this action. It is unquestionable, however, that the Welfare Board at the County level is the conduit for the disbursement of federal funds, and certainly does not enjoy a merely passive existence in this area.
In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962) Mr. Justice Brennan propounded this question: "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions?" Although Baker, supra, was a reapportionment controversy, and perhaps distinguishable on that basis from the present case, the analogy is present and the answer to Justice Brennan's question is yes, if for no other reason than the Board has an interest in the funds it will be required to expend, and in the communities which will be the recipients of those funds. What petitioner could more "sharply present" the issues, e.g., the deprivation of the equal protection of the laws to a certain group of people by the AFDC freeze, for the court's "illumination" and determination than the Board? Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long recognized certain litigants as having "standing only as representatives of the public interest." See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14, 62 S. Ct. 875, 882, 86 L. Ed. 1229 (1942). See also Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-460, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958). The Board is seeking relief for the benefit of welfare recipients and, as such, has standing.
That petitioners Woods and Greenleaf have standing is beyond question. Each is the mother of four children and each is presently receiving aid from the Board under the AFDC program. Each certainly has a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. Presumably, their interests being reasonably direct and definite, they come within the purview of Baker v. Carr where the court's definition of standing stressed the "personal" and "concretely adverse" interests of the plaintiffs in the outcome of the controversy.
To find that Philip Lazaro, Director of the Board, suing as a taxpayer, has standing is more difficult. The complaint does not state whether Mr. Lazaro acts as a federal or as a state taxpayer; his standing in each capacity will be examined.
While Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 947 (1968) has liberalized the standing requirement for federal taxpayers,
the court still considers it necessary, in ruling on standing, to look to the substantive issues "to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated."
Suing as a federal taxpayer Lazaro cannot satisfy the nexus requirement without alleging an unconstitutional congressional expenditure. Instead, he attacks a congressional enactment that, when effective, would restrict and delimit federal expenditures. Since he can claim no injury to his pocketbook by the statute, and there is no judicially cognizable right of a federal taxpayer to force Congress to add to his tax burden and undertake additional expenditures, Lazaro has no standing as a federal taxpayer.
While it is conceivable that the AFDC freeze will result in an increase in the state taxes Mr. Lazaro must pay, it is perfectly obvious that pecuniary loss is not the real interest of Mr. Lazaro in this litigation. The grounds on which he attacks the statute do not relate to his status as a taxpayer, but it is as a taxpayer that he seeks standing. As a state taxpayer he does not have that "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [sufficient] to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
The other petitioners are far more germane to the controversy; Lazaro, suing as a state taxpayer, does not have standing.
On the issue of prematurity, the court cannot overlook the action of Congress in delaying the effect of the freeze by Pub.L. 90-364. See 1968 U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News, pp. 2361-2362, 2395-2396, 2408-2409. Both the Report of the Senate Committee (pp. 2361-2362) and the explanatory statement by Senator Smathers (ranking majority member of the Senate Committee on Finance) made on March 25, 1968 (pp. 2408-2409; 114 Cong.Rec. § 3272),
pointed out that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare had in 1967, prior to the enactment of Pub.L. 90-248, presented estimates that the freeze "would not reduce Federal participation in assistance payments because of the effect of the work incentive provisions of the amendments, in reducing the number of people on the rolls," and that "[the] Department has subsequently revised these estimates, and the President's budget states that assistance payments to about 475,000 AFDC recipients will not receive Federal matching funds totaling $125 million in fiscal year 1969. It is unlikely that the conference committee would have acted as it did if the members had been aware of the effects now predicted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare," 1968 U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News, p. 2361. This language also appears at pp. 2361-62 of the above-cited volume of the U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News:
"At the same time, there have been other developments which will have a major impact on the AFDC limitations as it applies to some States. Court decisions in a number of States, including Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, have forced those States to eliminate eligibility requirements based on length of residence. A court decision in Alabama, and litigation in process in Louisiana, would not permit those States to declare families ineligible for assistance because of the presence of a man in the house who is not married to the mother of the family.