Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Farley v. 400.97

Decided: November 17, 1969.


For affirmance -- Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Francis, Proctor, Hall, Schettino and Haneman. For reversal -- None. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Weintraub, C.J.


[55 NJ Page 33] This action involves competing claims of the County of Hudson and of the United States to the sum of $168,400.97. The County contends the moneys were forfeited to it by their use in the gambling activities of Joseph V. Moriarty. The United States claims it holds a lien upon the moneys for taxes assessed against Moriarty.

The County brought this proceeding to establish its title to the fund. The United States removed the matter to the United States District Court which, however, remanded it to the State court. State v. Moriarity, 268 F. Supp. 546 (N.J.D.C. 1967). The cause was then tried, resulting in a judgment for the County. 97 N.J. Super. 458 (Law. Div. 1967). The Appellate Division affirmed, 102 N.J. Super. 579 (App. Div. 1968), and we granted the petition of the United States for certification, 53 N.J. 273 (1969).

For many years Moriarty was a notorious "kingpin" in the "numbers racket" in and around Jersey City. His criminal record in that field dates from the 1930s. On March 2, 1962 he was sentenced to State Prison on a guilty plea to possession of lottery slips, and he remained in the State's custody until March 12, 1964, when he was delivered to federal authorities who held him until January 6, 1965.

While Moriarty was thus in custody, a chance event occurred which ultimately led to this litigation. On July 3, 1962 some workmen, renovating private garages at 127-131 Oxford Avenue, Jersey City, discovered $2,438,110 in currency and sundry papers in an old automobile. Those papers revealed Moriarty's operation of a gambling enterprise over an extended period.*fn1

This discovery precipitated activity at federal and local levels. On July 5 the District Director of Internal Revenue made a jeopardy assessment against Moriarty for income taxes and interest in the sum of $3,422,792.66. It is agreed that the federal lien became effective on that date. On the following day the local police discovered and seized the moneys involved in the action before us, under the following circumstances.

Since the papers found on July 3 related to a period which had ended sometime before the date of Moriarty's imprisonment, the police began a search for records of Moriarty's intervening operations and related cash. Moriarty having

selected a private garage for the cache discovered on July 3, the police thought it likely that he used still another garage to house the records and the product of that further gambling activity. This assumption proved correct, for, peering into a private garage at 56 Oxford Avenue, stipulated by the parties to be "in close proximity to the garage in which the $2,438,110 had been found on July 3, 1962," the officers saw the familiar paraphernalia of a lottery operation. Later on the same day, armed with a search warrant obtained upon that showing, they entered the garage and seized the moneys here involved, together with sundry papers revealing gambling operations from December 14, 1961 to February 19, 1962, the day before Moriarty was taken into custody. This discovery led to a further indictment of Moriarty, and later he pled guilty to possession of lottery slips for the period of December 14, 1961 to July 6, 1962, the date when the police seized the moneys here involved.

There is no dispute that the moneys were used in the gambling operation and were contraband on that account. Rather, the question is whether the tax lien attached to the moneys before title passed to the County. The United States contends the forfeiture could have occurred only when the moneys were seized by the police on July 6, which was one day after the date of the tax lien, while the County contends the forfeiture occurred at the moment the moneys were used for gambling, so that on the day of the tax assessment Moriarty had no property interest in the moneys to which the tax lien could attach. Upon this appeal the United States also urges, we think for the first time, that the Fourth Amendment bars the County's claim because the moneys were obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. We will treat the two issues in that order.


The Federal statute provides for "a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property,

whether real or personal, belonging" to the delinquent taxpayer, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6321. Whether the taxpayer has "property" or "rights to property" to which the tax lien may attach is controlled by State law. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512, 80 S. Ct. 1277, 4 L. Ed. 2 d 1365, 1368 (1960). The pivotal question, then, is whether, under our State law, the moneys were the property of Moriarty on the effective date of the tax lien or had already been forfeited to the County upon their use in his gambling operation.

There were two types of forfeiture under the English practice at the time of the American Revolution. They are described by Mr. Justice Story in The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 1, 14, 6 L. Ed. 531, 535 (1827), in these words:

"* * * It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the party forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a consequence, of the judgment or conviction. It is plain from this statement that no right to the goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown by the mere commission of the offense; but the right attached only by the conviction of the offender. The necessary result was, that in every case where the crown sought to recover such goods and chattels, it was indispensable to establish its right by producing the record of the judgment of conviction. In the contemplation of the common law, the offender's right was not divested until the conviction. But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the exchequer. The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offense be malum prohibitum, or malum in se. The same principle applies to proceedings in rem, on seizures in the admiralty."

In Palmyra, the question was whether the statutory forfeiture of the offending article depended upon a conviction of the offending person. The Court held that it did not. The Court had no occasion to say when the forfeiture did occur, but other authorities laid down some precise rules.

With respect to the so-called "common law" forfeiture, i.e., the forfeiture which depended upon the owner's conviction of treason or felony, the common law held that "The

forfeiture of lands has relation to the time of the fact committed, so as to avoid all subsequent sales and encumbrances; but the forfeiture of goods and chattels has no relation backwards; so that those only which a man has at the time of the conviction shall be forfeited." IV Blackstone, Commentaries, *388. This view of the common law forfeiture was accepted in United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 17, 10 S. Ct. 244, 247, 33 L. Ed. 555, 560 (1890). The doctrine of forfeiture upon conviction of treason or felony of course never obtained in our State, N.J.S.A. 2A:152-2, or elsewhere in this country, 36 Am. Jur. 2 d, Forfeiture and Penalties § 15, p. 622. We nonetheless refer to it because, although the forfeiture resulted from the commission of an offense rather than the misuse of the property forfeited, still the common law found that title to real property was forfeited as of the time of the criminal act rather than as of the date of conviction. The rule was otherwise as to personal property because of the practical considerations stated by Blackstone, at the reference just given:

"Therefore a traitor or felon may bona fide sell any of his chattels real or personal, for the sustenance of himself and family between the fact and conviction; for personal property is of so fluctuating a nature, that it passes through many hands in a short time; and no buyer could be safe, if he were liable to return the goods which he had fairly bought, provided any of the prior vendors have committed a treason or felony."

But as to the so-called "statutory" forfeiture, i.e., the forfeiture of the very property used in violation of the law, the rule has been constant, whether the offending property be real or personal, that title may be forfeited as of the moment of the offending use. Unlike the "common law" forfeiture which embraced all of the individual's property and resulted from the individual's personal offense, the "statutory" forfeiture is limited to the offending property itself, "which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of

inanimate and insentient." Various Items of Personal Property, etc. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581, 51 S. Ct. 282, 75 L. Ed. 558, 561 (1931).*fn2

Thus in United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 8 Cranch (12 U.S.) 398, 3 L. Ed. 602 (1814), which involved a statute forbidding the importation of certain articles, it was held that the statutory forfeiture occurred at once and therefore the title of the government was not cut off by a sale of the commodity to an innocent buyer. So in United States v. One Hundred Barrels Distilled Spirits, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 44, 20 L. Ed. 815 (1872), in which the forfeiture ensued because liquor was moved with intent to defraud the United States of taxes, it was held that title vested immediately in the United States when the liquor was so moved and that the subsequent payment of the tax did not vacate the forfeiture, even though the property had been sold to an innocent buyer. The Court stated the rule in these words (81 U.S., at 56-57, 20 L. Ed., at 816-817):

"Where the forfeiture is made absolute by statute the decree of condemnation when entered relates back to the time of the commission of the wrongful acts, and takes date from the wrongful acts and not from the date of the sentence or decree. * * * Many such adjudged cases are to be found in the reported decisions of this court, and it must be admitted that they establish the rule beyond all doubt, that the forfeiture becomes absolute at the commission of the prohibited acts, and that the title from that moment vests in the United States in all cases where the statute in terms denounces the forfeiture of the property as a penalty for a violation of law, without giving any alternative remedy, or prescribing any substitute for the forfeiture, or allowing any exceptions to its enforcement, or employing in the ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.