of the case, when one considers the evidence adduced on the Government's case, this application for a new trial can only be characterized as ludicrous in the extreme. Those few matters of which Papeika spoke even arguably relevant to guilt or innocence came out of the mouths of the Government's witnesses over and over again. Those witnesses, who were believed by the jury and who were, in my opinion, as credible as any witnesses of their type that I have seen, delivered a hydrogen bomb. I will not dignify this application with a recital of the specific evidence from each of those witnesses with reference to the specific allegations defendants press as the flyswatter to extinguish the hydrogen bomb. I am satisfied simply to note certain of the direct testimony of William Hawley, untouched on cross-examination.
DiNorscio, Hawley testified, was not employed; rather, his income came from narcotics and Cohen was his partner in narcotics. Tr. 187-189. Cohen, too, was not employed, yet spent money at the race track and went to the golf course every day where he played golf all day for a thousand dollars a hole. Tr. 184, 195, 212. DiNorscio spent his money on expensive cars - he had at that time two Mercedes 500 SL's - and on jewelry, women, $ 1500 meals, a swimming pool at his home, and cocaine for his own use. Tr. 210, 211, 438.
Hawley saw the proceeds from drug transactions every week, he continued, at DiNorscio's house and at co-defendant Truglia's house - hundreds of thousands of dollars at one time. Tr. 207. DiNorscio and Cohen each got one of the four piles into which the money was divided, Hawley delivered $ 40,000 to $ 50,000 to Cohen on each of approximately ten occasions, and Hawley delivered money to DiNorscio as well. Tr. 208 to 210. Cohen, on one occasion, complained to DiNorscio that he was owed $ 300,000 on drug deals and wanted DiNorscio to get it for him because Cohen's lawyers were starting to run him into money and he was having problems with the IRS. Tr. 444. DiNorscio, Hawley continued, had "ripped off a guy" for $ 450,000. Tr. 445.
A house, a boat and cars. They must have gotten the money from "some place". That is all that Papeika said. To imply, as defendants would have me imply, that Papeika was responsible for the suggestion that the defendants were involved in illegal activities which permitted them certain worldly goods, or that Papeika corroborated and thus made strong a weak Government case, borders on the irresponsible.
When I recall the testimony of William Hawley, Robert Fisher and Greg Hamilton, I am reminded of Justice Minton's observation in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619, 97 L. Ed. 593, 73 S. Ct. 481 (1953), that the record "fairly shrieks" the guilt of the defendants. When I recall those portions of that testimony relevant to the issue before me, and as only highlighted above, I am convinced to a moral certainty that the statements pressed to me can best be characterized in the Second Circuit's word as mere "molecules" and could not possibly have influenced this jury, particularly given the "abundant properly admitted evidence" concerning the matters to which these molecules were arguably relevant. United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1064 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958, 103 S. Ct. 2431, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1318 (1983); See also United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 928, (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 102 S. Ct. 2268 (1982). The motion for a new trial is denied.
Before concluding, I note that by letter dated April 9th, 1987, counsel for defendant Truglia writes that "part of the investigation hints at the existence of a near fatal drug overdose suffered by the juror's daughter-in-law in or about 1971 which resulted in her admission to Union Memorial Hospital. This episode was not disclosed to the court or counsel by the juror."
The Government correctly observes that while this bald innuendo is entitled to no consideration with respect to the motion for a new trial, it does warrant consideration for what it reveals about defendants' endeavors with regard to that motion. Clearly, states the Government, the juror has been targeted post-trial to provide the basis for a new trial and more than one way of accomplishing that result is being explored, even if that means delving back 16 years into the life of a juror's in-law in search of seeds of bias, and even if it includes Papeika, because "he felt a personal interest in the juror," telling her that he had been approached by "an investigator" about his conversation with her. Statement at 5.
One or more defendants is apparently seeking to do through the back door what he is expressly prohibited and apparently carefully avoiding doing through the front. I remind the parties and their counsel of the rules governing the courts of this state and this district, which provide in effect that except by leave of court granted after good cause shown, no attorney or party shall himself or through any investigator or any person acting for him, interview, examine or question any grand or petit juror with respect to any matter relating to the case. Together with my order denying a new trial, I will order that the defendants and their agents, the defense attorneys and their agents, and the Government attorneys and their agents, be restrained from communicating with or contacting in any manner whatsoever, any juror or alternate juror in this case without prior consent of the court. One final note, if any defendant persists in seeking information about a juror or jurors from sources other than the juror himself or herself, and brings that information to me as something more substantial than a "hint" of something that may have occurred 16 years ago, I assure him that whatever "investigation" led to such information will be carefully scrutinized. See State v. La Fera, 42 N.J. 97, 199 A.2d 630 (1964) (extensive, professional post-conviction investigation among relatives, friends and associates of jurors in hope that something would be found to impeach verdict offended spirit of what is now N. J. Court Rule 1:16-1).