The opinion of the court was delivered by: WHIPPLE
The parties appear before this Court after having concluded a nine and a half week trial before a jury at which the defendant Brunswick was found to have violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. The jury found no violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. The plaintiffs were awarded damages by the jury in the amount of $2,358,030 before trebling and consented to a remittitur in the amount of $499,050 for the reasons set out in an opinion by this Court filed on September 17, 1973, Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Brunswick Corporation, 364 F. Supp. 316, 324-326 (D.N.J. 1973). The relief presently sought by the plaintiffs is for an injunction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 16 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 ordering the defendant Brunswick to divest itself of Belmont Lanes, Pueblo, Colorado; Interstate Lanes, Ramsey, New Jersey; Fair Lawn Lanes, Fair Lawn, New Jersey; Ten-Pin-on-the-Mall, Paramus, New Jersey; and Lodi Lanes, Lodi, New Jersey.
In considering the propriety of this relief, the Court is mindful that the jury has already found injury and has awarded damages which, prior to Telex v. I.B.M., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. OK. 1973), represented the largest outstanding, privately-litigated recovery under the antitrust laws of the United States. This Court is also reminded by the plaintiffs that, "divestiture has been called the most important of antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. It should always be in the forefront of a Court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been found." United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330-331, 6 L. Ed. 2d 318, 81 S. Ct. 1243 (1961).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act reads:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18
Since the jury previously found for the defendant on the Sherman Act charge of attempted monopolization, the defendant reasons that the italicized language above must now be removed from the Court's purview. Therefore, the defendant's violation of Section 7 must fall within the alternative language of the statute and reflect activities on its part which have resulted in a substantial lessening of competition. The defendant closes its argument by entreating the Court, as it makes its findings of fact pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, to discover and reveal those specific acts of misconduct by which the defendant produced the substantial lessening of competition required by the statute.
Although linguistically interesting and possessed of a certain persuasive allure, I conclude that the defendant's argument is legally deficient. It fails to recognize that the test for attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act involves, among other elements, the finding of a specific intent to monopolize. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 97 L. Ed. 1277, 73 S. Ct. 872 (1953); Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 49 L. Ed. 518, 25 S. Ct. 276 (1905). No such findings of specific intent, however, is a necessary element for a conviction under the "tendency to create a monopoly" provision of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. As a result, the jury's Sherman Act determination does not preclude this Court from finding that its Clayton Act verdict was based upon a "tendency to create a monopoly." United States v. DuPont de Nemours & Co., supra, at 607 (1957); Crown Zellerbach Corporation v. F.T.C., 296 F.2d 800, 825 ( 9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937, 8 L. Ed. 2d 807, 82 S. Ct. 1581 (1962). It is also established that, ". . . the legislative history of Section 7 indicates clearly that the tests for measuring the legality of any particular economic arrangement under the Clayton Act are to be less stringent than those used in applying the Sherman Act." United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294 328-9, 8 L. Ed. 2d 510, 82 S. Ct. 1502 (1962). The decision by the jury on defendant's alleged violation of the Sherman Act goes no further than what it appears to be on its facts and thus it bears no logical relationship to the Court's present task of making factual findings on the defendant's violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In making the present findings this Court places primary reliance on Reynolds Metals Company v. F.T.C., 114 U.S. App. D.C. 2, 309 F.2d 223 ( D.C. Cir. 1962) and the authorities cited therein. The Reynolds case is analogous to the case at bar. It concerned a vertical merger by Reynolds, the world's largest manufacturer of raw aluminum foil, with Arrow Brands, a converter of raw aluminum foil into decorated forms sold almost exclusively to the florist trade. The Court found:
Brunswick is a manufacturer of bowling equipment and its acquisition of these bowling lanes, which were potential and actual purchasers of its equipment, provided it with the opportunity of acting, like Reynolds, as a rich parent with a deep pocket. In Brunswick's case, however, the opportunity to tap the deep pocket did not prove merely to be a potentiality.
The history of the bowling industry and Brunswick's role in it is particularly illustrative on this point. Prior to Brunswick's entrance into the market of operating bowling centers, control of these businesses rested in the hands of single proprietors and a few small chains. One year after its entrance, however, Brunswick controlled 176 bowling centers in the United States and immediately became the industry's largest single operator controlling 5.5 times more centers than any of its competitors. (Pl. Ex. 32)
Its growth in this area, however, did nothing to diminish its prominence as a major manufacturer of bowling equipment and, incident thereto, its position as a major creditor to the bowling centers which purchased its equipment. As a credit-extending parent it was able to subsidize the purchases of its newly-acquired business at the rate of $2,000.00 per lane per year, ( Pl. Exs. 1, 1A , 2 ) while it placed the plaintiffs on a "cash only" basis although prior to entry in this market it customarily extended credit to these plaintiffs ( Pl. Ex. 35-38; Lieblich Tr. 598-601, 604-609, 617-628). Obviously the ...