Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Electronic Associates Inc. v. Heisinger

Decided: July 2, 1970.

ELECTRONIC ASSOCIATES, INC., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT,
v.
SUSAN J. HEISINGER, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT



Sullivan, Carton and Halpern. The opinion of the court was delivered by Carton, J.A.D.

Carton

In this workmen's compensation case petitioner contended she incurred an occupational disease known as carpal tunnel syndrome. The judge of compensation dismissed her petition on the ground that she failed to give her employer, Electronic Associates, Inc., notice that she had contracted such occupational disease as required by statute. The county judge reversed the Division and remanded the matter to fix the amount of the disability award.

Electronic assails the judgment entered after the award on remand, principally contending that the County Court erred

in holding that the notice requirement was satisfied. The statute provides that unless the employer has actual knowledge the employee has contracted a compensable occupational disease or unless the employee gives the employer written notice within 90 days after he knew or ought to have known of the nature of his disability and its relationship to his employment, the employee shall have no right to recover disability benefits. N.J.S.A. 34:15-33. There is no claim here that Electronic had actual knowledge.

Petitioner began to work for Electronic July 18, 1966 and worked for about a year. Her work required the repeated twisting and turning of her wrists, manually placing individual wires in printed circuit banks and "harness" which were being assembled. She was laid off from July 14 to October 16, 1967. On the following November 1 she quit because of pregnancy. On January 10, 1968 she went to a hospital clinic because of pains in her right wrist. There an operation described as the release of a carpal tunnel was performed. In May-June 1968 when she experienced similar symptoms in her left hand, she went again to the hospital where an operation was performed on her left wrist. On September 12 of that year petitioner consulted counsel, who immediately wrote a letter to Electronic advising that they represented her and were bringing a workmen's compensation suit in her behalf.

It was stipulated that petitioner's disability was work-connected. The employer argues, however, that petitioner is barred from recovery because she knew or ought to have known of the nature of her disability and its relation to her employment when she had the second operation on June 6, 1968. If Electronic's contention is correct, the notice given on September 12 was a few days outside the 90-day period and she is barred from recovery. The basis of Electronic's contention is certain testimony of petitioner given in response to an inquiry from the trial court as to when she came to the decision that her condition came from her employment:

I always thought when I had my first operation [January 10, 1968]. I thought that's when maybe it was from, but I couldn't be sure until I went back for my second, because I didn't lift, I didn't do any heavy work.

The trial judge found that although petitioner may have been aware of her disability, she was unaware of its relation to her employment until she consulted counsel and consequently that the notice was sufficient to comply with the statute.

We conclude that the evidence in the record warranted the trial court's determination that she did not know and could not reasonably be expected to know the relation of her disability to her employment. See Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry , 49 N.J. Super. 187, 211 (App. Div.), certif. den. 27 N.J. 398 (1958). In this connection, we note that nothing in the testimony indicates that petitioner's disability was of such a general occupational character that its prevalence might make the employee apt to realize she had a compensable condition.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are mindful that notice requirements of this kind must be construed and applied in the light of petitioner's particular background, intelligence, experience, and the character of her disability, and "in the full light of the goals of the humane social legislation of which [they are] part" Panchak v. Simmons Co. , 15 N.J. 13, 16 (1954). Nothing in that legislation dictates that, under the circumstances of this case, petitioner should be deprived of the statutory benefits. Particularly is this so because the employer does not dispute that petitioner's disability is work-connected nor attribute any prejudice to the failure to receive the notice at an earlier date.

The employer is correct, however, in its additional contention that petitioner is not entitled to the temporary disability ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.