In any event, petitioner has been informed of the charges against her. She has been represented by three different attorneys and bail has been set. See petitioner's letter of March 7, 1976.
Petitioner next asserts that when she was rearrested in California she was not afforded a second extradition hearing prior to being transported to New Jersey. Where a fugitive from justice challenges the legality of extradition proceedings, habeas corpus relief may be sought from either a state or federal court located in the asylum state. U.S. ex rel. Darcy v. Superintendent of County Prisons of Philadelphia, 111 F.2d 409, 411 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 662, 61 S. Ct. 19, 85 L. Ed. 425 (1940); Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52, 41 S. Ct. 222, 65 L. Ed. 497 (1921); In re Hunt, 276 F. Supp. 112, 114 (E.D.Mich. 1967). Thus, the petitioner while detained in Los Angeles could have filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Federal District Court for the Central District of California to test the validity of the extradition procedure under Article 4, Sec. 2, Cl. 2 of the Constitution and 18 U.S.C. § 3182 et seq. Once extradited, however, a state prisoner cannot seek habeas corpus relief from a federal district court in the demanding state on the grounds that the extradition proceedings in the asylum state were unlawful. Hunt v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1020, 89 S. Ct. 1644, 23 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1969); Nelson v. Sacks, 290 F.2d 604, 605 (6th Cir. 1961); Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349, 1350-51 (W.D.Mo. 1970); U. S. ex rel. Huntt v. Russell, 285 F. Supp. 765, 767 (E.D.Pa. 1968), aff'd, 406 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1969); New Jersey v. Noyes, Fed.Cas.No. 10, 164 (D.N.J. 1878). The Supreme Court has consistently held that "the power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.'" Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S. Ct. 509, 511, 96 L. Ed. 541 (1952) citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S. Ct. 225, 229, 30 L. Ed. 421, 424 (1886).
Finally, petitioner asserts that she was not advised of her Miranda rights upon her second arrest in Los Angeles. The Miranda rule merely provides for the suppression of statements made as a result of custodial interrogation if the accused was not previously given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The denial of this constitutional right cannot be raised as ground for federal habeas corpus relief unless and until the trial court refuses to exclude such evidence and is upheld by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Absent "special circumstances" the exhaustion doctrine will not "permit the derailment of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court." Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 493, 93 S. Ct. 1123, 1128, 35 L. Ed. 2d 443, 451 (1973); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253, 6 S. Ct. 734, 741, 29 L. Ed. 868, 872 (1886); Note, Developments in the Law -- Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1094 (1970).
The petition will be denied.