there is no suggestion in the statute, or its legislative history, that the New Jersey legislature ever intended to indemnify charitable institutions operating wholly outside of the state. Moreover, as a matter of statutory construction, it is elementary that laws enacted by a state legislature must be assumed to apply only to institutions which are either incorporated in or located within that state. Liberal construction of the statute which is prescribed by N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A:53A-10 does not alter this assumption.
In addition, "New Jersey would have no prevalent policy consideration of protecting a foreign corporation from suit when the state of incorporation does not grant that protection." Wuerffel v. Westinghouse Corporation, 148 N.J.Super. 327, 335, 372 A.2d 659, 663 (Law Div.1977). In Wuerffel, the issue of whether the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act applied to Drexel University was raised but never specifically decided. After balancing New Jersey's interest in granting charitable immunity to an institution against Pennsylvania's interest in demanding accountability of its corporations, the Court held that Pennsylvania law controlled because New Jersey would have no interest in applying its Charitable Immunity Act to a foreign corporation, especially at the expense of a New Jersey resident plaintiff. Id.
HUP maintains that there exist several policy considerations which would warrant application of the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act to it. Primarily, defendant cites the close connections between the hospital and the state of New Jersey.
Due to this relationship, HUP contends that the state has a significant interest in applying the immunity statute to HUP in order to insure the availability of the hospital's services to New Jersey residents.
This Court has construed the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act to apply only to New Jersey institutions. Although HUP may provide substantial services to New Jersey residents, the institution was incorporated in Pennsylvania and performs all of its functions therein. Any connection between HUP and New Jersey which does not include incorporation or operation within the state is insufficient to bring the hospital under the purview of the statute.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, our decision in this matter will not result in the denial to the hospital of equal protection of law. HUP argues that the decision of WHYY v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117, 120, 89 S. Ct. 286, 287, 21 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1968) (per curiam) in which the Court held that a New Jersey statute which denied a tax exemption to nonprofit corporations operating in New Jersey but incorporated elsewhere is analogous to the case at bar.
WHYY, however, is factually distinguishable from the instant case because HUP is not only incorporated outside of New Jersey but it also conducts all of its business activities outside of that state. It is apparent from the language in WHYY that the holding in that case did not extend to organizations which have no facilities in New Jersey. Indeed, as indicated in Prince, it is doubtful that New Jersey has authority to legislate with respect to entities operating outside of the state. 282 F. Supp. at 837.
WHYY was also concerned only with the state's taxing authority. The Court reasoned that once a state has permitted a foreign corporation to enter its territory, "the adopted corporations are entitled to equal protection with the state's own corporate progeny, at least to the extent that their property is entitled to an equally favorable ad valorem tax basis." 393 U.S. 119, 89 S. Ct. at 287 (citations omitted). There is no indication in the opinion that the same ruling would apply to the state's power to grant a corporation limited immunity from tort liability.
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act does not apply to the University of Pennsylvania Hospital. Consequently, defendant's motion for summary judgment must be denied. The Court shall prepare an appropriate order to be filed with this opinion.