not misleading." It has also met the prescription of Section 6(b)(1) by taking "reasonable steps" to assure that the disclosure is "fair in the circumstances and reasonably related to effectuating the purposes" of the statute.
Thus, it learned of four infant deaths resulting from squeeze toys and then undertook the comprehensive study that I have earlier described to determine that these toys with bulbous shaped ends and narrow handles were the cause of the infant choking deaths. The submissions support the claim that the staff people doing the investigation were acting conscientiously and in good faith; and there is not a suggestion that Danara was somehow singled out for prosecution or for proceeding against; indeed, several manufacturers of squeeze toys were covered.
Thereafter, Danara was first notified of the problem over three months ago, and it has had ample time to contest on the merits the notion that its toys were hazardous. As I have already noted, to this day it has submitted nothing from any expert source, for example, a pediatrician, that its toys are not hazardous.
Danara was thereafter informed that if it disputed the accuracy of the press release a comment from Danara would be included in any press release issued by the Commission. Danara chose not to include such a statement in its response to the Commission.
Based upon the other information that has been conveyed to me and to which I have referred earlier, it is clear that the procedures that were set forth to assure the accuracy of the information and to ensure that the entire proceedings were accomplished fairly meet the requirements of the statute.
To repeat to a degree, although Section 6(b)(6) requires the Commission to establish procedures to assure the accuracy of the information it releases, Danara has cited to no authority for its assertion that this requires the Commission to afford a full adversary proceeding prior to publishing a press release pursuant to Section 6(b)(1) or 6(b)(2). In fact, the legislative history of Section 6(b)(6) is explicit, that the "requirement is solely a direction to the Commission to establish internal clearance procedures." H.R. REP. NO. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,880, reprinted in  U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 396, 1242. In this case the recommendation of the Commission staff was presented to the Commission for approval, along with all of the studies undertaken concerning the choking dangers of Danara's squeeze toys. This satisfies the statutory requirement of Section 6(b)(6).
Thus, despite the holding of the Fountainhead court, which holding I note is presently on appeal to the Second Circuit, I find that the plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
Turning to the matter of public interest, here it merges with the balancing factor, and as merged these factors militate strongly against the application. The Commission is aware of and has provided documentation to this court concerning infant deaths resulting from infants having placed these bulbous ended narrow handled squeeze toys in their mouths, blocking the passageway and causing suffocation; and has concluded that Danara is the manufacturer of bulbous ended, narrow handled squeeze toys, similar to those causing deaths.
Plaintiff has made no showing that the public interest has been violated by Commission action. Danara's position apparently is that absent a full scale adversary hearing, nothing short of an infant injury or death from choking on one of its products should require it to undertake the corrective action suggested by the Commission. Dealing as we are with dissemination of information which may preserve an infant's life, and particularly in light of the fact that Section 6(b)(1) and 6(b)(2) provide the Commission with the authority to act as it did and intends to do here, I find that the public interest would not be served by the grant of a temporary restraining order.
In so finding, and dealing with the other factor which I said emerged with the public interest factor, namely, the balancing of interest, it is clear to me that the Commission here serving the public interest that I have just defined, has by far the better of it in the matter of balancing.
The application for the temporary restraining order is denied for the reasons that I have set forth.
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