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September 17, 1973

Treadway Companies, Inc., et al. Plaintiffs,
Brunswick Corp. Defendant

Whipple, D.J.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: WHIPPLE

The trial of this case began for the second time on March 13, 1973 and concluded on May 11, 1973 with the following verdicts being returned:

 1. In favor of defendant Brunswick and against plaintiffs Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., Holiday Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., Bowl-O-Mat Paramus, Paradise Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., Treadway Companies, Inc. (for losses claimed to have been suffered by the closing of Fort Lauderdale Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.), Treadway Companies, Inc. (for losses claimed to have been suffered by interest charges) and Indianapolis Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., with respect to the claims of monopolization and/or attempted monopolization asserted by them, under 15 U.S.C. § 2.

 On May 31, 1973, this Court, having previously trebled the amounts awarded to the plaintiffs on the Section 7 claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15, entered judgments reflecting the jury verdicts. Within ten days after the entry of said judgments, defendant brought the instant motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. A more detailed statement of facts is not presently necessary; where facts do become operative, the Court will set them out. The grounds for the motion are numerous and will be treated seriatim.


 Motions for a judgment notwithstanding verdict, since they are, by definition, " intrusions upon the province of the jury", must be granted cautiously and sparingly. Rumsey v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 408 F.2d 89, 91 (3rd Cir. 1969). In ruling on the motion, the Court must review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed at the trial. Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 476 F.2d 471, 474 (3d Cir. 1973); Rumsey, supra, at 90 of 408 F.2d; 5A J. Moore, Federal Practice Para. 50.07[2]. In fact, it is the general rule that such a motion may only be granted where "reasonable minds could reach no other conclusion". Pope v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 464 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1972); Sotell v. Maritime Overseas, Inc., 474 F.2d 794, 796 (2nd Cir. 1973); Reeves v. Power Tools, Inc., 474 F.2d 375, 380 (6th Cir. 1973). It is the further duty of this Court upon the instant motion to refrain from weighing the evidence and to ignore the credibility of the witnesses. Cole v. Chevron Chemical Co. -- Oronite Division, 477 F.2d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 1973). It is upon these procedural guidelines that defendant's motion will be considered.

 Defendant's initial argument is that its motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' case was improperly denied as a matter of law. The first specific argument under this general heading is that the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence from which the jury could properly conclude that defendant's operation of competing bowling establishments gave rise to any reasonable probability that competition would be lessened or that a monopoly would tend to be created in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

 The crux of the defendant's hypothesis is that the activity in which it engaged cannot be violative of § 7 as a matter of law because that activity had the effect of preserving competition rather than reducing it. Entwined in this proposition are the defendant's subordinate contentions that (a) even if competition could be lessened or a monopoly created by their actions, damages could not, as a matter of law, flow therefrom, and (b) even if damages could flow as a matter of law, none were proven.

 The only purely legal issue implicit in this theorem, in this Court's view however, is whether a private party can, as a matter of law, recover damages for a § 7 violation. The conceptual difficulty inherent in this question is that the Act speaks in terms such as " may be to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly". Thus, can a violation caused by a tendency result in damages? The question was laid to rest in Gottesman v. General Motors Corporation, 414 F.2d 956, 960-961 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911, 29 L. Ed. 2d 689, 91 S. Ct. 2208 (1970):

We agree with those authorities cited above that indicate that a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act does furnish a basis for a claim for money damages under the broad language of Section 4 of the Act. . .. The basis of the pre-trial ruling was that a Section 7 violation can cause no damage because it establishes only that harm was threatened, not that it occurred. But if the threat ripens into reality we do not see why there can never be a private cause of action for damages.

 The legal issue of capacity being answered, the only remaining question is whether the plaintiff carried his burden of proof. As the court stated in Gottesman :

If Section 7 is designed to prevent acquisitions that "may" or "tend to " cause specified harm, such an acquisition may either itself directly bring about the harm or make possible acts that do. We do not say that a Section 7 violation must, or even probably will, have that result; but that it may and that plaintiffs should have a chance to prove injury "by reason of " the violation are persuasive propositions.

 414 F.2d at 961. The question of whether the plaintiffs proved their damages as a proximate result of the defendant's activities is one for the fact-finder, see Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 427 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1970). There was ample evidence adduced at the trial to show how Brunswick's entry into the retail market lessened competition, see Reynolds Metals Co. v. F.T.C., 114 U.S. App. D.C. 2, 309 F.2d 223 (1962); Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966), and this Court views the ...

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