panel by its order of January 5, 1981, Exh. P-1.
In other words, Haynes applied to both the resentence panel of the trial court, and to the Appellate Division, for the same relief. That relief having been granted first in the trial court, there was no need to grant it again, as noted in Exh. P-2.
Haynes' complaint here is that clerical personnel in the Appellate Division have incorrectly required that he file a Notice of Appeal, and attaches letters to him dated April 6, 1981 and May 4, 1981, referring to a letter (not supplied here) and an inquiry about a "Motion for Free Transcripts" (not supplied here). The second letter mentions information enclosed, but the enclosures are not supplied.
Haynes grounds his complaint here on the proposition that under N.J. Court Rule R.2:5-1(g), the indigency order of the resentence panel must be treated as a notice of appeal, and that no separate notice of appeal is needed.
Although it has been ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 extends to rights secured by "laws" as well as by the Constitution, the laws referred to are laws of the United States; see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980). The issue raised by Haynes arises out of a New Jersey court rule, the equivalent of state legislation under the Supreme Court's rule-making power, N.J.Const., 1947, Art. 6, sec. 2, par. 3. Thus, the right to which he complains of being deprived is a right allegedly secured by state law, not federal law, and as a consequence there is no jurisdiction here under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or on any other federal basis.
By way of remedy, Haynes wants:
1. A declaration that the Chief Justice and the named clerical personnel in the Appellate Division have violated his constitutional rights.
2. An order directing that Exh. P-1 be treated as a notice of appeal, to assign a docket number and schedule his "second motion" for a free transcript.
3. Ordering the Chief Justice to institute a training program for the clerical staff.
4. Awarding compensatory and punitive damages (stating specific amounts contrary to the provisions of General Rule 8-G of this District).
5. Awarding litigation costs, including attorney fees.
Insofar as Haynes asks this court to order the clerical staff of the Appellate Division to treat the Exh. P-1 order as a notice of appeal, he is seeking mandamus to compel the doing of what he claims is a ministerial act. See, e.g., Baumann v. Hoboken District Court, 49 N.J.L. 537, 13 A. 43 (Sup.1887); Laird v. Abrahams, 15 N.J.L. 22 (Sup.1835); Terhune v. Barcalow, 11 N.J.L. 38 (Sup.1829); Lerner v. McDermott, 11 N.J.Misc. 99, 164 A. 864 (Sup.1933).
By N.J.Const., 1947, Art. 6, sec. 5, par. 3, mandamus (along with all other prerogative writs) was superceded and like review, hearing and relief shall be afforded in the Superior Court. See, also, N.J. Court Rules R.2:2-3 and R.4:69.
The federal courts do not sit to supervise the internal workings of the state judiciary, or as courts of appeal to review or regulate their operation, and for this reason as well, there is no jurisdiction here.
Finally, even if the interpretation by clerical personnel be incorrect, they have instructed Haynes on the steps to take to perfect his appeal. He need only file a notice of appeal with request for extension of time or that it be accepted nunc pro tunc. Haynes obstinately refuses to follow the instructions and comes here instead to ask this court to decide a matter of state law. He is also entitled to the professional assistance of the N.J. Public Defender, see N.J. Court Rule 2:7-2, but evidently insists on handling his own case. In this respect he may be trying to chalk up a record of needless litigation greater than that recorded in Green v. Jenkins, 80 F.R.D. 686 (D.Mo.1978).
Refusal to comply with instructions given (even if incorrect) and failure to seek the assistance of the Public Defender, renders the complaint frivolous, as an independent ground for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
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