Cohen, District Judge.
Do the Indecency and Obscenity Statutes of New Jersey and the regulations of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), which allegedly proscribe the increasingly popular, but controversial form of barroom entertainment, "topless" dancing, infringe upon the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs? This is the issue plaintiffs seek to have resolved by this three-judge court.
Challenged is the constitutionality of the New Jersey Lewdness or Indecency Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:115-1;
the Statute prohibiting the occupation or use of one's premises for the purpose of lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2A:133-2(b);
and Rule 5 of Regulation 20
of the ABC, interdicting "lewdness and immoral activity" at licensed establishments which serve alcoholic beverages.
Jurisdiction is conferred by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1343(2) and (4), 2201, 2202, 2281 and 2284.
Plaintiffs in these three consolidated actions are the waitresses and employees of the Club Lido, Pennsauken, New Jersey (Civil No. 49-73); its operators and performers (Civil No. 50-73); and the corporate owner, stockholder, managers, entertainers and a patron (Civil No. 51-73).
The defendants are the New Jersey Attorney General, George F. Kugler; the Camden County Prosecutor, Thomas J. Shusted and his assistants; the Director of the ABC, Robert E. Bower; and other law enforcement and ABC personnel as agents of the above officials.
Plaintiffs contend that the statutes and regulation under attack facially violate the first and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution in that the proscriptions therein infringe on their freedom of expression and, alternatively, are void for vagueness, with respect to the activity of "topless" dancing
conducted for the entertainment of patrons of the Club Lido. Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief.
Contra the contentions raised by plaintiffs, all defendants, in addition to asserting that the pertinent statutes and regulation are facially constitutional, move to dismiss the complaints on the basis of abstention. Railroad Comm'n. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1941). Defendants also urge that this Court should refrain from interfering with the pending state criminal prosecution, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971). There have been, however, allegations of official lawlessness and bad faith harassment which, if proved, would place this case within the exceptions to Younger, thereby permitting injunctive relief. With the view we take of the case, resolution of this issue is unnecessary.
In determining whether the abstention doctrine should be applied, the United States Supreme Court has held that a federal court should not abstain if the state statute is "clear and unambiguous in all material respects," Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535, 85 S. Ct. 1177, 1182, 14 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1965), and if the statute is not susceptible to a saving constitutional construction, Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S. Ct. 391, 19 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1967).
Additionally, the defendants Director Bower and other ABC personnel contend that the instant case is singularly appropriate for the application of the abstention doctrine, inasmuch as Rule 5 of ABC Regulation 20 has never been challenged in the New Jersey Courts as being void for vagueness; further, that unless the regulation is facially unconstitutional which is denied, the state courts should initially be afforded an opportunity to construe and interpret the regulation in a manner which might eliminate the need to reach the constitutional issue. See e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S. Ct. 507, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1971); Meridian v. Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 79 S. Ct. 455, 3 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1959); and C'est Bon, Inc. v. North Carolina State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 331 F. Supp. 82 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
For ABC Rule 5 or the statutes challenged here to withstand constitutional scrutiny, they must not be "in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S. Ct. 618, 619, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939). See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1971). Uncertainty cannot exist either with respect to the scope of the acts encompassed by the statute, or with regard to the substantive standards to be applied to the conduct. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-516, 68 S. Ct. 665, 92 L. Ed. 840 (1948).
Statutes containing language similar to that of the administrative rule and legislative enactments hereinunder consideration have been upheld by the Supreme Court against challenges that they were void for vagueness. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 86 S. Ct. 958, 16 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957). In so doing, however, the Court required that the following constitutional standard for judging lewdness or obscenity be applied to the statute for it to be upheld:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418, 86 S. Ct. 975, 977, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1967).