On appeal from the Sussex County District Court.
Botter, King and McElroy. The opinion of the court was delivered by King, J.A.D.
Plaintiff, owner of a farm with two dwellings, one barn and 100 acres of farm land, obtained a judgment of possession entered on the ground that the lease had expired. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53(a). Defendant tenant appeals, contending that N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq., generally known as the Anti-Eviction Act, applies to this tenancy and bars the eviction.
Prior to leasing the farm defendant was a subtenant renting one of the dwellings on the premises. When the prior tenants left, defendant expressed an interest in leasing the entire farm; he indicated to plaintiff that he would farm the property to a limited extent. A written lease was drawn by a friend of defendant, who was an attorney practicing in New Rochelle, New York. The term was 18 months, October 1, 1977 to March 31, 1979. A March 31 termination date is traditional in farm leases. In addition, the lease gave defendant the option to renew for an additional year which he exercised.
Defendant did not actually do any farming on the premises other than to arrange with another farmer to cut wild hay which grew on the property. The wild hay was cut in shares -- 60 to the farmer, 40 to the defendant. The venture brought defendant $36 worth of hay the first season, $225 worth the second. Defendant, whose principal occupation was making leather goods, claimed that he lacked the financial resources to engage in extensive farming. He admitted that his sales efforts kept him "on tour" at shows and fairs from May to October.
During the tenancy defendant sublet one house and the barn to Valerie Webber. Effective April 1, 1980 plaintiff leased the entire farm to Webber for farm purposes. Although he received a timely notice to quit, defendant refused to vacate the premises, claiming that plaintiff lacked good cause for eviction. Plaintiff thereupon brought this suit for possession. The trial judge ruled in favor of plaintiff on the ground that the Anti-Eviction Act did not apply to this tenancy. We stayed the judgment of possession pending appeal.
The novel question before us is whether N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq. , applies to a farm lease. Defendant maintains that the controlling question in determining the applicability of the statute is whether the tenancy is residential. According to defendant, tenants need only show that they live on the demised premises in order to receive the protection of the Anti-Eviction Act. Plaintiff responds that the statute applies only to dwelling units, such as houses or apartments, and here defendant leased much more than residential space.
N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53(a) provides that the county district court has jurisdiction to remove a lessee or tenant of "any houses, buildings, lands or tenements" where that tenant holds over and continues in possession after the expiration of his term. However, the statute specifically excepts "residential lessees and tenants included in" N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1. That latter statute provides:
No lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the county district court or the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guest house or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant, except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause: . . . .
The statute then enumerates the reasons for which a tenant may be removed. Expiration of the term is not one.
The purpose of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 is to protect residential tenants from the effects of what the Legislature has deemed to be a severe shortage of rental housing in this state. The statute seeks to prevent unfair and arbitrary evictions by limiting the basis for removal of tenants who occupy premises not excluded from its coverage to reasonable grounds, e.g. , default in rent, disorderly or destructive conduct, retirement from the market, and violation of reasonable regulations. Stamboulos v. McKee , 134 N.J. Super. 567, 572 (App.Div.1975). Since the statute is in derogation of the ...