Breslin, J.c.c. (temporarily assigned).
[118 NJSuper Page 355] This matter originally came before the court on an order to show cause
why plaintiff was not entitled to relief sought in his verified complaint in lieu of prerogative writs against defendants Borough of Ridgefield and George Calza. The parties have stipulated that the court now consider and decide the issue presented as counter-motions for summary judgment.
The facts disclose that plaintiff holds a certificate of exemption issued January 1964 declaring that he had joined the Ridgefield Fire Department in June 1956. For the four consecutive years from 1968 to 1971 defendant borough passed resolutions appointing plaintiff as building inspector. At the annual organization meeting of the mayor and council a resolution appointing defendant Calza as building inspector for the year 1972 was adopted.
Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to tenure during good behavior in the office of building inspector as an exempt fireman, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-64. Defendants attack this claim as barred by the provision of N.J.S.A. 40:87-15 that a borough building inspector shall hold office for one year. This controversy arises because N.J.S.A. 40A:14-64, effective as of July 1, 1971, fails to specifically limit its application to offices with terms not fixed by law.
Prior to July 1, 1971 the entire statutory set-up pertinent to the tenure of exempt firemen was found in N.J.S.A. 40:47-60 through 65. Section 62 referred to abolishment of positions. Sections 61 and 65 pertained to dismissal hearing procedure. Section 60 covered any form of governmental employment where the term of office was not fixed by law and prohibited removal for political reasons. Section 63 covered only offices and positions not created by the State Constitution and made no mention of term of office or political reasons for removal. Finally, section 64 was also limited to offices and positions not created by the Constitution, failing again to mention either term of office or political removals, and further required firemen to serve three consecutive years in office before attaining tenure.
Clearly, the above statutory scheme is ambiguous, inconsistent and contradictory. Plaintiff contends that these
difficulties have been resolved by the enactment of 40A:14-60 through 65. Sections 63 and 65 now refer to abolishment of positions. Section 61 provides that all exempt firemen be entitled to the same rights and privileges, and section 62 pertains to inter-municipal employment. The two sections relevant to the case at hand are sections 60 and 64, both of which have identical provisions for hearing procedures. Section 60 covers any form of governmental employment where the term of office is indeterminate and prohibits removal for political reasons. Section 64 is limited to offices not created by the Constitution, requires three consecutive years of service and fails to make any mention of term of office or removal for political reasons.
Plaintiff contends that section 64 is an exception to section 60. As a result, under the operation of the new statutory arrangement exempt firemen have tenure during good behavior in certain offices even where the term of office is fixed by law. This position is contrary to that taken by the courts when dealing with the predecessors of the present statutes.
The controlling case on the interpretation of the preceding statutory scheme in Greenfield v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs , 126 N.J.L. 171 (Sup. Ct. 1941), in which plaintiff, an exempt fireman, was appointed to a statutory five-year term as a member of the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners. When his term ended plaintiff claimed tenure during good behavior under what later became known as N.J.S.A. 40:47-63. The court concluded that the statute was not intended to give, and did not give, tenure to occupants of offices which are for a period of time definitely fixed by the legislature. There were four reasons set forth by the court that lead to this conclusion. It is the opinion of this court that these reasons are still applicable to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-64.
The first reason was based on the observation that the statute called for a hearing in order ...