APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.
Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Since 1824 a provision of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, now Art. V, § I, para. IV, has provided that its Governor shall be selected (1) by a majority of votes cast in a general election, and (2) if no candidate receives a majority of votes at such election, then a majority of the members of the Georgia General Assembly shall elect the Governor "from the two persons having the highest number of votes . . . ."*fn1 At the State's general election, held Tuesday, November 8, 1966, no single candidate received a majority of the votes cast. A Georgia three-judge federal district court has in this case enjoined the State Assembly from electing one of the two highest candidates as Governor on the ground that this method of election, required by Article V of the Georgia Constitution, would deny Georgia voters equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
uphold the constitutionality of Article V of the State Constitution, for so long as this provision is applied as it is written, we perceive no conflict with the Equal Protection Clause. We reverse the District Court's judgment.
The District Court erroneously relied on Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, to strike down Article V of the State's Constitution. The Gray case held that it had been demonstrated that Georgia voters were denied equal protection of the laws by the operation of a county-unit system under which state officials were elected by a majority of counties voting as units instead of by a majority of individual voters. The result was that the number of votes of persons living in large counties was given no more weight in electing state officers than was given to a far fewer number of votes of persons residing in small counties. This discrimination against large county voters was held to deny them the equal protection of the laws. That case, as was emphasized, had to do with the equal right of "all who participate in the election," 372 U.S., at 379, to vote and have their votes counted without impairment or dilution. But as the Court said, 372 U.S., at 378, the case was "only a voting case." Not a word in the Court's opinion indicated that it was intended to compel a State to elect its governors or any other state officers or agents through elections of the people rather than through selections by appointment or elections by the State Assembly. It is wrongly cited as having either expressly or impliedly decided that a State cannot, if it wishes, permit its legislative body to elect its Governor.
The language of Article V of the State Constitution struck down by the District Court has been a part of Georgia's State Constitution since 1824 and was readopted by the people in 1945. It set up two ways to
select the Governor. The first, and preferred one, was election by a majority of the people; the second, and alternative one, was election by the State Assembly if any one candidate failed to receive a majority of the popular vote. Under the second method, in the legislative election the votes of the people were not to be disregarded but the State Assembly was to consider them as, in effect, nominating votes and to limit itself to choosing between the two persons on whom the people had bestowed the highest number of votes. There is no provision of the United States Constitution or any of its amendments which either expressly or impliedly dictates the method a State must use to select its Governor. A method which would be valid if initially employed is equally valid when employed as an alternative. It would be surprising to conclude that, after a State has already held two primaries and one general election to try to elect by a majority, the United States Constitution compels it to continue to hold elections in a futile effort to obtain a majority for some particular candidate. Statewide elections cost time and money and it is not strange that Georgia's people decided to avoid repeated elections. The method they chose for this purpose was not unique, but was well known and frequently utilized before and since the Revolutionary War. Georgia Governors were selected by the State Legislature, not the people, until 1824. At that time a new constitution provided for popular election, but with the provision that upon the failure of any one candidate to receive a majority, the General Assembly should elect.
Two States, Mississippi and Vermont,*fn2 that provide for majority voting also provide for state legislative election of their governors in case of no majority in the general election. Thirty-eight States of the Union which today provide for election of their governors by a plurality also
provide that in case of a tie vote the State Legislatures shall elect.*fn3
It thus turns out that Georgia, clearly acting within its rights as a State, has decided that, any one candidate failing to obtain a majority in a general election, its General Assembly will elect its Governor. Its clear choice has remained in its constitution for 142 years. The District Court below treated Article V of the Georgia Constitution as the valid law of the State except as it thought itself compelled to strike it down because of Gray v. Sanders, supra. The Gray case, however, did no more than to require the State to eliminate the county-unit machinery from its election system. The State did this in an election that resulted in the election of no candidate. Its duty now, under Article V of its Constitution, is to proceed to have the General Assembly elect its Governor from the two highest candidates in the election, unless, as some of the parties contend, the entire legislative body is incapable of performing its responsibility of electing a Governor because it is malapportioned. But this is not correct. In Toombs v. Fortson, 384 U.S. 210, affirming 241 F.Supp. 65, we held that with certain exceptions, not here material, the Georgia Assembly could continue to function until May 1, 1968. Consequently the Georgia Assembly is not disqualified to elect a Governor as required by Article V of the State's Constitution. Neither is it disqualified by the fact that its Democratic members had obligated themselves to
support the Democratic nominee in the general election on November 8, 1966. That election is over, and with it terminated any promises by the Democratic legislators to support the Democratic nominee.
Article V of Georgia's Constitution provides a method for selecting the Governor which is as old as the Nation itself. Georgia does not violate the Equal Protection Clause by following this article as it was written.
262 F.Supp. 93, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE FORTAS concur, dissenting.
This is an appeal from a decision of a three-judge district court declaring unconstitutional and enjoining the enforcement of Article V, Section I, Paragraph IV, of the Georgia Constitution which authorizes the election of the Governor of Georgia by the General Assembly when no candidate has received a majority of the total votes cast in the general election.*fn1
We are told that in the November 8, 1966, general election for Governor, there were ...