which sum was expended by various members of the firm (T-139)(G-10c).
80. The firm, as reflected in its 1972 tax return, has deducted approximately $71,000.00 in convention and meeting expenses for various members of the firm (T-140)(G-10c).
81. The law firm of Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry has deducted proportionately from its gross income contributions in excess of $54,000.00 made to various charities on behalf of the firm (T-142)(G-10c).
82. The Federal Partnership Tax returns of the law firm of Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry reflect that the firm has paid Philadelphia City tax, Net Profit tax, Mercantile tax, General Business tax, Personal property tax, and Sales and Occupancy tax (T-123)(G-10a, b, c).
83. The Federal Partnership Tax returns of the firm of Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry have set forth the firm's capital account, from beginning of the year as to each one of the firm's partners, showing ordinary income, additional first year depreciation, contributions that were made, withdrawals, distribution, and capital income at the end of the year (T-127)(G-10a, b, c).
84. All so-called profit-sharing members of Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry contributed capital to the law firm of Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry as reflected in their respective capital accounts (T-108, 109)(G-10a, b, c).
85. On June 18, 1975 petitioner was served by an agent of the United States Attorney's Office with a grand jury subpoena to produce certain books and records of the law firm of Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry. At that time, the records subpoenaed were either in the firm's Philadelphia office or in the firm's New York office, and some in the possession of the law firm's accountant, Murray Axelrod (T-54, 55, 56) including all of the accountant's work papers; financial statement file; copies of Federal Income Tax returns of the partnership; City Tax returns of the partnership and individual partners and State Tax returns (G-9).
86. On or about June 27 and 30, 1975, petitioner called the law firm's accountant, Murray Axelrod, and asked him to deliver to the firm of Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry all of the records in his possession (T-56).
87. Pursuant to the direction of petitioner, Murray Axelrod, the accountant for the firm of Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry, delivered on or about July 27, and July 30, 1975, to petitioner the various records of the law firm of Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry as set forth in G-9 (T-78, 79).
88. Petitioner has submitted an affidavit in which he contends that he may have been the subject of illegal surveillance by the United States. In support of this allegation, he submits that "the existence of unusual noises or occurrences on the telephone system together with the positive responses obtained . . . in his initial scan of the offices, led [him] to believe that his office may have been subjected to illegal electronic surveillance."
89. The Government has submitted the affidavit of Assistant United States Attorney Frank C. Razzano in which he states that to his knowledge there has been no electronic surveillance of the conversations of petitioner or any electronic surveillance of conversations occurring on premises owned, leased or licensed by him whether or not he was present or participated in those conversations, by the United States Attorney's Office or any agency in the investigation.
90. The United States has also submitted a letter from the United States Department of Justice to the effect that an inquiry has been made with the appropriate federal government agencies in order to determine if there has been any electronic surveillance occurring on premises owned, leased or licensed by petitioner whether or not he was present or participated in those conversations. Based upon the results of such inquiry, the U.S. Department of Justice has represented that there has been no electronic surveillance of any conversation of petitioner or any electronic surveillance of any premises owned, leased or licensed by him.
91. Petitioner has failed to offer any evidence indicating that the affidavit of Assistant United States Attorney Frank C. Razzano and the letter from the U.S. Department of Justice were false or defective.
92. Petitioner has contended that the grand jury subpoena requiring the production of the firm's financial books and records for the relevant period under investigation is overly broad, burdensome and unreasonable.
93. Petitioner has failed to establish these allegations and the United States has demonstrated the relevancy, necessity and reasonableness of the documents subpoenaed in the affidavit of Assistant United States Attorney Frank C. Razzano dated July 10, 1975.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The principal question presented for decision is whether the nature and character of the documents sought by the grand jury is such that petitioner, Abraham E. Freedman, may assert the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination with respect to their production.
In order to place the facts of this case in their proper perspective it is necessary to consider the fifth amendment privilege in the context of some basic postulates. It is of course axiomatic in our system of justice that a witness may not be compelled to give testimony which would tend to incriminate him. This constitutionally inviolable privilege, however, is a purely personal one which precludes the government from eliciting testimony from the individual himself. In other words, the privilege inheres to the person invoking it and may not be claimed by one for the benefit of another. As Mr. Justice Holmes described it, "A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production." Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458, 33 S. Ct. 572, 57 L. Ed. 919 (1913).
As early as 1886, the United States Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment proscribes the compulsory production of incriminating personal papers and effects in addition to oral testimony. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886). As the Court stated in the important case of Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88, 94 S. Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974):
The privilege applies to the business records of the sole proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to personal documents containing more intimate information about the individual's private life. [citations omitted]
And in United States v. White, discussed at length in Bellis, the Supreme Court described the principle thusly:
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals . . . It is designed to prevent the use of legal process to force . . . him to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might incriminate him.