BARLOW, District Judge.
The plaintiffs, residents of Illinois, allege that on July 5th, 1974, while driving in the Province of Quebec, Canada, they were injured when their automobile was struck by that of the defendant, Victor Yue, a New Jersey resident. Almost two years later, on June 15th, 1976, the plaintiffs commenced the present action in this Court. The defendant now moves for summary judgment, maintaining that the instant suit is timebarred by Quebec's one-year personal injury statute of limitations. The plaintiffs counter with the argument that the appropriate standard to apply is New Jersey's more favorable two-year statute of limitations.
A federal court sitting in diversity is bound to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Company, Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941). Thus, New Jersey's conflicts of law principles are binding on the Court in this matter.
New Jersey has abandoned the mechanical lex loci delicti approach to choice of substantive law questions in favor of a flexible governmental interest analysis. See, e.g., Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229, 229 A.2d 625-626 (1967). This state's supreme court has recently extended this approach to encompass the question of which jurisdictions' statute of limitations will be utilized to gauge the timeliness of the litigation where suit is brought in a forum foreign to where the cause of action arose. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). The Heavner court established a "borrowing rule" which dictated that where suit is brought on a foreign cause of action in a New Jersey court, the court will not employ this state's statute of limitations but will, instead, "borrow" that of the foreign jurisdiction if "the parties are all present in and amenable to the jurisdiction of that state, New Jersey has no substantial interest in the matter, . . . and [the foreign jurisdiction's] limitation period has expired at the time suit is commenced". Id. at 141, 305 A.2d at 418. The court noted, however, that this holding was limited to the factual circumstances "identical with or akin to the [ Heavner ] case". Id.
In Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28 (1975), the Third Circuit had occasion to consider the application of Heavner and reiterated the New Jersey Supreme Court's position that when a court must choose between New Jersey's statute of limitations and that of a foreign jurisdiction "New Jersey choice of law rules . .. require a determination of which law will govern the merits of the case". Id. at 32 (footnote omitted). If a court concludes that New Jersey substantive law will not govern the action, the Third Circuit concluded that " Heavner requires borrowing of the foreign limitation period". Id. at 37. Thus, the Court's task is to determine whether the merits of the instant litigation would be governed by the substantive law of New Jersey or Quebec. A conclusion that the substantive law of Quebec applies would necessitate dismissal of the action as time-barred.
The procedure for making such a determination was recognized by the Third Circuit in Henry to require a two-step analysis:
The court determines first the governmental policies evidenced by the laws of each related jurisdiction and second the factual contacts between the parties and each related jurisdiction.