as do other procedural regulations.' The Goodwill Station, supra 337 U.S. at 276, 69 S. Ct. at 1103. Where, as here, Exhibits 136-139, by their very nature, presented '(n)o material issues of fact . . . in dispute' an oral hearing was not required to be held. Allied Van Lines Xo. v. United States 303 F.Supp. 742, 749 (C.D.Cal.1969); Frozen Food Express, supra at 260; National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. United States, 293 F.Supp. 634 (N.D.Okl. 1968).
Under the circumstances it was neither necessary nor desirable to reopen the proceedings for additional testimony and oral argument. The Administrator exercised proper judgment in affording the parties the opportunity to propound their views in writing, at the same time refusing to reopen the record. Arthur Murray Studio v. Federal Trade Commission, 458 F.2d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 1972); Shachtman v Dulles, 96 U.S.App. D.C.287, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (1955).
The Authority was given ample opportunity to present its position to the Administrator concerning Exhibits 136-139, as it was likewise afforded every opportunity to be heard throughout these long proceedings. The DRPA was not prejudiced as a result of the Administrator's decision not to reopen the proceedings. Arthur Murray Studio, supra.
The procedure followed here was proper and fair to all parties. The requirements of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment were satisfied.
VII. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA).
The DRPA claims that the Administrator was required, pursuant to NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332,
to file an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). It is alleged that the Administrator's failure to file an EIS renders his action, the implementation of the new toll schedule, unlawful.
The necessary prerequisite to the raising of the environmental impact statement issue is, or course, the proper showing of standing by the DRPA. Article Iii of the Constitution, which expressly limits the exercise of the judicial power to 'cases' and 'controversies,' provides the basic framework for analysis of the standing question. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.,v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-52, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970). To demonstrate standing a plaintiff must establish a personal stake and interest in the outcome of the controversy. This requirement makes certain that the resolution of disputes between parties will take place in an adversary contest. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204,82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21, 94 S. Ct. 2925, 41 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1974); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975).
To make the requisite showing of standing, the DRPA must demonstrate both that 'the challenged action has caused (it) injury in fact' and that it is 'within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated' by NEPA. Data Processing, supra 397 U.S. at 152-53, 90 S. Ct. at 829; see Cape May County Chapter, Inc., Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F.Supp. 504, 511 (D.N.J. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164, 1171-71 (6th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 389 F.Supp. 689, 697 (D.D.C. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F.Supp. 356, 367-68 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
Injury to an environmental interest may be sufficient to meet the 'interest may be sufficient to meet the 'injury in fact' test. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734, 92 S. Ct. 1361, 31 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1972). However, the plaintiff 'seeking review (must) be (itself) among the injured.' Id. at 735, 92 S. Ct. at 1366; see Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F.supp. 419, 422 (D.Conn.1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, supra; O'Brien v. Brinegar, 379 F.Supp. 289, 290 (D.Minn.1974) (dictum). The plaintiff must allege 'a distinct and palpable injury to (itself) . . ..' Warth v. Seldin, supra 95 S. Ct. at 2206 (1975); see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689, 93 S.ct. 2405, 37 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1973).
Further, a casual connection must be demonstrated between the action complained of and the alleged injury. Warth v. Seldin, supra, 95 S. Ct. at 2208; S. v. D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1973); Seirra Club, 405 U.S. at 735, 740, 92 S. Ct. 1361. The plaintiff must 'establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm.' Warth v. Seldin, supra; see also Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3rd Cir., filed Oct. 14, 1975).
Applying the foregoing principles of the law of standing to the DRPA's pleadings, it is plain beyond doubt that the Authority has failed to satisfy the 'injury in fact' test. Paragraph 32 of the DRPA's complaint alleges:
The Administrator has not considered that his order reducing the tolls in major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment in the Delaware Valley, and thus requires an environmental impact statement per Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 4332).
Absent from Paragraph 32 is any allegation that the DRPA will suffer injury resulting from the implementation of the Administrator's toll schedule.
Rather, Paragraph 32, generously construed, appears to raise by implication the environmental interests of the citizens of the Delaware Valley. The DRPA argues that the Administrator's toll schedule, insofar as it lowers the commuter and basic cash tool will add to urban congestion and pollution.
Standing cannot be based upon a 'generalized grievance' held in common by all or a large class of citizens. Warth v. Seldin, supra 95 S. Ct. at 2205; Paton v. LaPrade, supra. Nor is the assertion of the rights of third parties sufficient, without more, to confer standing. Warth v. Seldin, supra; see Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. 1586 (1953). Of course, if the plaintiff makes the requisite showing of actual injury suffered by itself, the claims of third parties, as well as those of the general public, may properly be advanced and ultimately adjudicated; but the DRPA has made no such showing here.
The only possible harm which the DRPA might suffer from the implementation of the Administrator's toll schedule is economic in nature, i.e. decreased revenues from lower tolls. But such injury, if any,
does not fall within the zone of interests which NEPA seeks to protect. Clinton Community Hospital Corp. v. Southern Maryland Medical Center, 374 F.Supp. 450, 455 (D.Md.), aff'd per curiam, 510 F.2d 1037, 1038 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 95 S. Ct. 2666, 45 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1975); cf. Duke Lumber Co. v. Butz, 382 F.Supp. 362, 373-74 n. 35 (D.D.C.1974). In Clinton Hospital Corp., the court observed that the plaintiff's real aim was not to protect the environment, but rather to prevent the building of a competitive hospital nearby, and found that the plaintiff lacked standing. 374 F.Supp. at 455. The DRPA's position here is virtually the same as that of the Clinton Community Hospital Corporation.
The DRPA has not satisfied the two-part test of Data Processing. It has not demonstrated that it will be injured if the Administrator's toll schedule is implemented. Nor had it established that it is within the zone of interests to be protected by NEPA. Therefore, the DRPA has no standing to challenge the Administrator's alleged failure to file an EIS. It follows that the court need not consider whether the Administrator's toll schedule is major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
The court reaches the conclusion that the Administrator's toll schedule is lawful in all respects. Accordingly, the motions of the Defendants and the Intervenor for Summary Judgment are granted, and the motion of the Plaintiff for Summary Judgment is denied.
The toll schedule set forth in Appendix A of the Federal Highway Administrator's Opinion and Order of May 19, 1975 shall take effect at 12:01 a.m., December 1, 1975, in accordance with the court's Order entered this date.