. Ct. 703, 62 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1980). The Continental court found that such a procedure should be used sparingly due to the danger of prejudice, but that its application was particularly appropriate in multi-defendant conspiracy cases. Id. This court will follow the procedures outlined in Continental. To the extent feasible, the government will be required to make the Ammar showing prior to submission of such statements. However, in limited circumstances, the court will allow for the admission of co-conspirator statements pending a final threshold determination of conspiracy by the court before sending the case to the jury. See e.g. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 247. Defendants' motion is denied.
D. Defendants' Joint Motion for Pre-trial Hearings on Evidentiary Material (Prior Conduct, Prior Convictions, Bad Acts)
Defendants seek an order requiring that the government disclose the evidentiary material it will use at trial under Fed. R. Evid. 403, 404(b), 608, 609(e). The question presented by the motion calls for the balancing of the prejudicial effect of the evidence against the probative value of the evidence of prior conduct, prior convictions, or bad acts. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443, 105 S. Ct. 460 (1984). Such balancing is most effectively done at trial when such evidence can be evaluated in the factual context of the government's case and the defense put forward. Id. at 41. This court will deal with these issues outside of the presence of the jury as they arise. It would be unduly speculative to try to resolve them without developing the factual context of the case. See generally United States v. Bianco, 419 F. Supp. 507, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem. 547 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1977). The joint motion of the defendants and all individual motions for pretrial evidentiary hearings are denied.
E. Defendants' Joint Motion for Pretrial Discovery (Witness List, Statements of Non-Testifying Witnesses, Grand Jury Information)
Defendants have made a broad motion for various types of information to be disclosed by the government. Some of these requests have been treated above, (i.e. prior conduct, prior convictions, bad acts). Specifically, the defendants seek production of a witness list, statements of non-testifying witnesses, and grand jury information. The government is obligated to disclose information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972); and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. No evidence has been brought before the court that the government is not meeting or will not meet these continuing obligations. With regard to the specific requests for a witness list and statements of non-testifying witnesses; neither is required to be disclosed as Brady material. See United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1294 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228, 105 S. Ct. 1226, 105 S. Ct. 1227, 84 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1985)(witness list); United States v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (W.D.Pa. 1983)(recorded statements of alleged co-conspirators); United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914, 93 S. Ct. 233, 34 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1972)(witness statements discoverable under Jencks Act). The defense seeks disclosure of the identity of confidential informants. No specific need for disclosure has been demonstrated. United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923, 71 L. Ed. 2d 465, 102 S. Ct. 1282 (1982). At oral argument, the defense suggested that information pertinent to John LaMonte should be disclosed now because "this is an impeachment case." The court will require that such information be released pursuant to the normal procedure of the Jencks Act in this district. This requires release in time for effective cross-examination. The government is encouraged to release such information on or before the first day of trial.
The joint defense motion and defendant Vastola individually seek disclosure of grand jury materials, or in the alternative, an in camera review of the grand jury minutes. There exists a long established policy of secrecy of grand jury proceedings. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1323, 79 S. Ct. 1237 (1959). However, the trial court can invade the secrecy of the proceedings in the interests of justice where a defendant demonstrates "a particularized need." Id. at 400. The defense request for disclosure of unauthorized persons, impanelment date, and other procedural details, is not supported by such a demonstration. A "presumption of regularity" attaches to the proceedings, and the defense has provided nothing to the court, such as reliance on perjured testimony, to disturb the secrecy. United States v. Vaughn, 510 F. Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J. 1981). Defendant Vastola's argument that there could be no evidence presented to the grand jury to support his indictment on narcotics charges is also without merit. This court does not know the full scope of the evidence presented to the grand jury, nor need it inquire into such evidence at this time. United States v. Louie, 625 F. Supp. 1327, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal dismissed, 787 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1986)(argument that facts do not support the charges is premature). If inadequate evidence of narcotics activity exists, the narcotics counts can be challenged by a motion to dismiss. The motions to disclose or conduct in camera review of the grand jury materials are denied.
F. Defendants' Joint Motion For A Bill Of Particulars
The joint defense motion seeks a 110-item bill of particulars. The purpose of a bill of particulars is "to inform the defendant of the nature of the charges against him, to adequately prepare his defense, to avoid surprise during the trial and to protect him against a second prosecution for an inadequately described offense." United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936, 30 L. Ed. 2d 812, 92 S. Ct. 949 (1972). A motion for a bill of particulars is a discretionary matter for the trial court. Id. Defendants' request was denied in its entirety by the government.
The defense has categorized its request into four groups: (1) information about when, where and by whom the alleged criminal acts or managerial acts relevant to the alleged enterprise were committed; (2) information about the identity of non-named participants in these acts; (3) information about uncharged overt acts or other uncharged criminal conduct which the government will seek to prove at trial; and (4) information necessary to determine whether the indictment is proper. Some of what is being sought in category (3) has already been asked for and denied in the context of other motions (e.g., prior conduct, prior convictions, bad acts). In addition, the request for information necessary to determine the adequacy of the indictment, category (4), has been denied for the most part based on other rulings made in this opinion. The court has found in large part that the indictment is adequate. Pleading of the statutory language that provides basic notice of the culpable behavior is sufficient.
Nevertheless, the court finds that defendants are entitled to more detailed information on some of the counts charged. They are entitled to "central facts," not unlimited discovery. United States v. Johnson, 524 F. Supp. 199, 207 (D.Del. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 690 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214, 75 L. Ed. 2d 450, 103 S. Ct. 1212 (1983). To the extent that the government is able to do so, the precise date and place of each event alleged in the indictment should be provided. United States v. Holman, 490 F. Supp. 755, 762 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In addition, the names of all co-conspirators or participants in the alleged offenses should be provided, "except insofar as the Government can show, in camera, that such disclosures might endanger the safety of prospective witnesses." Id. The government is not obligated to provide uncharged overt acts and uncharged criminal conduct. United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 55 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858, 96 S. Ct. 111, 46 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1975); Johnson, 524 F. Supp. at 207. These are not central facts to the offenses as charged. This ruling incorporates the granting of a bill of particulars as to defendants Harris and Majuri, discussed at II-F, G, of this opinion. Defendants' motion for a bill of particulars is granted in part and denied in part. Information is to be provided to the defense within 15 days of the date of the attached order; in the event that it is necessary for the government to make an in camera submission to the court, it shall be made within 10 days of the date of the attached order.
In conclusion, all motions for pre-trial hearings and compelled disclosure of discovery material, with the exception of the bill of particulars motion, are denied. The bill of particulars motion is granted in part and denied in part.
V. MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
A. Individual Defendants' Motions To Suppress Fruits of Searches
Several defendants seek suppression of evidence under a theory that the relevant search warrants were not supported by probable cause. The review of a magistrate's probable cause determination is not de novo, but rather deference is to be paid to the magistrate. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). The magistrate is to consider the particular factors of each case in determining if a "substantial basis" for probable cause exists. Id. at 238-39. Where a defendant demonstrates an inadequacy of probable cause, the appropriateness of applying the suppression mechanism must be evaluated under the requirements of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). Under Leon, suppression is not required where "an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope." Id. at 920. Any one of the following conditions requires suppression under Leon : (1) where the affiant intentionally or recklessly misleads the magistrate; (2) where the magistrate abandons his or her objective judicial role; (3) where the affidavit is so lacking in probable cause that an officer could not reasonably rely on the warrant; (4) where the warrant utterly fails to meet particularization standards. Id. at 923; see also United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1985)(motel room search without sufficient probable cause upheld under Leon ; "reasonably well-trained officer" could have concluded that probable cause was sufficient). Under these standards, the defendants' suppression motions challenging the search warrants and execution of such warrants are granted in part and denied in part as explained below.
1. Vastola Motion
Vastola challenges the probable cause finding in support of the search warrant of his home. The warrant identifies the objects of the search as follows:
Fruits and instrumentalities of the crimes of extortion and mail and wire fraud including but not limited to cash received from extortion, records of loansharking and extortion, and a television set obtained by mail and wire fraud.