The opinion of the court was delivered by: BROTMAN
This is one of a host of actions arising from the alleged exposure of workers to asbestos or asbestos containing products while in the course of their employment. Jurisdiction in this case is predicated upon the diversity of citizenship of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The court must answer the question whether the employers of these workers may be called to answer for their alleged tortious conduct in an action at common law or whether they are shielded from any liability at common law as a result of the operation of the New Jersey workmen's compensation statute. N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 et seq.
This question is presented to the court by plaintiffs' motions for leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint setting forth their claims of "intentional wrong" against the former employers of two workers, Owens-Illinois, Inc. (Owens-Illinois) and Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation (Owens-Corning), and for leave to file an amendment
to the proposed amended complaint.
The plaintiffs' proposed amended and supplemental complaint contains a count setting forth their claims against these two companies, stating in pertinent part:
7. Defendant, Owens-Illinois, Inc., and defendant Owens Corning Fiberglass, forewarned with the knowledge of plaintiffs' imminent peril, intentionally, maliciously, wilfully, wantonly and with reckless disregard to the health interest of plaintiffs and others similarly situated failed to advise plaintiffs of their peril, failed to take proper precautionary steps to protect plaintiffs from this peril, failed to provide a safe workplace as described by law, failed to remove plaintiffs from said peril and intentionally withheld information from the plaintiffs about the dangerous conditions in which they worked and the dangerous nature of material to which they were daily exposed and, moreover, failed to advise plaintiffs that they were in fact developing a disease while in these defendants' employ.
9. As a result of defendants' failings aforedescribed, plaintiffs directly and proximately suffered the injuries complained of herein.
Plaintiffs' Proposed Amended and Supplemental Complaint, at 10. The court shall now consider whether the New Jersey workmen's compensation statute bars the assertion of a claim predicated upon these allegations.
The New Jersey workmen's compensation statute, like all workmen's compensation acts, establishes a different method for determining liability than the traditional approach followed by the courts in actions at common law. It creates a presumption, rebuttable only by an express written statement to the contrary in advance of any accident, that every employment contract is governed by its article on elective compensation. N.J.S.A. 34:15-9. That article states that "compensation for personal injuries to, or for the death of, such employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment shall be made by the employer without regard to the negligence of the employer" according to statutory schedules for payment. N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. The quid pro quo for this statutory declaration of employer liability for all employee injuries is to be found in N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, which provides that the agreement of the parties to adhere to the article on elective compensation shall normally bar the pursuit of other remedies against the employer. It reads:
Such agreement shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof than as provided in this article and an acceptance of all the provisions of this article, and shall bind the employee himself and for compensation for his death shall bind his personal representatives, his widow and next of kin, as well as the employer, and those conducting his business during bankruptcy or insolvency.
If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.
N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 (emphasis added). In other words, an injured worker cannot maintain a common law action for damages against his employer unless the alleged conduct of the employer constituted an "intentional wrong" within the meaning of the statute. The issue which the court must now resolve is whether the plaintiffs' proposed claim against Owens-Illinois and Owens-Corning states a claim for an "intentional wrong," as the term has been construed by the courts.
The only New Jersey case interpreting the "intentional wrong" exception, which was adopted in 1961 when the New Jersey legislature amended N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 to add the second paragraph of that section, is Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 248 A.2d 129 (App.Div.1968), certification denied, 53 N.J. 581, 252 A.2d 157 (1969). In that per curiam opinion the court reviewed the circumstances under which N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 was amended, as set forth in the opinion in Miller v. Muscarelle, 67 N.J.Super. 305, 321, 170 A.2d 437, 445 (App.Div.1961), certification denied, 36 N.J. 140, 174 A.2d 925. According to the Miller court, the amendment was enacted in response to the criticism of "(t)he continued subsistence of a cause of action in tort against a fellow-employee." Id., at 321, 170 A.2d, at 445. The court observed that the existence of that cause of action
Id. Based upon its review of the legislative background of the amendment by the Miller court, the Bryan court rejected "the contention of (the) plaintiff that the exception for "intentional wrong' in the statute eliminating tort liability, as between persons in the same employ, where the injury sued for is compensable by workmen's compensation, N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, is equatable with "gross negligence,' or similar concepts importing constructive intent." Bryan, supra, at 523, 248 A.2d, at 130. The Bryan court reasoned:
The policy objective sought by the 1961 amendment would not be attained if the exception for "intentional wrong" were construed to leave open a loophole for such actions against fellow employees in the guise of claims for "gross negligence." We think the Legislature intended the words "intentional wrong," in this ...