The opinion of the court was delivered by: BIUNNO
The claims remaining in this case are by Mr. & Mrs. Young against Dr. Braun and Dr. Malcolm for alleged medical malpractice. There has also been a claim, from the time the complaint was filed, against Holy Name Hospital and several fictitious persons described as its employees.
The claims against Dr. Braun, a pathologist at Holy Name, and Dr. Malcolm, an internist specializing in hematology, are alleged on the basis of failure to adhere to medically accepted standards applicable to each of their fields. The claims against Holy Name and its fictitiously named employees are alleged in a separate paragraph grounding liability on deviation from accepted standards for hospitals.
At the call of May 3, 1982 the court raised the question of jurisdiction over the claim against Holy Name Hospital, in view of the fact that there was no dispute that the hospital came within N.J.S. 2A:53A-7 and 8, restoring the long-established "charitable immunity" doctrine except for allowing recovery of a maximum of $10,000 to beneficiaries, to whatever degree, as the result of any one accident.
Thus, at most, Mr. & Mrs. Young together, one suing for alleged personal injury and the other for derivative damages per quod, could not recover more than $10,000., aside from interest and costs. Even if each could claim $10,000. (which they cannot), their claims cannot be aggregated to support diversity jurisdiction, Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. 143, 6 Peters 143, 8 L. Ed. 349 (1830); Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379, 45 L. Ed. 583, 21 S. Ct. 402 (1901); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 60 L. Ed. 817, 36 S. Ct. 416 (1916); Lion Bonding v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 67 L. Ed. 871, 43 S. Ct. 480 (1923); Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 86 L. Ed. 951, 62 S. Ct. 673 (1942); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 22 L. Ed. 2d 319, 89 S. Ct. 1053 (1969); Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 38 L. Ed. 2d 511, 94 S. Ct. 505 (1974).
Thus, the $10,000. limit under New Jersey law falls short of the jurisdictional minimum, which requires that the amount in controversy exceed $10,000., not counting interest and costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
The court then ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the Hospital and an order was signed dismissing the complaint against it on that ground pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), in accordance with the obligation and responsibility mentioned in Wymard v. McCloskey, 342 F.2d 495 (CA-3, 1965) (en banc), where the court also pointed out, at p. 497, that "* * * absent federal jurisdiction, no judgment of a federal court can stand." And see, also, Inventive Music Ltd. v. Cohen, 564 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.J.,1982), after remand pursuant to 617 F.2d 29 (CA-3, 1980). The order entered then recited that a written articulation of reasons would be filed, and this opinion does so.
Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hospital, 392 F.2d 149 (CA-3, 1968) involved two claims, both based on negligence, one being a personal injury (survival) claim and the other a wrongful death claim, both arising from an incident in which plaintiff's decedent fell out of bed while in the hospital. The trial judge had granted the hospital's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to it in view of the limited liability under the statute, see 259 F. Supp. 836 (D.N.J., 1966), and had evidently expressly directed the entry of final judgment as to it on an express determination that there was no just reason for delay, F.R.Civ.P. 54 (b), thus making the order appealable then and there.
The panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, taking the view that, so far as the complaint alleged that both the hospital and one physician were negligent in failing to supervise the patient in a way that would have prevented him from falling out of bed, there was a single "action" seeking in excess of $10,000., even though the liability of one of the two defendants so charged, the hospital, was limited to $10,000.
There was also a separate claim against the same doctor and another doctor, charging both (but not the hospital) with negligence in diagnosis and treatment, see 392 F.2d 149, at 153, note 1, which is a medical malpractice claim.
In any case, the Court of Appeals considered the question one to be decided on a flexible approach, exercising the court's best judgment in the light of many interacting factors for which the statement of a simple rule of thumb was impossible, see 392 F.2d at 155, especially note 6 and text accompanying it. The court then went on to find support in the analogous case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966), a case involving "federal question" jurisdiction coupled with a pendent State-law claim.
The analogous support, however, was not accepted by the Supreme Court in Owen Equipment v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 57 L. Ed. 2d 274, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978), where a substantial majority declined to apply Gibbs to a case that had no "federal question" jurisdiction.
There, as here, the plaintiff selected the federal forum for the assertion of entirely state-law claims based solely on diversity, and was found not in a position to complain if the federal court, having limited jurisdiction, could not hear all the claims in one case. He could have brought his suit ...