For reversal and remandment -- Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Proctor, Hall, Schettino and Mountain. For affirmance -- None. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Weintraub, C.J.
This is a class action brought by private individuals charging fraud and irregularities in the sale of grave sites. The Attorney General was named a defendant because of his official responsibility with respect to cemeteries. The Attorney General filed a cross-complaint against the defendants alleging violations of the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion under R. 4:32-2(a) that they be permitted to maintain their suit as a class action. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal to the Appellate Division from the denial of a class action. That motion was denied. Plaintiffs then moved before us for leave to appeal and we granted the motion.
The denial of authorization to maintain the suit as a class action was apparently based on the single circumstance that the Attorney General had filed a cross-complaint. That fact, however, could not alone justify the order. Neither the Consumer Fraud Act, just cited, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et seq., nor the statute creating the Office of Consumer Protection in the Division of Law of the Department of Law and Public Safety, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-5.6, et seq., purports to vest in the Attorney General the exclusive power to act in the area of consumer fraud. Whether a private class action should be authorized remains subject to our class-action rule, R. 4:32-1 et seq. In this connection we note that the Consumer Fraud Act was amended in 1971 (c. 247, § 7, p. 1177) to authorize a private action by an individual damaged by a violation of that statute. That amendment does not expressly or by implication bar an individual from suing for a class for violations of the statute or for wrongs actionable without the aid of that statute. Nor,
on the other hand, does that amendment itself mandate that a private class action should be authorized. The terms of our class-action rule still control.
In Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Center, 61 N.J. 218 (1972), we said that "There are advantages when a public official is the plaintiff, but, as was noted in Kugler v. Romain, supra, 58 N.J. 522 at 540, staff limitations are such that the private class action must be accepted if the objectives are to be realized in this area." When the Attorney General sues for a class, there may be no need for a private class action if the class is the same and the relief sought by the Attorney General will adequately deal with the grievance alleged by the private suitor. But here the Attorney General does not purport to deal with the whole subject, and this being so, a private class action should not be denied because of the Attorney General's activity. The Attorney General agrees, pointing out that the substantive bases and the remedies sought by plaintiffs are materially different from the bases advanced and the relief sought by him.
The complaint alleges (1) fraudulent misrepresentations in the sale of burial plots; (2) legal infirmities in the written contracts; and (3) fraudulent imposition upon buyers in the entry of default judgments against them. A comparison of the complaint and the Attorney General's cross-complaint demonstrates that the cross-complaint does not cover the whole ground.
As to fraudulent misrepresentations in the sale of plots in the past, the Attorney General does not seek to maintain a class action. Rather he sues solely on behalf of named individuals. Those named individuals are some of the plaintiffs, but the Attorney General seeks relief only as to them and upon the specific misrepresentations which the Attorney General alleges. Nor, at the moment, do plaintiffs ask certification of a class action based upon sales misrepresentations. Although plaintiffs' complaint charges that others were also defrauded in the sale of the plots, they tell us they
did not assert "in the trial court, the existence of a class based upon fraudulent misrepresentations" but do reserve the right to seek to maintain a class action in that regard "if further discovery reveals that the fraudulent misrepresentations were substantially identical in nature"*fn1 and satisfy the prerequisites of a class action.
With respect to the attack upon the face of the contracts themselves, the Attorney General assails three of the four forms defendant used while plaintiffs attack all four. The Attorney General alleges the three forms of contract fail to disclose the total dollar amount of the service or interest charge and hence fail to disclose the total dollar obligation of the prospective consumer. This failure is charged to constitute the suppression, concealment, and omission of a material fact in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. The relief sought as to all affected individuals is an order permanently restraining defendants from collecting or receiving any service or interest charge in any case in which the total dollar amount of such charge is not clearly set forth in the purchase agreement.
As to the three purchase contracts just mentioned, plaintiffs level the same attack advanced by ...